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Chapter 1 
 
General Introduction 
 
This thesis is about making choices. Like the famous but slightly patronizing saying: 
“Life is about making choices.” And it’s true! Think about your daily routine for a 
minute: Getting up in the morning (At what time?), deciding from your wardrobe what 
to wear (Blue sweater or red blouse?), deciding whether or not to skip breakfast 
(Because you are late!) etc. This list can go on and on. Moreover, when you turn the 
microscope up and look more carefully, you see that within these decisions there are 
dozens of ‘smaller’ choices: For instance, what arm to use for hitting the alarm clock, 
what leg to put into your trousers first, and, at an even more detailed level, choices 
about the precise timing and force of the movements involved. You will probably have 
no problem with dubbing the former list as part of decision making and something you 
can plan (in advance). But what about the latter list? This list is about the choices for 
individual actions to take, and belongs to what has been called action selection. Despite 
the differences between the lists, the problem of selecting appropriate activities seems 
central to both. A number of interesting questions arise: What is the relation between 
action planning / action control and action selection? What role do earlier actions and 
experiences play in the formation of subsequent choices? What role do choices of future 
goals play in the selection of activities that prepare for these goals? Finally, and more 
generally, how do you come to any of the choices you make? 
To concur with thesis tradition, I would like to proceed with an elucidating 
example. What hand would you recruit in order to (unimanually) pick up a glass of 
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water that is in front of you on the table? Without any further specifics on the 
circumstances, your most likely response would be with your preferred hand. Next, 
suppose the glass is positioned to the left end of the table, while you are sitting at the 
table’s center. Irrespective of handedness, you would probably grasp it with your left 
hand. When the glass’ lateral position is somewhat less extreme, your choice of hand 
will also be not so apparent. It is not so hard to imagine that somewhere in between the 
two lateral extremes (left and right), your hand choice will probably switch from left to 
right or vice versa. Stretching the example one final step: Suppose the glass is 
positioned to your extreme left side again, but instead of trying to quench your own 
thirst, you are picking up that glass of water in order to give it to someone else. It 
happens to be that this thirsty person is sitting on the other side of the table and to your 
right, just within reach. So, in order to hand her/him the glass you have to reach across 
the table with your right hand. There are two obvious possibilities: You can grasp the 
glass directly (and quite awkwardly) with your right hand. Or, the other possibility, you 
pick up the glass with your left hand and then switch it to the right hand, somewhere in 
the midst of transporting it to the right. 
The example presented above reveals a number of important issues that are quite 
general for goal-directed behavior. Arguably, the most striking point is the variety of 
coexisting factors that may influence your choice of what to do. This might seem a bit 
odd when you are, either introspectively or scientifically, used to assign to each decision 
(effect) a singleton or most prominent reason (cause). First of all, you seem to ‘evaluate’ 
quite carefully, though automatically and unconsciously, the position of the glass 
relative to your body. But even in such a simple case as picking up a glass of water, 
when you look at the situation more closely, there is more to making choices than meets 
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the eye. Obviously, your handedness also plays a major role. This means that, a priori, 
you prefer to do things with a specific side of your body. Moreover, the intention 
accompanying (or as some might say, preceding) the grasping action, that is, either 
wanting to drink from the glass yourself or handing it over to someone else, certainly 
will influence your choice of hand as well. What we need therefore, is a view on the 
planning and control of action that enables us to understand how multiple sources of 
information (which can be of quite a different nature and timescale) come together at 
the same time to select the proper activities to perform. 
 
This chapter proceeds with a selective overview of research on planning and 
control of voluntary action, goal-directed behavior, and their development, starting with 
a general characterization of planning. In correspondence with the focus of the 
empirical part of the thesis, viz. young children’s planning (only Chapter 4 presents 
experiments with adults), emphasis of this chapter will be on developmental aspects. 
The overview presented here has no intention of being a comprehensive description of 
the research to date. It merely serves to highlight a number of relevant approaches, in 
order to situate and validate the studies presented in this thesis. Moreover, the thesis 
aims to contribute to some of the issues that are currently dominating the debate in this 
field. The chapter concludes with an overview of the remainder of the thesis. 
 
What is Planning? 
 
Both in its scientific and every-day use, the words ‘plan’ or ‘planning’ can have 
several different meanings and can refer to a number of different things. Two types of 
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obvious classifications can easily be given (see e.g., De Lisi, 1987): Plan as a 
representational entity versus plan as a functional-behavioral entity. The former 
classification, the representational aspect of a plan, highlights the function of conveying 
thoughts and ideas to others, to decide about them, and/or to consolidate and archive 
them. Examples are maps, blueprints, scripts and scenarios. They generally serve an 
inter-personal, communicative goal. The latter classification, the functional-behavioral 
aspect of a plan, highlights the process of preparing, organizing, and guiding (goal-
directed) behavior of oneself and/or others. As such, planning is tightly linked to the 
way we interact with the physical and social environment; the world of objects and the 
world of others, respectively. In this classification, a plan is seen as part of procedural 
knowledge, referring to perceptuomotor operations, or simply ‘knowing how’ 
(Anderson, 1980; Case, 1984; Cox & Smitsman, 2006a; De Lisi, 1987; Squire, 1987; 
Van Leeuwen, Smitsman & Van Leeuwen, 1994), although not exclusively (see De 
Lisi, 1987). 
In order to sketch the general idea of what planning entails, I will list a number of 
classifications of the terms ‘plan’ or ‘planning’ which can be found in the literature: 
 
[…] plan [as] any hierarchical process in the organism that can control the 
order in which a sequence of operations is to be performed. 
(Miller, Galanter & Pribram, 1960) 
 
Two demands are placed on the system to permit successful planning. First 
is the architectural feature to being able to spin forth a goal structure 
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without acting upon it. Second, working memory has to be able to maintain 
the goal structure for operation. 
(Anderson, 1983) 
 
Planning is deliberate organization of a sequence of actions oriented 
towards achieving a goal. 
(Rogoff, Gauvain & Gardner, 1987) 
 
Planning [as] future-oriented problem solving. 
(Haith, 1994) 
 
One quality of planning, which can be recognized in at least three of these 
classifications, is that it has to do with attaining a goal or some intended state of affairs. 
Because of this focus on achieving something, of serving a specific purpose, planning 
can be said to be goal directed. Another meaning that follows explicitly or implicitly 
from all four classifications is the aspect of anticipation and prospection, or ‘yet to 
happen’. In other words, planning is for all intents and purposes, that is, essentially 
always, oriented at future states. Finally, planning has the connotation of having to do 
with ordering things, with figuring things out (be it of a procedural or representational 
nature). It is about sequencing or hierarchically ordering steps to take, but also about 
deciding what each of these steps must entail (i.e., what actions or inferences). In other 
words, planning is about what to do and what to do next. In conclusion, by taking these 
three features together, planning can generally be characterized as an activity (not 
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necessarily conscious or deliberate) that sequences and decides about actions that are 
yet to be performed in order to bring about something that is not yet a state of the world. 
 
In the following two sections some concepts and themes of the research on the 
development of goal-directed behavior and prospective control of behavior will be 
discussed, respectively. It will become clear that there are two somewhat opposing 
views on the development of action planning, each with their own line of research. One 
of them embraces a structural stance with respect to development, emphasizing a 
number of basic qualities that underlie planning. The other, taking a process stance, 
sees planning as naturally evolving form early processes of action and perception. 
 
Goal-Directed Behavior 
 
The first real appearance of goal-directed behavior in infants is generally supposed 
to show up in Stage IV of Piaget’s theory of sensorimotor development (Piaget, 1952, 
1954; any textbook on cognitive development, e.g., Björkland, 2005; Flavell, Miller & 
Miller, 2002; Siegler, 1998; see also Willatts, 1999; however, see Rochat, 2001). At this 
stage –the age of eight to 12 months–, children already possess a fair level of object 
knowledge, which shapes their bodily interactions with the physical world (e.g., Rochat, 
1989). In turn, children’s conceptual knowledge of objects and their interactions is also 
shaped by their increasing level of motor skills and dexterity. This enables them to 
engage in more complexly structured activities with these objects, such as, for example, 
tool use (e.g., McCarty, Clifton & Collard, 1999, 2001; Lockman, 2000; Smitsman, 
2001; Smitsman & Bongers, 2003; Steenbergen, Van der Kamp, Smitsman & Carson, 
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1997; Van Leeuwen, Smitsman & Van Leeuwen, 1994). In addition, several basic 
qualities clearly reveal the prevalence of goal-directedness and future-orientation in the 
behavior of Stage-IV infants. For example, children will deliberately search for hidden 
objects in order to retrieve them, even when the object is totally blocked from vision 
(e.g., Harris, 1983). Moreover, they are capable of visually pursuing objects and 
anticipating their movement in order to grasp or catch them (e.g., Rosander & Von 
Hofsten, 2002; Von Hofsten & Rosander, 1996, 1997). 
In a series of studies, Willatts (1984, 1985, 1989, 1990, 1997, 1999) investigated 
the development of goal-directed behavior (or means-end behavior) in infants. In one of 
the studies (Willatts, 1999), eight-months-old infants were able to persist in pulling a 
cloth during a period long enough, such as to retrieve a toy that was placed on the cloth. 
Younger infants (i.e., seven-month-olds) only managed to succeed when the cloth was 
considerably shorter and required less pulling time. At some point during the act of 
pulling the longer cloth, the toy lost its attractiveness in favor of the cloth itself as item 
for playing with. The older infants, on the contrary, were capable of sustaining goal 
fixation until the toy was grasped. In another study (Willatts, 1989), infants as young as 
nine months were able to perform several steps in succession (i.e., moving a barrier, 
pulling the cloth, and pulling a cord) in order to retrieve the toy. Together these results 
demonstrate that infants before the end of the first year of life are capable of adaptively 
organizing their behavior in order to achieve a goal (Willatts, 1989). 
Clearly, several of the preliminaries for planning are already ‘present’ in Stage-IV 
infants. So what do we know about their planning abilities? One of the very few 
detailed models on the development of action planning in children at this stage and 
onwards, is that by McCarty et al. (1999; see also 2001). This model describes the 
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upcoming of “well-formed” planning behavior or strategies for the use of a spoon (i.e., 
grasping and feeding oneself) in the age of 9, 14, and 19 months. In accordance with De 
Lisi’s classification of planning types (De Lisi, 1987), these authors propose four 
successive stages in the development of action planning: a feedback-based stage, a 
partially planned stage, a fully planned stage and a heuristic or habitual stage. These 
stages were identified in the age differences that were found in the organization of 
activities involved in the task: Unimanually grasping a spoon for varying orientations of 
the handle, and subsequently transporting it to and emptying it in the mouth. The 19-
months-old children were (fully) planning their grasping behavior in anticipation of the 
end state of the spoon in the mouth, completely mirroring the handle orientation. On the 
contrary, the nine-month-olds were occupied by performing the first reach and did not 
plan their actions in a goal-directed way. This resulted in a high number of awkward 
grasps (i.e., bowl-end instead of handle-end, or palm up instead of palm down), and 
movements with the handle ending up in the mouth. Fourteen-month-olds were at an 
intermediate level of performance: When they initially performed an inappropriate 
grasp, they made a considerable number of corrections ‘in flight’, that is, rotations of 
the spoon or switches of the spoon between the hands during its transportation to the 
mouth. 
Finally, children at this stage will make the famous A-not-B error (Piaget, 1954), 
demonstrating in a striking way that their interaction with the physical world is not yet 
fully developed. The A-not-B error involves infants erroneous-reaching behavior to a 
location (labeled as A) in search of an object, despite having witnessed the object being 
hidden at another location (labeled as B). A key aspect to the effect is that it only occurs 
after the child has successfully retrieved the object at location A, a number of times 
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before. Piaget’s initial explanation of this typical and peculiar (though very reliable) 
error was by suggesting that searching behavior of infants is guided solely by reinstating 
a sequence of earlier sensorimotor experiences. The object is not directly relevant to the 
infant; it does not yet exist as an (action-independent) entity. As a derivative of this, 
more recent explanations dub the error to be a lack or incompleteness of object 
permanence. Adopting the structural stance with respect to cognitive development, 
research has demonstrated relations between the error and immaturities of, for example, 
memory and inhibition (e.g., Diamond, 1991a, 1991b; Diamond, Cruttenden & 
Neiderman, 1994), and representational abilities (e.g., Marcovitch & Zelazo, 1999; 
Munakata, 1998; Munakata, McClelland, Johnson & Siegler, 1997). 
Summarizing, from these results it seems that we are forced to the conclusion that 
Stage-IV infants are not yet capable of planning their actions in accordance with the 
requirements given by a goal. This capacity must reveal itself somewhere between the 
ages of 14 months and 19 months. And, although children at this age are clearly goal 
directed, it seems that they are still to a large extent at the mercy of trial-and-error 
discovery of success or failure in a task. Typical for this view are Björkland’s words 
(2005): “In general, planning is a late developing ability […]”. 
 
Prospective Control of Behavior 
 
The ecological approach to infants’ perceptuomotor development provides a 
compelling contradictory view to the statements given in the previous section (i.e., 
Piaget’s Stage IV indicates the onset of goal-directed behavior, and the onset of 
planning is probably at a later age). This view suggests that some rudimentary form of 
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goal-directed and/or future-oriented behavior, called prospective control or prospection, 
is already present at a significantly earlier age. The empirical evidence for this comes 
from various faculties of infants’ (still limited) behavioral repertoire. A considerable 
number of researchers have hinted at prospective control of action in newborn babies’ 
gaze control (e.g., Rosander & Von Hofsten, 2002; Von Hofsten & Rosander, 1996, 
1997), nutritive sucking (Craig & Lee, 1999; Craig, Grealy & Lee, 2000), and 
prehension (e.g., Thelen, Corbetta, Kamm, Spencer, Schneider & Zernicke, 1993; Von 
Hofsten, 1984), but also for example in breathing and vocalizing (for an overview see 
Adolph & Joh, in press; Bertenthal & Clifton, 1998; Gibson & Pick, 2000; Goldfield, 
1995; Lee, 2006; Smitsman, 2001; Von Hofsten, 1993). 
This research demonstrates that prospective control seems to be fundamental to 
neonates’ behavior, enabling them to anticipate future events and prepare actions to 
control and influence these events. It seems to arise from the way sensory and motor 
systems are functionally interconnected. Moreover, it is argued that prospection is 
morphologically prestructured in the body and its neural architecture at birth (Von 
Hofsten, 2003). Over time this process becomes more advanced and pronounced, when 
more and more sensory, motor and cognitive components are starting to cooperate in 
order to regulate the infant’s relation with her environment. Following this line of 
reasoning, prospective control might be seen as an early or primitive form of action 
planning, developing over time to a full-grown level of planning. In light of the present 
thesis, this planning-from-prospection view raises an interesting point: Continuity in the 
development of planning. More specifically, it suggests that action planning develops 
naturally and gradually from different underlying processes of perception, action, as 
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well as (preliminary) cognitive processes (see also Thelen, Schöner, Scheier & Smith, 
2001). 
This view has given us a great deal of insight into how action-perception processes 
combine with cognitive processes such as intentionality, memory, and inhibition, both 
on a within-task timescale and on a developmental timescale. While much of traditional 
research on action planning focuses on determining the age at which certain basic 
qualities are present in infants (structural perspective; see also Chapter 6), this view, in 
contrast, stresses their cooperation and co-development (process perspective). I will 
review two examples that exemplify this. As a first example, consider the recent and 
successful approach to the A-not-B task inspired by this process perspective (e.g., 
Smith, Thelen, Titzer & McLin, 1999; Thelen et al., 2001; Thelen & Smith, 1994). In 
this approach infants’ perseverative reaching emerges as a result of the task dynamics 
and various internal and external constraints (‘inputs’). Embracing dynamic field theory, 
Thelen et al. supposed reaching to be governed by a motor planning field, the activation 
level of which continuously and gradually changes under the influence of all these 
inputs in real time (see also Erlhagen & Schöner, 2002). The ideas underlying this 
approach are a major source of inspiration to the work presented in this thesis. See 
Chapters 4 and 5 for a more extensive discussion (and extension) of the dynamic model 
used to simulate children’s reaching behavior in the A-not-B task. 
The second example is a study by Claxton, Keen, and McCarty (2003), who 
presented 10-months-old children with a two-phase task, in which the action in the first 
phase is preparative for the second phase. The researchers argued that, in order for this 
prospective control of action to meet the criteria of planning, it is essential that it is 
(also) guided by the intention of a future goal. In the experiment children had to grasp a 
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ball and then perform one of two possible subsequent actions with that ball: Either 
throwing it away or fitting it into a narrow tube. Results showed that the kinematics of 
children’s grasping movements in the first phase were affected by the nature of the 
required second activity (i.e., throwing or fitting). Because immediate perceptual 
information for grasping is the same in both situations, the infants must have had some 
sort of goal-state intention preceding or during the grasping movement. Consequently, 
the researchers concluded that 10-month-olds demonstrated at least the beginnings of 
planning behavior. 
Considered as a method to the study of action planning, the type of task used by 
Claxton et al. (2004), that is, two-(or multi-)step tasks, provide an interesting and rich 
instrument for studying the interplay of a diverse set of influences during subsequent 
phases of a goal-directed task (see e.g., Cox & Smitsman, 2006a, 2006b; Johnson-Frey, 
McCarty & Clifton, 2004; Willatts, 2004; see also Marteniuk, MacKenzie, Jeannnerod, 
Athenes & Dugas, 1987; Rosenbaum, 1987). In general, the activities in earlier phases 
of a multi-step task prepare for the activities in later phases. One reason why this is 
interesting is because such tasks enable us to study processes on different timescales. 
For instance, in Claxton et al.’s experiment, infants’ grasping was clearly influenced by 
extrinsic and intrinsic properties of the ball. That is, they reached to the correct location 
in space and the size of their hand expenditure matches that of the ball. The information 
necessary to do this was available to the senses in real-time. The key finding however, 
was that the final goal also had an effect on the preparative activities of grasping, 
although this goal was achieved only in the last phase of the task. With respect to this 
influence, the intended goal clearly stretched over a longer timescale than the real-time 
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sensory information. Of course, in any realistic case a goal needs to have such an 
influence on behavior to assure successful task performance. 
From a developmental perspective it is a fundamental question how the 
constraining influences of several different sources of information (seemingly forwards 
and backwards in time) come together in young children’s action planning. Studying 
this question in combination with thorough task analyses might open new ways of 
thinking about how intentions, goals, and preferences combine with on-line information 
in real time, in the pursuit of a goal (the essence of guiding goal-directed behavior). 
 
Embedded Agents 
 
This section will bridge the general overview of issues in the development of 
planning presented in the latter two sections, with the discussion of planning and control 
in the context of voluntary action of the following sections. I will explicate the fact that 
any realistic agent (i.e., human or robot) is neither a mechanistic stimulus-response 
apparatus (see e.g., Withagen & Michaels, 2006), nor is it solving problems in the 
comfort of its own ‘mental’ niche (see Chapter 6). On the contrary, it is acting in a real-
world environment with which it is intrinsically connected by perceptual systems 
(Gibson, 1966, 1979) and action systems (Reed, 1982, 1996). In other words, the agent 
is embedded (or situated) as well as embodied (i.e., the agent’s actions are codetermined 
by the properties of its own body; see e.g., A. Clark, 1997, 1999; Johnson, 1987; Varela 
et al., 1991; Wilson, 2002). Via these perceptual and action systems the agent regulates 
a mutually influencing relationship with its environment. For instance, and most 
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importantly, the agent can engage in goal-directed activities of a physical and social 
nature. 
To better understand goal-directed behavior, we have to take notice of this 
situatedness and embodiedness of an agent. In the context of this thesis, we must 
address the question of what this means for the planning and control of voluntary 
actions. To appreciate the fundamental issues that are raised when studying embedded 
agents, I will proceed by listing the general ‘subtleties’ of the agent-environment system 
(Russell & Norvig, 1995). In general, a real-world environment appears to the agent (to 
some degree) as: 
 Inaccessible, which means that an agent generally has information on only 
part of the world; the part that is in sight and available at one instance in time. 
And even that part of the information is accessed by sensors/senses that are not 
perfect (however, cf. Gibson, 1979; see also Stoffregen & Bardy, 2001); 
 Non-predictable, such that changes in the world are not completely 
determined by the current state of the world and the agent’s actions in it. This 
point is related to the former by noticing that the non-accessible part can make 
the world appear non-deterministic from the perspective of the agent. Non-
predictability makes predictions about what will happen and about the success 
of one’s actions very uncertain and sometimes even (hap)hazardous; 
 Non-episodic (or non-regular), which means that behavior cannot be divided 
into unrelated and disconnected episodes of an agent perceiving and than 
acting. In other words, subsequent behavior depends on (the outcomes of) 
previous behavior. As a result of this, actions do not always have the same 
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effect, but depending on the circumstances the effects of actions can be quite 
different; 
 Dynamic, as opposed to static and fixed, acknowledging that the state of the 
world changes over time and that these changes are not only and exclusively 
caused by the agent’s actions. Therefore, sometimes it is better to act 
immediately, sometimes to wait; 
 Continuous, which signifies that states of the world, as well as the actions of 
an agent, vary on a continuum of possibilities, rather than being drawn from a 
discrete set of configurations. 
These properties raise several interesting issues that have profound consequences 
for our view on action planning and action control. This will be the topic of the 
following sections; here I will suffice with a brief review of a few relevant points. 
First, a consequence of the dynamics and continuity of an agent-environment 
system is that goal-directed action must be governed by a process that itself is also 
dynamic and continuous, in order to be effective. That is, an agent’s actions must be 
continuously updated during the process of action. For this, an on-line calibration is 
necessary to keep the agent attuned to its environment, and to keep the agent directed 
toward its goal. A fundamental question is how this connection with the outside world is 
divided and balanced between the processes of planning and control. 
Second, because the world appears (partly) inaccessible and behaves non-regularly, 
an agent has to keep track of things, both on a short timescale (e.g., recent events and 
actions) as well as on a longer timescale (e.g., goals, meaningful relationships, and 
preferences). To come to an optimum level of efficiency of its behavior, the agent might 
have to make use of long-term functional relationships or structures, such as action-
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effect contingencies (e.g., Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Hommel, 2003), or more complex 
structures like scripts and schemata (e.g., Anderson, 1980; Nelson, 1997; Schank & 
Abelson, 1977). This means that earlier experiences of events in the world and how they 
relate to the agent’s prior actions and cognitions, become integrated in the planning and 
control of future behavior (the essence of cognition). 
Third, another consequence of non-regularity is that, in general, effects cannot be 
reduced to a single cause. Changes in the world that seem to be inflicted by an agent are 
not caused by the agent’s actions in isolation. A more realistic viewpoint would be to 
acknowledge that these changes are codetermined by the system as a whole, that is, 
perceptual systems, action systems, and various external constraining influences. More 
specifically, non-regularity entails that behavior is the resultant of a complex interaction 
between constraints of the agent’s perception and action systems (neuromuscular 
organization, CNS, etc), of the agent’s goal, intention or task-setting, and of relevant 
factors of the environment (Newell, 1986, 1989; see also J. Clark, 1997).i A 
consequence of this is that the long-term functional relationships and functional 
organizations, mentioned earlier, must always be either equipped or completed with on-
line sensorimotor information, in order to be useful and applicable. 
Summarizing, on the one hand, for an agent to act effectively and efficiently in the 
world and to be goal directed, it must ‘remember’ and ‘know’ certain things about its 
own behavior (e.g., actions, goals, and preferences), and about its environment (e.g., 
events and contingencies). On the other hand, for an agent to be adaptive and stay goal 
directed, it has to be attuned to (i.e., continuously in touch with) the sensory information 
that is available from its environment and the effectors that connect it to this 
environment. To come to a fuller account of goal-directed behavior, we have to ask the 
General Introduction 
 25 
following questions: How (much) does an agent have to ‘know’ (about) the world in 
order to regulate the relation with its environment in a successful way (see e.g., Beer, 
2000; A. Clark, 1997, 1999; Gibson & Pick, 2000; Thelen & Smith, 1994; Varela et al., 
1991; Wilson, 2002)? How is this knowledge attained and structured? How are the 
cognitive part and perception-action part of an agent functionally and structurally 
linked, in order to deal with the characteristics and consequences of a real-world 
environment as sketched above? Finally, from a developmental perspective: How do 
children’s growing knowledge about the world (i.e., their cognitive capacities) and their 
increasing perception and action capabilities influence each other’s development? 
 
Below, I will discuss two views that approach these issues in a different way: a 
dissociation view and a dynamic view. The dissociation view is based on the ideomotor 
principle, which will be introduced first. The dynamic view has been inspired by the 
dynamical systems theory. 
 
Ideomotor Principle 
 
From a developmental point of view, an interesting attempt towards answering the 
questions raised above is the ideomotor principle (Harless, 1861; James, 1890; Lotze, 
1852). This concept has recently seen renewed interest in the literature (see e.g., 
Hommel, 2003, 2006; Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Prinz, 1997). The principle comprises a 
two-stage process in the development of action planning. One stage deals with 
establishing long-term links between movements and their associated effects, while the 
other stage deals with initiating goal-directed action by using these links for the 
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recruitment of appropriate effect-related movements. In this section, a rough description 
of the ideomotor principle will be given, as well as some of the empirical evidence that 
give it credibility. It is not within the scope of the present thesis to formally treat all of 
the ins-and-outs of this concept, nor to extensively discuss all of its implications for and 
connections to a wider theory of action planning (see e.g., Hommel, Müsseler, 
Aschersleben & Prinz, 2001). Some of the issues it raises when considered as a central 
concept of sensorimotor development will be discussed in Chapter 6. Here, it will 
suffice to get an idea of how the ideomotor principle conceives of the acquisition of 
goal-related sensorimotor cognitions (i.e., stable long-term information of behavioral 
consequences), and how they come to influence the planning and control of voluntary 
actions. 
In the first stage discerned by the ideomotor principle, newborns (or novices to a 
task) produce only uncoordinated movements that are either reflexive or randomly 
generated. Their movements are not deliberately aimed at a target and are not made to 
attain an intended goal. Nonetheless, all the movements an infant makes will have a 
perceivable and causally-linked consequence in the outside world. As a result of this, 
there will be a temporal overlap of activation patterns in the motor system and cognitive 
system, associated to the movement and the effect, respectively. This temporal overlap 
is sufficient to integrate these two patterns, that is, to establish a link between the 
underlying codes (features) that specify them. In this stage, an increasing number of 
contingencies are ‘learned’ between performed actions and the sensory effects these 
actions bring about. 
In the second stage, conceiving an action goal (i.e., imagining or intending a 
particular effect in the outside world) activates the appropriate action-effect association 
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from long-term memory. This then forms the basis of planning the movements for 
producing the desired effect. Because of the couplings established in the first stage, 
anticipating the codes (features) of the intended effect also activates the associated 
codes that represent the necessary motor patterns. Consequently, this mechanism 
provides a selection of the appropriate effect-related movements. In a nutshell: Action 
planning is launched by the anticipation of action effects. 
Fundamentally, for this two-stage process to be feasible, repeated co-occurrence of 
a movement and its effect (i.e., co-activation of motor and sensory codes) should 
intensify their association as a bi-directional knowledge structure. In other words, it is 
essential that the couplings between movements and effects that are learned in the first 
stage are established both ways. Besides linking the (initially random) movement to the 
resulting (though initially unintended) sensory effect, the opposite link between this 
effect and the movement that caused it must also be established. That this is non-trivial 
will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
Support for the ideomotor principle, at least for the existence of (bi-directional) 
action-effect relations, comes from neurophysiological findings (e.g., mirror neurons; 
Di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992; Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & 
Rizzolatti, 1995) as well as from behavioral data. Both research areas highlight the close 
structural and functional link between sensory-effect codes and motor codes. For 
example, consider the interesting overlap of processes that are involved in imagining 
actions and in planning actions (e.g., Jeannerod, 1994): When asked to imagine a 
movement, people are most likely to remember the ‘feeling’ (i.e., the pattern of 
proprioceptive stimulation) that accompanied that movement.ii This demonstrates that 
sensory codes and motor codes are closely linked. This claim is further backed up by 
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the fact that, in such an imaging task, brain areas responsible for action planning are 
known to be activated. 
Examples of behavioral research come from the well-known stimulus-response 
compatibility effects (e.g., Greenwald, 1970a, 1970b; Hommel & Prinz, 1997; 
Poffenberger, 1912; Simon, 1969; Simon & Rudell, 1967; see also Rosenbaum, 1980). 
The effect of stimulus-response compatibility refers to the finding that responses are 
generally faster (sometimes also easier and more efficient), when they share specific 
features with the corresponding stimulus or cue. For example, a right-hand response is 
faster to a right-side stimulus than to a left-side stimulus, and vice versa. These studies 
demonstrate that action planning is facilitated (i.e., less time consuming) if the codes 
that correspond to the action-evoking stimulus and the associated action show some 
degree of overlap. The codes that are activated by perceiving the stimulus also activate 
(some of) the codes for the to-be-performed response. Summarizing, a number of recent 
studies using variations on this theme are quite convincing in their demonstration (1) 
that adults can easily learn new action-effect associations, (2) that these associations are 
indeed bi-directional, and (3) that they play a role in action selection (for a review of 
these studies, see Hommel, 2005; for an interesting study with four- to seven-year-olds, 
see Eenshuistra, Weidema & Hommel, 2004).iii 
Finally, there is ample evidence that action-effect associations are indeed already 
acquired (and employed!) at a very early stage in life (see e.g., Rochat, 2001; Watson, 
1967). Amongst the most convincing are the studies of conjugate reinforcement in 
infants by Rovee-Collier and coworkers (Rovee & Rovee, 1969; Fagen & Rovee, 1976; 
Fagen, Rovee & Kaplan, 1976). In these studies infants learn (or rather: are conditioned) 
that by kicking they can move a crib mobile that is attached to one of their legs with a 
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ribbon. They pick up this contingency very easily, as observed by a rapid and large 
increase in their rate of kicking compared to baseline kicking. The same procedure has 
also been used for assessing infants’ long-term memory capacities (e.g., Rovee & 
Fagen, 1976). This study showed that after a retention period of 24 hours, when placed 
underneath the same mobile again, infants as young as eight weeks spontaneously 
increase kicking their legs again. 
 
The quintessence of the second stage of the ideomotor principle is that previously 
acquired action-effect associations can be mobilized for the purpose of preparing goal-
directed actions.iv However, as mentioned before, for these associations to be useful in 
guiding voluntary actions, we should conceptualize how such knowledge structures are 
integrated into the actual stream of behavior. In other words: How is an intended or 
imagined goal; or rather: How are the codes of the associated goal-related movements 
connected to the time-varying environmental circumstances in order to control the 
actual movements? 
Both types of information (i.e., long-term action-effect associations and real-time 
sensory flow) should be ‘absorbed’ in the way the agent regulates its relationship with 
the outside world, because no action-effect relation (retrieved from long-term memory) 
will make a perfect ‘fit’ with the state of the world at any particular point in time. 
Neither in its ability to predict the circumstances that are different in every new 
situation that is encountered (no matter how familiar); nor in specifying all the relevant 
codes of a goal-related movement to a degree that is enough to get the job done 
effectively and efficiently. What is needed is a process in which the to-be-performed 
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goal-related movements are complemented with the sensory information about the 
specifics of the task and situation. 
 
Dissociation View 
 
The dissociation approach incorporates the necessary ‘enrichment’ of information 
into the guidance of goal-directed behavior, by assigning distinct functions to action 
planning and action control (see e.g., Elliot, Helsen & Chua, 2001; Glover, 2002, 2004; 
Hommel, 2003, 2006; Jeannerod, 1988; for a remarkable recent developmental study 
that hints to this distinction already early in life, see DeLoache, Uttal & Rosengren, 
2004; Ware, Uttal, Wetter & DeLoache, 2006). In its generic form this dual-process 
view entails two (quasi-)separate channels, one for action planning and one for action 
control. In general, planning precedes control, although in practice the two might show 
a temporal overlap (Glover, 2004). The planning system operates before movement 
initiation and selects an appropriate motor program, while the control system basically 
operates as an error-correction mechanism during movement execution. In the planning 
phase a general and rough sketch of the to-be-performed actions (i.e., a plan) is 
produced, initiated by intentions and goals (i.e., ideomotor processing). This is 
subsequently enhanced and completed in the control phase, which connects the action 
system to the outside world (i.e., sensorimotor processing). The two channels are clearly 
different with respect to their access to information (Hommel, 2003, 2006). More 
specifically, action planning is generally supposed to be an off-line process that is 
disconnected from the outside world and is susceptible to higher cognitive processes 
like memory, language and consciousness. Action control, on the other hand, is an on-
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line process, immersed in the sensorimotor information (e.g., visual and proprioceptive 
feedback) that is necessary to get the job done.v The processes of planning and control 
of action are schematically shown in Figure 1 (adopted from Hommel, 2003, 2006). 
Figure 1. The processes of action planning and action control as conceived of in the 
dissociation view (Hommel, 2003, 2006). For details see text. 
 
This model properly deals with connecting the ideomotor process and sensorimotor 
processes, and encapsulates a number of well-known and agreed-upon facts of action 
planning (see e.g., Hommel et al., 2001). For example, in general, action planning 
seems to precede the actual performance of the action. In this model, the off-line 
channel comes up with a rough and incomplete plan first, which is subsequently 
completed with sensorimotor information and then executed. Moreover, in the context 
of goal-directed action, an action plan (only) needs to entail the most relevant features 
of the to-be-performed goal-related actions (see e.g., Jeannerod, 1984, 1988; Schmidt, 
1975; Turvey, 1977). That this aspect is automatically part of the model is evident from 
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the fact that the action-effect associations, in general, can entail only a certain number 
of the necessary features (i.e., variables) of the goal-related movements. 
Delegating the details of action to lower-level sensorimotor processes has several 
obvious advantages (Hommel, 2006). For instance, it minimizes cognitive load and 
interference with other high-level processes, and it increases flexibility by maximizing 
sensitivity to situational circumstances. Note that the level of detail contained in the 
action plan depends on the amount of motor codes that are (co-)activated by the 
anticipated effect. A very general and rough action plan transfers much of the action 
details to the control phase. This makes behavior very flexible. A more detailed action 
plan (i.e., many pre-activated motor codes) makes behavior very robust and resistant to 
situational changes. However, ideomotor processing in the planning phase might leave 
the action plan underspecified in the sense that not enough motor codes get activated for 
actually executing a movement. 
More seriously however, the planning-control dissociation model is not at all clear 
on how the integration of off-line planning and on-line control of action is materialized 
in the action system. More specifically, intentional information (e.g., on goals) and 
sensory information come from very different modalities, are generally exerting their 
influence on very different timescales, and can be ambiguous or oppositely directed. 
How does action selection come about in the context of such diverse sources of 
information? Although Hommel (2003) acknowledges the problem of (multi-modal) 
competition with respect to action control, no clear solution is suggested to solve it. For 
instance, consider the last part of the glass-of-water example at the beginning of this 
chapter. (To recapitulate: You wanted to grasp the glass, which was positioned to your 
left, in order to give it to someone else, who was sitting to your far right.) As discussed, 
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one of the choices your action system has to make in such a situation is whether to use 
the right hand or the left hand. Spatial information on the glass’ position (sub-goal) will 
probably activate codes for the left hand because of stimulus-response compatibility. 
However, spatial information of the person sitting to your right (end-goal) will probably 
already activate right-hand codes. According to the model presented above, the intended 
effect will activate movement codes that prepare a general grasping plan. Does this plan 
already include codes selecting for one of the limbs? In other words, is limb selection a 
matter of planning or control? More generally, how does the information that is 
available actually lead to the selection of one of the limbs for grasping the glass?vi The 
model will probably have a hard time deciding on this matter. The kind of behavioral 
choice making described in this example is a key issue in the empirical part of this 
thesis. 
 
Dynamic View 
 
The dynamic approach also expresses the need for goal-directed behavior to be 
guided at several levels of control (see e.g., Schöner, 1995; Spencer & Schöner, 2003). 
This approach conceives of behavioral control to be in a constant balancing act between 
stability and flexibility, in the sense of dynamical systems. With respect to goal-directed 
behavior, the action system has to come up with the appropriate action(s) directed at the 
goal. On the one hand, this has to be maintained long enough so as to attain the goal. In 
particular this includes the capability of defying random, systematic, or accidental 
perturbations that might drive the system of its ‘path’. Behavioral patterns that possess 
this quality have been called (temporarily) stable states of the system. (More 
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technically, such a state refers to a stationary solution or attractor state of the governing 
dynamical system.) On the other hand, action(s) must be flexible enough so as to allow 
for relevant adjustments when circumstances require so or when there is a change of 
goal. In such a case, the earlier behavioral pattern destabilizes under the influence of 
(deliberate) perturbations, and the system switches to a new stable state. Fundamentally, 
stability and flexibility are qualities of one and the same self-organizing dynamical 
process. This means that the ability of the action system to adapt behavior to changing 
situations (i.e., its flexibility), is a property of the same process that gives it the ability 
to maintain one type of behavior under varying circumstances (i.e., its stability). Both 
qualities arise as a result of the interactions between different weakly-coupled 
components of the action system (i.e., levels of control). 
As represented in Figure 2 (adopted from Spencer & Schöner, 2003), this view 
distinguishes between three global levels of control (each of which consists of several 
cooperating subsystems). First, the planning level, in which the global characteristics of 
movements are specified. This is where the goal is anticipated, and in this sense it is 
comparable to the off-line planning channel in the earlier view. However, as we will 
see, it is by no means off-line here. Second, the timing level, in which temporal aspects 
of movements are arranged. This level deals with the aspects of timing between the 
different components of the motor system. Third, the coordination and control of forces 
in the motor system are regulated at the control level. The levels are mutually coupled 
and continuously influence each other in real-time. Moreover, they are all continuously 
and directly (i.e., sensory) linked to the environment. Basically, the three control levels 
are interactive and dissipative processes which together incorporate a multi-level 
dynamical system with a high level of redundancy. 
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Figure 2. The different levels of control as conceived of in the dynamic view (see e.g., Schöner, 
1995; Spencer & Schöner, 2003). For details see text. 
 
This redundancy in the system allows for stability as well as flexibility in the 
guidance of goal-directed behavior. Within this framework, stability and flexibility refer 
to various interrelated properties. First, they refer to the possibility of ‘softly-
assembling’ the control levels in a context-related and goal-directed way, making the 
action system into a multi-purpose apparatus. Second, they refer to the fact that, in 
general, one and the same feature of an action can be controlled by processes at each of 
the three levels. For instance, stability can be the result of monitoring a specific source 
of information at the timing level (e.g., tau in case of time to contact with an object; see 
e.g., Lee, 1976), or by precisely coordinating the control of the forces necessary for a 
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movement. Third, destabilization of one state and switching to another can happen in 
many ways. For example, force adjustments (control level) can alter the timing of a 
reaching movement, but this can also be accomplished by directly interfering at the 
timing level (Schöner, 2002). 
There is considerable empirical evidence in favor of the stability-flexibility 
interplay as a basic quality of action systems, which I will only very briefly review. This 
evidence also supports the idea of three levels of control as suggested by this view. 
Most notably, the influential line of research on rhythmical limb movements 
demonstrated that reliable transitions between different stable behavioral patterns 
indeed occur in biological systems (e.g., Kelso, 1981, 1984; Kelso, Scholz & Schöner, 
1986; Schöner & Kelso, 1988a; Tuller & Kelso, 1989). These transitions are predictably 
induced by what is called a control parameter, in this case the oscillatory frequency. 
Research also showed that such transitions can be influenced by intention (e.g., Kelso, 
Scholz & Schöner, 1988; Scholz & Kelso, 1990; Schöner & Kelso, 1988b), and 
mechanical or muscular constraints (e.g., Sternad, Collins & Turvey, 1995) or 
perturbations (e.g., Kelso, Tuller, Vatikiotis- Bateson & Fowler, 1984). Finally, new 
(formerly unstable) patterns can be learned (e.g., Schöner, Zazone & Kelso, 1992; 
Zanone & Kelso, 1992, 1994), which in some cases might (permanently) destabilize 
formerly stable ones. The latter research also hints at the importance of the stability-
flexibility interplay for understanding the pattern changes that occur in (motor-) 
development (see e.g., J. Clark, 1997; Spencer & Schöner, 2003; Thelen & Smith, 1994; 
Thelen et al., 2001). 
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Although both views contain different levels (or channels) for the guidance of goal-
directed action, a major difference between the two concerns how they conceive of the 
way action arises in the presence of internal and external influences. The dissociation 
approach, for instance, allows for the influence of long-term sensorimotor cognitions. 
This is not explicitly part of the dynamic approach, although it might be easily 
incorporated as part of the planning level. The latter view, however, gives us a way of 
dealing with multi-causality (i.e., the confluence of many different sources of 
information), by virtue of the dynamic interactions between the three levels and their 
continuous sensory connection with the environment. On top of this, because of these 
dynamic interactions and sensory connections, the model might enable us to deal with 
behavioral switches. That is, it might help us understand how adjustments of action 
arise, due to changes in the contributing processes in the course of an activity. 
The research presented in the empirical part of this thesis neither explicitly tests 
hypotheses derived from the views presented above, nor is it aimed at conclusively 
deciding on their merit. On the contrary, in the interpretation and discussion of the 
results of our experiments, many of the concepts and ideas put forth by both these views 
are borrowed. In fact, we seek to merge them rather than to choose between them. 
 
Overview of the Dissertation 
 
The experiments that are presented in the following four chapters address two main 
issues: The multi-causality and multi-timescale dynamics underlying action, and in 
particular the role of long-term factors such as goals and preferences on the choices for 
action to take. Fundamentally, these issues are investigated from a developmental 
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perspective. By focusing on age-related changes, we may well gain considerable 
knowledge about the processes underlying these issues, as well as on how they interact. 
Below I will give a short outline of the studies presented in the empirical chapters. 
Chapter 2 reports an experiment that investigated young children’s use of a cane 
(hooked stick) for displacing an object on a table. The group of children that 
participated had an average age of 32.3 months. In the experiment they were asked to 
pick up the cane that was located and orientated differently on each trial. With this cane 
they had to displace a target-object towards a free-to-choose goal location. By leaving 
goal location unconstrained, we tried to explore the (other) factors that influence 
children’s behavioral choice making in a goal-directed task. An interesting finding was 
that children seemed to perceive the tool functionally. That is, irrespective of the cane’s 
starting location and orientation, they preferred to enclose the object in the crook, which 
provided a high level of controllability. Moreover, children virtually always tried to 
bring the object closer. In order to do so, they preferred to make a specific type of 
movement with the cane, viz. sweeping movements, which are highly effective and easy 
to make. Children grasped the cane with the hand ipsilateral to the cane’s lateral 
location. However, in a subtle way hand choice was also influenced by the preference 
for enclosing the object in the crook. During displacement of the object, handedness 
also played a role in hand choice. Overall, behavioral choices in the task were 
influenced by sensory information on the tool’s starting configuration (at least for hand 
choice) as well as several preferences, such as handedness, object enclosure, and 
sweeping movement.vii 
As discussed in an earlier section of this chapter, multi-step tasks generally 
comprise of several coupled phases of activities (see also e.g., Claxton et al., 2004; 
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Johnson-Frey et al., 2004; Willatts, 2004). A clear category of such tasks are tool-use 
tasks, which in our set up consist of two phases, viz. picking up the tool and 
subsequently using the tool. In the experiments presented in Chapter 3, we scrutinized 
and utilized the multi-step character of tool use, in order to learn more about young 
children’s action planning. In two experiments we mainly focused on two-year-olds’ 
and three-year-olds’ limb selection in picking up and subsequently using a simple 
handheld tool for displacing a target-object towards a specified goal location on a table. 
The differences with the earlier experiment (Chapter 2) are twofold. First, instead of a 
free-to-choose goal location, in these experiments the goal location for the target-object 
was fixed: In both experiments the final location was to the left of the child in some 
conditions or to the right in others. Second, we used two types of tools: In Experiment 1 
the children had to use a stick, while in Experiment 2 they had to use a cane that was 
lying in varying starting orientations. This set up enabled us to study the effect of 
varying tool-related (means) information in combination with varying goal-related 
information on the behavioral choices (in this case limb selection). The results revealed 
age differences in the way these sources of information (i.e., hook and goal) influenced 
the choice of which hand to use in different phases of the task (i.e., grasping and 
transporting). In this chapter a first outline of a view on action planning is developed as 
a dynamical action-selection process, integrating factors that are internal (e.g., motor 
preferences and dexterity) as well as external (i.e., sensory) to the child’s action system. 
In order to come to a more comprehensive view on action planning, we performed 
the following two experiments, which motivated the development of a dynamic model 
on adult limb selection. This is reported in Chapter 4. In Experiment 1 left-handed and 
right-handed participants repeatedly used one hand for grasping a small cube. After a 
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clear switch in the cube’s location, perseverative limb selection was revealed in both 
handedness groups. In Experiment 2 the cube was presented in a clockwise and counter-
clockwise sequence to right-handed participants. A spatial delay (or shift) in the switch 
point between right-hand use and left-hand use was observed. The model we propose 
implements the multiple-timescale dynamics of the action-selection process underlying 
limb selection. It integrates two mechanisms that were earlier proposed to underlie this 
selection aspect of manual activity (Gabbard & Rabb, 2000, 2004): Limb dominance, or 
handedness, a long-term feature of behavior, and attentional information, which is 
basically of a sensory nature. By using the model we were able to simulate our 
experiments and replicate their results. In addition, we simulated Gabbard, Iteya, and 
Rabb’s (1997) original experiment, by coupling strength and direction of handedness 
into one concise framework. Several basic features of the model were inspired by the 
more general dynamic field theory (see e.g., Erlhagen & Schöner, 2002), which was 
successfully used by Thelen et al. (2001) in simulating the A-not-B task.  
Chapter 5 presents an empirical test of perseverative limb selection in children of 
14, 24, and 36 months old, and an extension of the dynamical model on limb selection. 
In the experiment children repeatedly grasped a spoon with one hand. In the first part of 
the experiment there were two (training) conditions: The spoon was presented either 
four times on their right side (with the handle also pointing to the right) or four times on 
their left side (handle pointing left). In both conditions, following these training trials, 
the spoon was presented on midline for two more trials. This set-up enabled us to 
determine if children’s limb selection was influenced by their prior choices in the task, 
that is, if they persevered in their choice of hand. Individual children’s direction and 
strength of handedness was determined in a third condition consisting of five spoon 
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presentations on midline, with the handle pointing towards the child. The model extends 
the earlier model (Chapter 4) to incorporate developmental changes in the strength of 
handedness. With it we simulated the experiment and reproduced its results. The results 
and implications are discussed in the context of developing action selection in goal-
directed behavior. 
The epilogue of this thesis, presented in Chapter 6, will revisit three points that 
were either raised or announced in the present chapter and use them as an opening for 
further discussion on development of action planning. In short, the chapter (briefly) 
treats the problem-solving approach to planning, then moves to the ideomotor principle 
and its significance for cognitive development, and concludes the thesis by picking up 
the discussion on planning and control of action again, approaching it from a slightly 
different angle. 
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Notes 
                                                 
i In fact Reed’s conception of regulating a relation with the environment, as the ‘main mission’ of action 
systems, comprises of such a co-determinacy of behavior. 
ii Might one ask: What else? In my opinion, the proprioceptive sensory feedback of a movement is 
something quite different than the sensory effect this movement might bring about when actually 
executed. Moreover, proprioceptive patterns that ‘feel’ quite different can accompany (roughly) the same 
perceptual effect in the world. Think, for example, about the concept of motor equivalence (e.g., Hebb, 
1949; Lashley, 1930). Likewise, the same proprioceptive pattern can accompany different consequences 
in the world, depending on other constraining influences. 
iii Note that Pavlov (1904; 1927) was the first to experimentally investigate the acquisition of new and 
‘unnatural’ stimulus-response relations in dogs, now known as classical conditioning. (Aristotle was 
among the first to describe it, as a ‘law of contiguity’.) Pavlov studied the coupling of some initially 
neutral stimulus (e.g., a sounding buzzer; the conditioned stimulus) to an unrelated physiological reaction 
(salivation; the unconditioned response) that initially was reflexively coupled to some other stimulus 
(food in the mouth; the unconditioned stimulus). After establishing this association by repeated co-
occurrence of buzzer and food (i.e., conditioning), sounding the buzzer would instigate the dog’s 
salivation even in the absence of food. The two-stage process of the ideomotor principle goes a significant 
step further in a number of ways: First, the ideomotor principle is about relations between acts and their 
outcomes, instead of building on an existing physiological reflex. Because of this, the ideomotor principle 
is closer related to the idea of instrumental conditioning (Skinner, 1938). Second, the relations are bi-
directional. By analogy, suppose that, at some time, Pavlov’s dog desired to hear the buzzer (effect). This 
would have to make him deliberately salivate (action) in the hope to achieve this result. I am not aware of 
Pavlov ever reporting such (not easy to measure) behavior. Finally, the ideomotor principle is about 
action selection in the context of voluntary behavior. Action-effect relations in the ideomotor sense can be 
used to instigate specific movements by (first) activating the associated sensory codes of the goal. 
Contrary, once established, the conditioned reflex in the Pavlovian sense is always the same and 
automatically (i.e., involuntarily) reactivated by the appropriate stimulus. 
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iv The idea of such a (high-level) preparation of behavior is not unique to the ideomotor principle. Many 
other (sometimes more complex) ‘constructions’ have been suggested for the various ways in which 
stable long-term factors such as memory, skill, learning, and development come to influence behavior. 
Consider, for instance, action semantics and procedural knowledge (e.g., Anderson, 1980; Squire, 1987); 
heuristics and strategies (e.g., Boden, 1977; De Lisi, 1987; McCarty, Clifton & Collard, 1999); scripts, 
schemata and routines (e.g., Nelson, 1996; Randall, 1987; Schank & Abelson, 1977; Schmidt, 1975). 
v Basically, this model brings action planning and action control in close correspondence with Milner and 
Goodale’s (1995) model of visual processing, although there are clear differences (see Glover, 2004). 
Milner and Goodale’s model comprises of two structurally and functionally separate cortical pathways for 
visual information in the brain; a dorsal stream and a ventral stream. The first, also called how or vision-
for-action pathway, deals with action-related sensory information, which is directly accessible to the 
motor system. This pathway is supposed to be one-line and unconscious. The second, also called what or 
vision-for-perception pathway, deals with perception-related information, which is leading to the 
phenomenological awareness of the external world. This pathway is off-line, consciously accessible and 
linked to memory. Although Milner and Goodale do not describe a clear mechanism for coupling the two 
streams of information in the guidance of goal-directed behavior, there is an obvious correspondence 
between the two models. The basic idea of a distinction between an on-line sensory channel and an off-
line memory channel is upheld in both. 
vi To analyze this example further: If codes for the limb are already part of the action plan, it must be for 
the right hand because the intended effect or end-goal (i.e., handing the glass to someone on the right) 
will activate right-hand codes. Although this might agree with simple observation (try it yourself; in 
certain cases you actually do grasp the glass directly with your right hand), as mentioned before, this is 
not the only ‘solution’ people tend to choose. If limb selection is part of action control, the spatial 
information on the glass’ position will ‘cause’ a left-hand grasp. This choice will then be adjusted during 
transportation of the glass to the right, as a result of changes in the sensorimotor flow associated with the 
movement. Indeed, sometimes (e.g., when the glass is not only to the left but also somewhat farther away, 
or when it is a mug filled to the edge with hot coffee) you will grasp left-handedly and then switch it to 
the right hand. In fact, whether you will switch between the hands or use a direct right-hand grasp will 
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depend on a number of other factors: Most prominently on handedness, dexterity, prior experiences and 
additional task constraints. 
vii A behavioral variable that plays a central role in the empirical parts of this thesis is the choice of which 
hand to use for performing a particular task, that is, limb selection. One of the factors affecting limb 
selection is of course handedness. Instead of devoting a separate section to handedness, the reader will 
acquire a sufficient level of familiarity with this topic from the introductory parts of the empirical 
chapters. (Because each chapter was written as a separate and stand-alone paper, beware of 
redundancies!) 
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Chapter 2 
 
The Planning of Tool-to-Object Relations in Young Children 
 
Although tool use has recently seen a revival in the interest of developmental 
psychologists (see e.g. Bongers, Smitsman & Michaels, 2004; Lockman, 2000; 
McCarty, Clifton & Collard, 1999, 2001; Smitsman, 1997; Van Leeuwen, Smitsman & 
Van Leeuwen, 1994; Want & Harris, 2001), as yet it remains unclear by what 
mechanisms young children learn how tools modify their action system with respect to a 
certain task. What children have to discover in tool use, is that the body’s inadequacy 
for a task in some of its dynamical, geometrical and/or perceiving-acting abilities can be 
resolved by using a hand-held object with suitable properties (Smitsman, 1997; 
Smitsman & Bongers, 2003). They have to learn that the intended goal (e.g. food in the 
mouth) can more effectively and efficiently be attained after their action system has 
been modified with an appropriate object (e.g. a spoon). 
The functional relationship that exists between the tool-object and the target-
object, which fundamentally constraints the possibilities for tool use, has been labeled 
topology (Smitsman & Bongers, 2003; Smitsman, Cox & Bongers, 2005; see also 
Wagman & Taylor, 2004), or tool-environment interface (Wagman & Carello, 2003; 
Wagman & Taylor, 2004). The term topology expresses that, for tool use to be 
successful, the dynamical, geometrical and perceiving-acting properties of the tool in 
some way have to match the properties of the target-object, within the context of a 
certain task. This means that it is not the tool in isolation that predicts its usability, but 
the way it adapts the actor’s bodily means in relation to the target-object and the goal. 
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Specifically, the topology comprises a set of relative parameters, like relative size and 
shape, and relative distance and orientation, which are defined for the tool + target-
object system as a whole (Smitsman et al., 2005). They are relative parameters because 
they describe a tool property relative to its corresponding target-object property. To 
clarify this, consider, for example, the way a screwdriver is shaped at the tip (or the size 
of the tip for that matter) to fit into the inversely shaped head of the screw. 
The topological relation between a pair of objects, and the set of relative 
parameters this entails, holds all the potential degrees of freedom for the tool-using 
possibilities. Therefore, to discover if an object is suitable as a tool for operating on 
another object to attain a certain goal, a child has to be sensitive to these relative 
parameters. Moreover, in order to use the tool adequately it means that the child has to 
learn to actively regulate the values of the relative parameters, within the constraints set 
by the task. This means that the child’s actions have to directed at controlling the 
parameter values, for example, changing the relative distance by bringing the tool closer 
to the target-object. Note that for any specific tool, some parameter values are fixed 
(e.g., for relative size and relative shape), which means that not all potential degrees of 
freedom are always free for the actor to regulate. These fixed parameters have a 
constraining influence on the tool-using possibilities. Summarizing, the child has to find 
out if it can be done as well as how to do it by discovering the topological relation and 
by regulating its underlying set of relative parameters. 
One of the findings from the famous primate studies performed by Köhler (1925) 
is that the discovery of this topological relation, called insight, is facilitated by 
perceptual factors of the spatial layout, like tool-target proximity and orientation. 
Richardson (1932), Bates, Carlson-Luden and Bretherton (1980), and more recently 
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Van Leeuwen et al. (1994) further developed Köhler’s pioneering work. Bates et al. 
state, contrary to Zhukova (1960), that a child has to see the tool and target-object as 
two distinct objects that in some way fit together. Their emphasis is on the discovery of 
the causal relations that hold between the two objects when they are connected (see also 
Want & Harris, 2001). They argue that the facilitating effect of the spatial configuration 
is as a reminder of the possible connection. 
In terms of the action problem the children have to solve, the issue remains 
unresolved however. For any given two objects of fixed size and shape (we shall omit 
the addition relative in front of the topological parameters from now on), their spatial 
configuration (i.e. their distance and orientation) concerns information about the actions 
that need to be performed to reach a goal. From this it follows that the tool a certain 
object can be emerges from the activities that it affords on a target-object. For example, 
because of the concave shape of its bowl, a spoon affords scooping, but only by 
penetrating the food’s surface and subsequently retrieving it (i.e. regulating distance), 
while holding it in a suitable orientation. Van Leeuwen et al. (1994) have argued that it 
is these activities that determine the discovery of tool functions. Interestingly, this view 
redefines the problem of insight in tool use into ‘discovering that it can be done by 
discovering how to do it’, in which the latter knowledge varies between different tasks. 
In Van Leeuwen et al.’s (1994) study, children between 8 months and 3.8 years of 
age were asked to use a cane with a curved part (hook) on one end and a straight part 
(handle) on the other end. The task involved pulling a desired target-object nearby. The 
object was placed out of reach on a table in front of them. The task started with placing 
the cane also on the table, in different positions and orientations relative to the object 
(i.e., different topologies). The handle always pointed towards the child and was within 
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reach. The different topologies formed starting configurations in the experiment. In 
some configurations the hook already enclosed the object, while in others the child 
needed to displace and/or rotate the cane so that the object could be pulled nearby. 
According to the authors, these configurations differed in complexity because of the 
different number of transformations (i.e. translations and rotations) the children needed 
to temporarily integrate in the planning, before they could use the cane for pulling the 
target-object within reach. For instance, in the most complex configuration the child 
needed to rotate the cane, displace it to the side and downwards, before its hook 
surrounded the target-object appropriate for pulling. According to their model, this 
complex configuration required the temporal integration of a sequence of four 
transformations, three to get the cane in the appropriate position and orientation, and 
one for pulling the target-object nearby. 
Results agreed with what the authors predicted: Children that were intermediately 
successful in retrieving the target-object (i.e. between 33% and 66% of all trials across 
the different configurations) were more likely to solve the problem when less 
transformations needed to be integrated, according to the model. Remarkably, this group 
consisted of both younger and older children, and performance was similar between 
them. The general conclusion of the researchers was that it is the temporal integration of 
necessary transformations that determine children’s discovery and planning of tool 
functions. 
This conclusion raises a number of questions. One question is whether it is solely 
the starting configuration that determines if and how the cane will be used and where 
the object will end up. If the cane is already in the hand, for example, it may be difficult 
to define a starting configuration at all. When the hand is active, the cane will be 
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moving relative to the target-object. This means that its (perceived) function changes if 
the complexity of the configuration changes due to this movement. A peculiar 
implication of this is that the cane can switch from being a tool object to being a non-
tool object, just by rotating it in the hand for example. 
Related to this is the fact that there is not just one way to use the cane that will 
effectively displace the object to a desired location. Which ones will be more efficient 
than others depends on a number of things. One very important factor is where the goal 
is located with respect to the tool and the target-object. In Van Leeuwen et al.’s (1994) 
task enclosure as the tool function of the cane is dictated by a goal location that requires 
the object to be inside the hook to succeed. For a goal location to the side of the table, 
sweeping the object by using the cane as a stick will be just as effective. For pushing an 
object further away, the outside of the hook will be more suitable. Thus, the particular 
topology that a child chooses is determined by many other factors besides the starting 
configuration, such as the shape of the tool and target-object, and the goal location. 
More fundamentally, it is questionable whether the required transformations form 
the basic units for planning functional relations between objects in tool use. This 
disconnects (i.e. disembodies) the ‘knowing how to do it’ from the action system and 
effectively turns it into mental operations on objects and on the trajectories between 
these objects in space. It could just as well be the other way around: Functional relations 
are the basic units themselves and the necessary trajectories follow from the relation a 
child chooses to realize. This hypothesis takes into account the flexibility that is 
available in the movement apparatus. Given this flexibility it may be more sensible to 
plan in terms of relations between objects, and exploit the flexibility to achieve these 
relations under varying circumstances. 
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This paper presents an experiment that was designed to shed more light on the 
issues raised above, by investigating whether and how 2-year-old children use a cane for 
displacing an object. In the experiment a target-object was placed in front of the child in 
the middle of a round table (see Figure 1). At the start of every trial the cane was 
randomly placed in one of four different locations on the table: on the near or far side of 
the table, either left or right from the child’s midline. The handle always pointed 
towards the child and was within reach. On each location the hook was oriented either 
towards or away from the object. The task for the child involved using the cane to 
displace the object to a free-to-choose goal location in a groove that fully surrounded 
the table. 
Figure 1. The eight different starting configurations of cane and target-object on the table. In 
each trial one of these configurations was randomly presented to the subject. 
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 Three action variables were monitored in the experiment: Topology, end-position, 
and hand choice. Topology was measured to give us insight into which tool-to-object 
relation the children realized during task performance. End-position was defined as the 
target-object’s final location after displacement, giving us the goal the children chose 
for the object. Finally, by also monitoring the hand the children used for grasping the 
tool with and subsequently for displacing the object, we hoped to shed some light on 
how they deployed their bodily means in performing the task. A general aim of this 
study was therefore to unravel children’s tool-use behavior in terms of these three action 
variables. 
Because in Van Leeuwen et al.’s (1994) study children of a large age range 
participated (8 to 44 months), their conclusions are applicable to the 2-year-old children 
in this experiment. Moreover, in their study there were children of this age that either 
used or refused to use the cane. Children that refused to use the cane in their complex 
configurations might use it in this study, because the free-to-choose goal location 
always enables them to perform the task very easily. Children that used the cane in all 
configurations of their study were expected to do the same in this study, but they too 
will be likely to solve the problem in the easiest possible way. 
If starting configurations determine the discovery of tool functions, as Van 
Leeuwen et al. (1994) argue, in this experiment one would predict the topology to 
directly follow from the cane’s starting location and orientation. For successful task 
performance, in principle, only two transformations have to be integrated for all eight 
starting configurations: A translation of the cane towards the target-object followed by a 
translation of the cane that displaces the object to the side. This means that the cane will 
be used as a stick in case its hook points away from the object in the starting 
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configuration, and as a hook in case its hook point towards the object. In fact, Van 
Leeuwen et al. reported stick use in comparable configurations. In the simple 
movements just described, the object is pushed away in a straight line until it falls into 
the groove. In the same line of reasoning, therefore, one would expect the object’s final 
location to be directly opposite to the cane’s starting location. A deviation from this 
pattern would imply that the necessary transformations are secondary to establishing a 
functional relation between actor, tool and target-object. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
In this research, the data of 11 children with an average age of 32.3 months and a 
standard deviation of 3.2 months were used for further analysis. This group contained 5 
girls and 6 boys. Two participants were excluded from the analysis because they were 
considerably younger than the rest of the group (21 months old). The children were 
recruited from a children’s day-care center near the Dutch city of Nijmegen. Parents 
were written about the experiment and granted their permission. It was verified in 
advance that the children were willing and able to participate in the experiment. From 
verbal inquiry of the day-care employees we concluded that most children were right-
handers. Handedness was not assessed separately because we know of no suitable and 
reliable test for this age group. Moreover, both direction and strength of handedness are 
not yet fully developed at this age (see e.g. McManus et al., 1988). 
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Materials 
The tasks were performed at a red round table with a diameter of 62 cm. The 
height of the table could be adjusted to the waist-height of the children. There was a 
ring-shaped groove in the table at 3.0 cm from the edge, all-around, 5.0 cm wide and 2.6 
cm deep. The bottom of this groove was painted blue. The whole groove acted as a 
possible location towards which the children could transport the target-object. It left a 
large disk with a diameter of 46 cm in the middle of the table. The cane was 37 cm long 
with a width at the hook of 7.0 cm. It was constructed by bending one end of an 8.0-mm 
thick, solid blue aluminum rod (mass: 58 g) into a hook shape. Using this cane, the 
children had to displace one of four small wooden target-objects. The target-objects 
were disks of 1.3 cm in height and 2.5 cm in diameter. They were painted white with a 
black edge on the top and the bottom and with a yellow side. To make these objects 
more appealing to the children, there were small animals painted on them – a duck, a 
swan, a frog, and a fish. 
 
Procedure 
All the experiments were performed at the day-care center, in a specially 
appointed, separate room. During each session an employee of the day-care center was 
present in the room together with the experimenter and the child. When the child was at 
ease in the room she was invited to sit down on a little chair at the table, with the 
experimenter sitting on her left side and the employee on her right side. The cane and 
the target-objects were shown and the child was allowed to explore these objects and the 
table for a while. During this phase the experimenter explained that the disks were little 
animals that would like to go to the water (the blue groove in the table), but that they 
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were to little to do this on their own. The child was then asked to help the animals get to 
the water by using the cane. The experimenter made it very explicit that it was allowed 
to bring the target-object anywhere in the blue groove. After this, the experiment started 
by first placing one of the target-objects on the table at a clear distance from the child 
(just behind the nearest half of the table). Then the cane was placed on the table in one 
of the eight possible starting configurations displayed in Figure 1. These configurations 
arose from combining lateral cane-position (on the left or on the right of the child), 
proximal-distal cane-position (near or far from the child) and hook-orientation (away 
from or towards the target-object). A total of 16 trials (2*8) were presented to the child 
in a completely randomized order. After each successfully performed trial, the 
experimenter removed the object from the groove and gently retrieved the cane from the 
child. A new object was chosen at the child’s wishes and a new trial was started. The 
duration of one complete experimental session was 10 to 20 min. 
 
Response scoring 
Three dependent variables were assessed from the videotaped sessions, viz. hand 
choice, topology and end-position. The variable hand choice was scored for two distinct 
phases of the task, because switches of the tool between the hands could occur in the 
time interval after the tool was picked up and before the actual start of the object’s 
displacement. The period of time between the start of the trial and the child’s grasping 
of the tool, that is, the period in which the child chose how to pick up the tool, is defined 
as the grasping phase. The period of time between the start of the target-object’s 
transportation with the tool and the first arrival of the object at its end-position is called 
the transporting phase. The values that were possible for hand choice were left, right or 
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both, where the latter value was assigned to the behavior of both hands grasping or 
touching the tool. 
The tool-to-object configuration that the child uses for transporting the object is 
called topology. It provides us with valuable information about how the children used 
the cane. The position where the object contacts the cane can in principle be anywhere 
on the surface of the cane, making it is a continuous variable. However, for the sake of 
reliable scoring with enough distinguishable power there were three values constructed 
for this variable, which are shown in Figure 2. Enclosure (Figure 2a) was defined as the 
configuration in which the object was always inside the hook, or touching the hook very 
near to the inside. The tip of the hook was scored as enclosure too. Exclosure (Figure 
2b) was defined as the configuration in which the object was positioned at the outside of 
the hook, or touching the hook very near to the outside. Stick-use (Figure 2c) was 
scored when the cane was clearly used as a stick, i.e. when the target-object touched the 
handle part of the cane including its tip. 
Figure 2. Examples of the three topologies: a) enclosure; b) exlosure; c) stick-use. 
c) b) a) 
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End-position served as a measure for the movement trajectory of the target-object. 
It was scored as the object’s location when it (first) arrived in the groove, regardless of 
possible further displacements of the object after that. For this, the groove was divided 
into four parts, relative to the child: near-left, near-right, far-left and far-right. End-
position was assessed using a computerized procedure. A marker on the target-object 
was recorded, relative to a set of reference markers, by means of a video-digitizing 
system. 
 
Results 
 
One observer scored the variables topology and hand choice for all subjects. A 
second observer scored about one third of the sessions (four subjects). Inter-observer 
reliability was calculated for this portion of the data, revealing an agreement of 96% for 
hand choice (κ = .93) and 94% for topology (κ = .86). In all cases the primary 
observer’s scoring was used in the analyses. 
Because each starting configuration was presented to the children twice, in a 
completely randomized order, the data was inspected for possible effects of repetition. It 
was concluded that no systematic effects were present. Therefore only the data of the 
first presentation of each condition was used in the analyses, resulting in a total of 88 
trials. In none of these trials children used both hands for grasping the cane or for 
transporting the object. 
 
Tool-to-Object Relations 
 59 
Hand choice 
In the grasping phase, where the children made the cane part of their action 
system, as well as in the transporting phase, where the children actually displaced the 
target-object towards the groove, there appeared to be slightly more overall use of the 
right hand (55% and 66%, respectively). For each individual child the proportion of 
right-hand use was calculated for both phases of the task separately. T-tests revealed 
that in both phases the proportions of right-hand use did not significantly differ from a 
test value of 0.5. 
The percentages of right-hand use in both phases of the task, for each of the eight 
different conditions, are presented in Table 1. A 2 (phase) × 2 (lateral cane-position) × 2 
(proximal-distal cane-position) × 2 (hook-orientation) repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted on the hand-choice data. The analysis yielded a main effect for lateral cane-
position, F(1, 10) = 29.307, p < .001. This effect revealed that the children 
predominantly used the ipsilateral hand, that is, they grasped and used the tool with the 
hand on the same side as the cane’s starting position. Furthermore, there was an 
interaction effect between phase and lateral cane-position, F(1, 10) = 7.368, p < .05. 
The nature of this interaction indicated that the ipsilateral effect of lateral cane-position 
on hand use was stronger in the grasping phase than in the transporting phase. This 
means that between the two phases, children, to some degree, switch the cane between 
the hands. No main effects were found for proximal-distal cane-position and hook-
orientation. Interestingly, there was a lateral cane-position by hook-orientation 
interaction, F(1, 10) = 15.802, p < .01. This effect was such that, for both lateral cane-
positions, when the hook was directed away from the target-object, the contralateral 
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hand was used relatively more often, than when the hook was directed towards the 
object. 
 
Table 1. Percentages of right-hand choice in the two phases of the task. The eight conditions 
follow from combining the three independent variables lateral cane-position (LCP), proximal-
distal cane-position (PDCP) and hook-orientation (HO). 
  
 Grasping Transporting 
HO – Away 82% 73% PDCP - Near 
HO - Towards 100% 91% 
HO – Away 82% 82% 
LCP - Right 
PDCP - Far 
HO - Towards 91% 91% 
HO – Away 36% 64% PDCP - Near 
HO - Towards 9% 36% 
HO – Away 27% 55% 
LCP - Left 
PDCP - Far 
HO - Towards 9% 36% 
 
To analyze these results further, a 2 (lateral cane-position) × 2 (proximal-distal 
cane-position) × 2 (hook-orientation) repeated measures ANOVA was performed for 
each of the two phases separately. This yielded a main effect of lateral cane-position in 
both phases of the task, F(1, 10) = 33.835, p < .001, in the grasping phase, and F(1, 10) 
= 11.228, p < .01, in the transporting phase, respectively. The interaction effect between 
lateral cane-position and hook-orientation was also significant in both phases of the 
task, F(1, 10) = 13.913, p < .01, in the grasping phase, F(1, 10) = 9.412, p < .05, in the 
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transporting phase, respectively. To elucidate this interesting finding, the percentages of 
right-hand use in both phases of the task, as a function of lateral cane-position and 
hook-orientation, are shown in Figure 3. 
Figure 3. Percentages of right-hand use in both phases of the task as a function of lateral cane-
position and hook-orientation. 
 
Topology 
In 79% of the trials the children enclosed the target-object in the hook, in 15% 
they used an exclosure topology, and in 6% they transported the object by using the 
cane as a stick. By combining the exclosure and stick-use topologies, an overall 
category of non-enclosure topology is formed. This makes the difference between hook 
use (enclosure topology; 79%) and non-hook use (non-enclosure topology; 21%) most 
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apparent. A 2 (lateral cane-position) × 2 (proximal-distal cane-position) × 2 (hook-
orientation) repeated measures ANOVA on the topology data in this latter form (i.e. 
hook vs. non-hook) yielded no effects of the independent variables. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that the way the cane was used for transporting the object was not determined 
by the starting configuration of tool and target-object. 
 
End-position 
Figure 4 shows the scores of each of the four end-positions (near-left, near-right, 
far-left and far-right) in percentages. The target-object’s final location was left free to 
choose, and the children almost always chose to move the object closer to them. With 
respect to the laterality, there appeared to be a clear preference for right-sided end-
positions. For the purpose of analysis, the end-position data were pooled into two 
categories: lateral (left / right) end-position and proximal-distal (near / far) end-position. 
A 2 (lateral cane-position) × 2 (proximal-distal cane-position) × 2 (hook-
orientation) repeated measures ANOVA was performed on the lateral end-position data 
and on the proximal-distal end-position data separately. This analysis yielded no 
significant effects of the independent variables on proximal-distal end-position. This is 
most probably due to the fact that participants mostly brought the object towards them. 
For lateral end-position, there was a main effect of hook-orientation, F(1, 10) = 5.714, p 
< .05, and an interaction effect between hook-orientation and proximal-distal cane-
position , F(1, 10) = 5.714, p < .05. This latter effect was such that when the cane was 
lying at the near end of the table, the object ended up on the right in 77% of the trials 
when the hook was pointing away from the object, whereas only in 59% of the trials 
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Figure 4. Percentages of realized end-positions for the four quadrants of the table. LEP is lateral 
end-position, and PDEP is proximal-distal end-position. 
 
when the hook was pointing towards it. When the cane was lying at the far end of the 
table, the object ended up on the right in 68% of those trials for both hook orientations. 
Lateral end-position varied with the hand the children used to transport the object 
with. When the location was on the child’s left side, in 96% of the cases this was done 
with the right hand, while only in 4% with the left hand. When the location was on the 
right side the percentages of right-hand use and left-hand use were almost equal: 52% 
and 48%, respectively. 
Although no separate analysis of motor behavior was conducted, two types of 
movement patterns are conceivable for the near end-positions (about 91% of the trials). 
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First, a sweeping movement, either with the right hand to the left side (32% of the trials) 
or with the left hand to the right side (33% of the trials). Second, a pulling movement, 
only performed with the right hand to the right side (35% of the trials), but never with 
the left hand to the left side (0% of the trials). These movement types are in 
correspondence with the preference that was found for end-positions to the right (68%). 
 
Discussion 
 
The starting location and orientation of the cane played no role in determining the 
topology that was used in performing the task. This is inconsistent with Van Leeuwen et 
al.’s (1994) earlier findings. Although in this experiment there were different starting 
configurations akin to those used in their task, these did not affect whether and how the 
cane was going to be used. Contrary to Van Leeuwen et al.’s task, in this experiment 
children were allowed to bring the object anywhere in a groove, which fully surrounded 
the starting position of the object. Arguably, with such a free-to-choose goal location, a 
possible constraining influence of this goal factor on task performance was absent. 
Because of this, the most direct and easiest possible solution to the task was to move the 
cane from its starting location to the object and further, letting topology and end-
position emerge from this. If children would have chosen to do so, hook-orientation 
must have had a significant effect on topology, viz. more non-enclosure (non-hook) 
topologies when the hook was initially oriented away from the object and more 
enclosure (hook) topologies when it was initially oriented towards the object. However, 
this was not what we found in our data. This shows that the tool-to-object relation was 
not the result of planning the simplest trajectory, which requires the least number of 
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transformations to be integrated. On the contrary, it proves that the tool-to-object 
relation must have been a central part of the planning itself, and that the necessary 
transformations followed from that. 
A notable feature of the children’s behavior was the preference they showed for 
the type of movement that can be characterized as sweeping (defined by using the hand 
contralateral to the object’s destination). Roughly over two-third of the transportations 
are executed in this way. One might argue that these movements are very simple 
translations in space, and that their presence therefore indicates that the children 
planned the easiest possible trajectory. Although controlling a movement trajectory is 
part of the task performance --it has to be in order to establish tool-object contact and to 
let the object arrive at its goal location-- the large number of enclosure topologies 
indicated that these trajectories were constrained by the tool-to-object relation the 
children planned to use. Children did not just ‘sweep’ from the tool’s starting location to 
the object and further. Instead the sweeping movements were instigated after tool-object 
contact had been established. 
Interestingly, sweeping was the only way in which the participants used the cane 
with the left hand, while for the right hand a considerable number of pulling movements 
(defined by using the hand ipsilateral to the object’s destination) were observed too. 
Together this resulted in a considerable number of object transportations to the right 
side. If the larger part of the children were right-handers, which is in accordance with 
the day-care employees’ verbal reports, the higher dexterity of the right hand enabled 
them to organize a more difficult and less comfortable (i.e. involving more degrees of 
freedom) movement like pulling. This indicates that biomechanical factors, in addition 
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to the task-related factors, are an inherent part of the task performance (see e.g., Leconte 
& Fagard, 2004). 
The strong ipsilateral effect of lateral cane-position on hand choice that was found 
is in agreement with the findings on reaching movements and tool use in children 
reported by others (see e.g. Harris & Carlson, 1993; McCarty et al., 1999, 2001; Van 
Hof, Van der Kamp & Savelsbergh, 2002). In the grasping phase children used the hand 
on the same side as where the cane was lying for making the tool part of their action 
system. In the transporting phase, when the tool was already in the hand and visual 
input of lateral cane-position was no longer available, the effect was still present but 
weaker. Arguably, it is the result of perseverance in hand use between the phases. 
On top of this ipsilateral grasping with respect to the cane’s starting location, the 
choice for the hand to pick up the tool with was also influenced by the future topology 
the children intended to realize. They seemed to plan an enclosure topology, afforded by 
the hook of the cane, and adapted the actions that had to be taken accordingly. When the 
hook was directed towards the target-object, they made relatively more use of the 
ipsilateral hand. This enabled them to accomplish an enclosure topology quite easily, 
that is, with the least number of transformations. For the same reason, the contralateral 
hand was used relatively more often when the hook was directed away from the object. 
This not only shows that children were sensitive to the initial tool-to-object 
configuration, but more importantly, it shows that they were able to use this information 
to appropriately adapt their future behavior. So, although they seemed to perform the 
task with the least number of transformations for the hook, this was instigated by the 
topology they planned, not vise versa. By cleverly choosing the hand to pick up the cane 
with, they realized this in an easy and comfortable way. 
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In conclusion, a tool cannot have its tool-use ‘meaning’ as a single, unattached 
entity in the world, but its existence as a tool is embedded in its relations with an actor, 
a target-object and a goal (Smitsman, 1997; Van Leeuwen et al., 1994). Tools are 
affordances (Gibson, 1986) and therefore possibilities for actions. This study showed 
that in realizing the affordance a tool entails, children were focused on the relation 
between the tool and the target-object (i.e. the topology). Moreover, the realization of 
this topology was clearly coupled to the kind of action system a child recruited from the 
body (i.e. the choice of which hand to use). The viewpoint we like to propose, therefore, 
is that in learning the new possibilities tools afford for action, children have to discover 
how the relation between the actor and the tool becomes constrained by the tool-to-
object relation. This statement is in accordance with research done by others (Bongers et 
al., 2004; Wagman & Carello, 2003), and certainly deserves further investigation. 
Finally, learning to use tools necessitates planning and control of a number of 
action variables in order to effectively and efficiently attain a goal. The general aim of 
this study was to investigate how children begin to negotiate these demands tool use 
imposes on them. The design of the experiment provided an interesting approach to this 
issue. By looking at a set of coupled action variables and the way they constrain each 
other in different phases of a task, valuable insights can be attained on the development 
of future-oriented problem-solving and goal-directed behavior (cf. Claxton, Keen & 
McCarty, 2003; Johnson-Frey, McCarty & Keen, 2004; Willatts, 2004). 
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Chapter 3 
 
Action Planning in Young Children’s Tool Use 
 
Research on action in infancy, among other evidence, strongly supports the view that a 
certain form of future-oriented and goal-directed behavior is present already from birth. 
Under the label prospection or prospective control, it has been demonstrated in a variety 
of activities such as looking, sucking, early reaching and early imitation (for an 
overview see Bertenthal & Clifton, 1998; Gibson & Pick, 2001; Smitsman, 2001; 
Thelen & Smith, 1994; Von Hofsten, 2003). Prospection enables an infant to anticipate 
future events and prepare actions for those events. 
Von Hofsten (1993) argues that prospection arises from the way sensory and 
motor systems are functionally interconnected. Moreover, prospection is not only 
functionally present from birth, but it is also morphologically prestructured in the body 
and its neural architecture at birth (Von Hofsten, 2003). Over time it becomes more 
advanced and pronounced, when different sensory, motor and cognitive components 
cooperate with respect to a goal or a set of goals. In this line of reasoning, prospection 
can be considered as an early or primitive form of action planning (Claxton, Keen & 
McCarty, 2003). What this demonstrates is that planning, as an executive function, does 
not just arise at a certain age. Rather, it co-develops continuously with and from closely 
related processes that are in progress already at birth. 
Because of the close relation with sensory and motor processes, in order to 
unravel the development of action planning we have to focus on if and how different 
sources of information with respect to a goal are picked up and used over time. Because 
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behavior takes place in the context of a certain task and in a certain environment which 
put constraints on that behavior (Newell, 1986, 1989), the planning itself is naturally 
embedded in that environment and in the activities that are part of the task. These facts 
cannot be ignored in any serious account of planning and its development. Not 
surprisingly, the issues this raises recently have become a topic of central concern in the 
study of goal-directed behavior and action planning (see e.g., Hommel, Müsseler, 
Aschersleben & Prinz, 2001; Thelen, Schöner, Scheier & Smith, 2001; Willatts, 1999, 
2004; see also Gergely, Bekkering & Király, 2002; Király, Jovanovic, Prinz, 
Aschersleben & Gergely, 2003). 
In this paper we would like to advocate the stance that planning is an action-
selection process for actions to take (cf. Busemeyer & Diedrich, 2002; Busemeyer & 
Townsend, 1993), underlying all goal-directed behavior. Sometimes selections (i.e., 
choices) are made rationally and consciously, but in action planning most of them arise 
spontaneously and unconsciously (sometimes called automated behavior). With the term 
action selection we highlight the fact that in the course of any activity, choices are 
constantly made about what to do and what to do next. These issues deserve 
investigation, to which this study likes to contribute. This paper will make three major 
conceptual points about this selection process, which we will elaborate on below. 
First, selections for action are multi-causally determined, that is, many factors 
potentially influence behavior (e.g., Busemeyer & Diedrich, 2002; Erlhagen & Schöner, 
2002, LeConte & Fagard, 2004; Thelen et al., 2001; Thelen & Smith, 1994). They all 
serve as input to the action-selection process, constraining the possible outcomes. The 
factors can be external to the action system, that is, part of the task or the environment 
(cf. Newell, 1986, 1989). But they can also be internal to the action system (Newell’s 
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organismic constraints), that is, in some way related to the body including the brain. 
This means that sensorimotor information as well as, for example, existing preferences 
and dexterity are at the basis of the choices that are made for actions. To better 
understand how action evolves from the way this input is combined, we have to look at 
the specific composition of all the factors involved and how it changes over time. 
Second, the way in which the different factors form input to the brain is by 
combining and interacting in accordance with recent models of brain functioning (e.g., 
Corballis, 1998; Georgopoulos, Schwartz & Kettner, 1986; Georgopoulos, 1990; Ghez, 
Hening & Favilla, 1990; Iacobini, Woods, Lenzi & Mazziotta, 1997; Iacobini & Zaidel, 
2003; Roser & Corballis, 2002). Different inputs can reinforce or compete each other, 
that is, they can strengthen or weaken each other’s possible effect on behavior when 
they are present at the same time. Moreover, because external factors are generally time 
dependent, therefore so is their possible effect on behavior. When the specific 
constellation of the relevant factors changes during task performance, which can happen 
due to the activities that are part of the task itself, changes in the environment or a 
change of goal, the resulting selections for action will also change. Interestingly, the 
dynamics of this input therefore can lead to behavioral adjustments over time (i.e., new 
selections). In our opinion, these kinds of overt behavioral changes form an important 
window on the dynamics of the action-selection process that lies underneath. 
Third, there is a development with age in the way the different factors come 
together in the selection process to ‘produce’ choices for action. As mentioned earlier, 
there is evidence that prospection and a certain level of action planning is present from 
very early on in life, although the way in which the different components come together 
in the process changes with age. We think that the action-selection process develops in 
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the way it combines the internal and external constraints the action system is subjected 
to. Ample evidence for this claim can be found, of which we will discuss just two 
examples, below. 
It is well known that there is a large influence on hand use by the spatial factors 
and complexity of a task, over a wide age range in infants and children (e.g., Gabbard, 
Rabb & Gentry, 2001; Gabbard & Rabb Helbig, 2004; Harris & Carlson, 1993; LeConte 
& Fagard, 2004; Van Hof, Van der Kamp & Savelsbergh, 2002), and adults (e.g., 
Bryden, Pryde & Roy, 1999, 2000; Calvert & Bisshop, 1998; Gabbard, Iteya & Rabb, 
1997; Harris & Carlson, 1993). We also know that the strength or consistency of 
laterality increases between these age groups (see e.g. McManus et al., 1988; for an 
overview on handedness see Hopkins & Rönnqvist, 1998). However, the difference in 
the patterns of hand use over different age groups (e.g., between children and adults) in 
various tasks cannot all be explained by this increase. It must also be the result of how 
laterality, dexterity and sensorimotor information interact in the choice of what hand to 
use in a particular situation (e.g., Cox & Smitsman, 2006a, 2006b; Leconte & Fagard, 
2004). 
Another example comes from Thelen et al.’s (2001) model for the A-not-B task in 
terms of dynamic field theory (for an overview on DFT see Erlhagen & Schöner, 2002). 
In their model of infant perseverative reaching behavior, there is an important h 
parameter that (basically) represents the density of nerve fibers. This density is 
supposed to increase with age, corresponding with the system being able to settle in a 
cooperative regime. This results in the child no longer making the A-not-B error. The 
key thing in explaining this overt behavioral change, however, was that the h parameter 
actually controls the relative strengths of the memory input and the sensorimotor input 
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in the process. In other words, this parameter regulates the way internal and external 
constraints on the behavior come together in the planning of a reaching movement. 
Returning to action planning, interesting observations that may shed light on the 
nature of the action-selection process described above come from looking at the 
development of future-oriented problem solving (Haith, 1994) or means-end analysis 
(Ellis & Siegler, 1997) in tasks with two segments or phases (Claxton, Keen & 
McCarty, 2003), also called multi-step problem solving (Willatts, 2004). This kind of 
behavior clearly involves planning on a level that has to be more advanced than mere 
prospective control of future events. Insights that are to gain from studying this kind of 
tasks come from looking at how actions in an earlier phase of the task prepare the actual 
performing of the task in a later phase. Claxton et al., for example, show that there is 
already a sophisticated level of action planning present in children of ten months old 
that grasp a ball for executing one of two subsequent tasks. Differences in the kinematic 
pattern of the hand approaching the target-object indicate an influence of future task 
demands on the grasping phase. It is in this type of research that we can detect the way 
in which the different factors involved in a task are combined and how they constrain 
behavior. 
Tool use certainly belongs to the category of tasks described above and is very 
suitable for studying the development of planning for at least two reasons. First, using a 
tool necessitates the planning of actions in different phases of a task. In its simplest 
form, at least two sub-goals have to become coupled and ordered over time, viz. the 
picking up and subsequent using of the tool in an effective way. Many studies have 
focused on the way information about the goal-state or tool-related information 
influence if and how a tool is used (e.g., McCarty, Clifton & Collard, 1999, 2001; 
Chapter 3 
 78 
Steenbergen, Van der Kamp, Smitsman & Carson, 1997; Van Leeuwen, Smitsman & 
Van Leeuwen, 1994; Want & Harris, 2001). It is clear that to really understand the 
complexity of tool use, identifying the goal state or focusing on the tool characteristics 
in isolation is not enough. To date we lack a clear knowledge of how these different 
aspects of the task come together over time, and how choices that are made in picking 
up the tool prepare the actual tool-using activities. 
Second, in addition to this multi-step character, using a tool involves the careful 
coordination and control of a number of different components, combined in a system of 
three coupled relations (Cox & Smitsman, 2006a; Smitsman & Bongers, 2003), also 
called interfaces (Wagman & Carrello, 2003; Wagman & Taylor, 2004). These relations 
exist between the tool, the target-object and the actor, by the very nature of tool use. 
They constrain each other in a fundamental way, and are further constrained by specific 
task demands. Every action system that has been ‘extended’ with a formerly detached 
object (i.e., the tool) is confronted with the challenge of integrating these relations into 
its system. The newly assembled action system is then capable of fulfilling a task that 
was otherwise impossible or very difficult without the tool. We believe that tool use 
becomes organized the way it is, because the information that is available on these 
relations in the different phases of the task, together with biomechanical factors, drive 
this integrated system. Not just one aspect of this system is the focus, for example, how 
a tool is grasped or held, or which tool-to-object relation is realized, but their interplay 
in time with respect to a certain goal. 
The present study reports two experiments that address the issues raised above, by 
investigating 2-year-olds’ and 3-year-olds’ hand use when picking up a tool and 
subsequently using that tool for displacing an object. In both of the experiments the 
Young Children’s Tool Use 
 79 
target-object was placed in front of the child on a table, together with the tool. In 
Experiment 1, a stick was used as the tool, perpendicularly positioned on the child’s 
midline between the target-object and the child. In Experiment 2, a cane (hooked stick) 
was placed on the child’s midline, with the handle either pointing to the left or to the 
right and with the hook oriented either towards or away from the target-object. In both 
of the experiments this starting configuration of tool and object was combined with 
different goal locations for the object, which were either to the child’s right side or left 
side on the near end of the table. 
The main questions these experiments tried to address were: How does the choice 
to use a particular hand and tool-to-object relation come about as the result of the 
different factors involved in the task? And how is this choice altered (or not) when 
action unfolds over time and circumstances change? At the beginning of the task, the 
child has to choose the hand to pick up the tool with. After that, the tool is in the hand 
and transporting the object has become the new goal. The state of the relations between 
tool, object and actor has changed, which corresponds to a change in the saliency and 
relative importance of the available sensorimotor information. In this second phase, the 
child has to control the tool-to-object relation, creating a movement path for the object 
towards the goal location. As a result of the changes in input and task demands, 
adequate control of the tool might necessitate the action system to be adapted 
accordingly. If necessary, therefore, this will lead to switching of the tool between the 
hands. 
Analyzing the task, we can identify three possible influences on hand choice: the 
tool’s orientation, the target-object’s destination, and various child factors, like 
handedness and dexterity, which are probably age related. No clear hypotheses can be 
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formulated about the way these factors will interact and combine in the action-selection 
process for the different age groups. Only a few simple predictions can be derived. 
Earlier studies have shown that object orientation influences hand choice (Cox & 
Smitsman, 2006a; McCarty et al., 1999; Rosenbaum et al., 1990; Van Leeuwen et al., 
1994). For example, Rosenbaum et al. found that for adult subjects orientation is an 
important variable determining grip type and hand choice in grasping a functional 
object. McCarty et al.’s research showed that from about 19 months of age the 
orientation of a spoon’s handle reliably predicts the ipsilateral hand for grasping it. Tool 
orientation is prominently present in this study also. Therefore, we expect a strong 
effect of orientation in the grasping phase when the cane is used, while this effect will 
be absent for the stick because of symmetry. Goal location is likely to be of more 
importance in the second phase of the task, because of its clear relevance for the actions 
involved in transporting. However, it might also have an effect even earlier in the task. 
We refer to Claxton et al. (2003) and Willatts (2004) who found evidence for kind of 
influence already in infants. 
 
Experiment 1 
 
This experiment was designed to investigate the influence of goal location as an 
external constraint on children’s hand use, in two different phases of the task. The major 
question this experiment addressed was whether, and if so, in what phase of the task, the 
choice of which hand to use for grasping a tool, and subsequently for displacing a 
target-object, will be influenced by this goal location. This will give us more insight into 
how action planning is influenced by information with respect to a future goal state. In 
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other words, how, if at all, does the goal state that has to be reached by actions in the 
second phase (i.e., transporting the object), affect the actions in the first phase of the 
task that prepare these activities (i.e., grasping the tool)? 
Because of the symmetrical shape of the stick, and by placing it with its center on 
the child’s midline, we expected no asymmetric effect on hand use coming from the 
tool. However, an asymmetric effect was expected to come from goal location, which 
was at the right side or left side of the child. Arguably, the hand contralateral with 
respect to goal location is more efficient for controlling the displacement of the object to 
its goal location with the stick. The contralateral hand enables the child to easily realize 
a suitable alignment of tool and object, in which the tool is held orthogonal to the 
object’s movement path that stretches diagonally across the table. The resulting 
movement has been observed in an earlier study and has been labeled sweeping 
movement (Cox & Smitsman, 2006). Sweeping movements are effective, efficient, and 
easy to make, that is, they require a relatively small number of degrees of freedom to 
become coordinated. This is especially true when using a stick, which, because of its 
shape, has no way of enclosing the object. To assess possible developmental differences 
in the way these factors influence the selections that are made for action, we compared 
children of two age groups: 2-year-olds and 3-year-olds. 
 
Method 
Participants. Children in two age groups, 2-year-olds that were within three 
weeks of their second birthday (23-24 months) and 3-year-olds that were within three 
weeks of their third birthday (35-36 months), participated in this experiment. The data 
of 19 2-year-old children and 22 3-year-old children were used for further analysis. The 
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group of 2-year-olds contained 7 boys and 12 girls, and the group of 3-year-olds 
contained 9 boys and 13 girls. The children were recruited by means of written 
invitations. Names and addresses of potential recruits were obtained through the birth 
records of the city of Nijmegen. The parents voluntarily replied with a return card, after 
which an appointment was made in a follow-up telephone call. The children and their 
parents were rewarded for their participation by means of a certificate and a small 
financial compensation. 
Material. The task was performed on a height-adjustable red round table, with a 
diameter of 66 cm (see Figure 1a). A blue curved pit in the table, 7.0 cm wide, 12 cm 
long, and 2.6 cm deep served as the goal location. This goal location could be varied, 
either at the left side or at the right side, in the half of the table nearest to the child. Its 
center was always at 7.5 cm from the edge and about 20 cm horizontal distance from the 
child’s line of sight. The stick that was used was 38 cm long, painted blue, and was 
made from a 12-mm thick hollow aluminum tube (mass: 36 g). It was symmetrical 
along all its principle axes. With this stick, the children had to displace one of three 
target-objects, which were luridly colored, plastic sea-animals (one yellow and one 
green fish, and one orange octopus), about (l) 5 cm × (w) 4 cm × (h) 4 cm in size. 
Procedure. All the experiments were performed in a quiet laboratory on the 
university campus especially adjusted to accommodate children. Upon arrival at the 
location, the child and the parent(s) were escorted to the experiment room and the 
necessary time to become at ease was taken. After this, the children were positioned at 
the table, the height of which was adjusted to the waist height. During the experiment, 
the children were standing on a footboard to prevent them from walking around the 
table. A parent sat behind them and an experimenter in front of them on the other side of 
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Figure 1.  a) Example configuration of Experiment 1. 
b) Example configuration of Experiment 2. 
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the table. If necessary, the parent was asked to keep the child in place by taking her 
between the knees or by holding her at the waist. This in no way impeded the children’s 
behavioral freedom in an experimentally relevant way. The task of the parent was 
further limited to verbally encouraging the child without giving any hints. The stick and 
target-objects were shown to the children and they were allowed to explore them and 
the table for a while. During this phase the experimenter told the child that the little sea-
animals would like to go to the water (the blue pit in the table). Because they were to 
little to do this on their own, the child was asked to help them by using the stick. The 
experiment started by placing the first target-object on the table at a clear distance from 
the child (always behind the nearest half of the table). The stick was always positioned 
between the child and the target-object, perpendicularly crossing the child’s line of sight 
(which equaled a table midline as can be seen in Figure 1a). This starting position was 
the same for all trials. The goal location was varied over four trials, such that each goal 
location (right side or left side) was presented twice in a completely randomized order. 
The duration of one experimental session was about 5 to 10 min. 
Response scoring. One behavioral variable, hand use, was determined from the 
videotaped sessions. The values that were possible for hand use were left, right or both, 
where the latter value was assigned when both hands grasped or touched the tool. To 
keep track of possible switches of the tool between the hands, in the time interval after 
the tool was picked up and before the actual start of the object’s displacement, two 
distinct phases of the task were defined. The period of time between the start of the trial 
and the child’s grasping of the tool, that is, the period in which the child planned the 
hand(s) to pick up the tool, was defined as the grasping phase. The period of time 
between the start of the target-object’s transportation with the tool and the first arrival of 
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the object at its end-position was called the transporting phase. Hand use was scored for 
both of these phases. 
One observer scored all trials. Reliability of scoring was checked by means of a 
second observer who scored a random sample of about one fourth of the data (10 
participants). The percentage of agreement between the two observers was higher than 
90% (κ > 0.89) for each of these participants. 
 
Results 
The use of both hands was 5.3% (two trials) for the 2-year-olds and 4.5% (two 
trials) for the 3-year-olds, in the grasping phase. In the transporting phase this was 2.6% 
(one trial) for the 2-year-olds and 0.0% (zero trials) for the 3-year-olds. These trials 
where excluded from further analysis. 
The percentages of right-hand use for the 2-year-olds were 76% in the grasping 
phase and 86% in the transporting phase. For the 3-year-olds this was 73% and 73%, 
respectively. For both age groups there was significantly more use of the right hand 
compared to the left hand in both phases of the task, as confirmed by t-tests performed 
on the proportions of right-hand use with a test value of 0.5: t(16) = 4.243, p < .001, in 
the grasping phase, t(17) = 5.333, p < .001, in the transporting phase, for the 2-year-
olds, and t(19) = 3.327, p < .01, t(21) = 3.578, p < .01, for the 3-year-olds, respectively. 
In Figure 2 the percentages of right-hand use for both phases of the task and for 
both age groups are shown, as a function of goal location. In the following, the analyses 
of the hand-use data will be presented. Because of the exploratory character of these 
analyses, they were performed on different levels: First, an omnibus analysis with goal 
location and phase as within-subjects factors and age as between-subjects factor. After 
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that, the most interesting results were looked at more closely within each age group, and 
finally for the two age groups and the two phases of the task separately. Analyzing the 
data in this way enabled us to make clear statements about what was driving behavior in 
both phases of the task in each of the two age groups. 
Figure 2. Percentages of right-hand use in the two phases of the task in Experiment 1 as a 
function of goal location (GL). 
 
We conducted a 2 (age) × 2 (phase) × 2 (goal location) repeated measures 
ANOVA on the hand-use data, with age as between-subjects factor. This yielded two 
main effects: For phase, F(1, 35) = 5.355, p < .05, and for goal location, F(1, 35) = 
6.551, p < .05. More importantly, there was an interaction effect between age and goal 
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location, F(1, 35) = 8.511, p < .01. This means that the effect of goal location was 
different for the older children compared to the younger children. 
Next, we performed a 2 (phase) × 2 (goal location) repeated measures ANOVA 
for each of the two age groups separately. This yielded a significant effect of phase in 
the 2-year-olds, F(1, 16) = 6.667, p < .05, revealing that the right hand was used more 
frequent in the transporting phase than in the grasping phase. For the 3-year-olds, a 
main effect of goal location was found, F(1, 19) = 17.292, p < .001. 
Finally, repeated measures ANOVAs with goal location as factor were performed 
for each phase and each age group separately. This revealed that goal location was 
significant in both phases of the task in the older children, F(1, 19) = 15.545, p < .001, 
in the grasping phase, and F(1, 21) = 17.500, p < .001, in the transporting phase. In this 
group, the direction of the effect was such that the right hand was used almost 
exclusively when goal location was left. When goal location was right, the proportions 
of right-hand use and left-hand use were about equal (see Figure 2). Goal location had 
no effect on the younger children’s hand use in none of the phases. 
 
Discussion 
It can be concluded that in both age groups there was an overall preference for 
using the right hand, both for picking up the tool as well as for displacing the target-
object with that tool. Although handedness was not assessed independently for each 
participant, the higher proportions of right-hand use indicated that such a right-hand 
preference was clearly present in both age groups throughout the task. 
The results of this experiment also revealed a major difference between the two 
age groups with respect to hand use. It is clear that goal-related information was 
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influencing only the older children’s behavior. Although the goal state of the target-
object was (a priori) only directly relevant for activities in the transporting phase, the 3-
year-olds prospectively adapted their action system to this later demand. Grasping the 
stick with the contralateral hand with respect to the goal location enabled them to make 
the sweeping movements (Cox & Smitsman, 2006a) which are very efficient. In the 
older children, therefore, external information about the future goal state constrained the 
actions that needed to be performed in an earlier phase of the task in a functional way, 
facilitating task performance. 
The 2-year-olds, on the contrary, showed no sign of such adaptive behavior 
instigated by goal-related information. The reason for this might be that, because goal-
related information is not directly relevant for which hand to grasp the tool with, 
attention was not focused on relevant information for limb selection from the start. This 
might be interpreted as not being able to pick up or use the information necessary to 
plan ahead. Because the symmetric tool-related information coming from the stick 
created no bias towards a particular hand, the younger children grasped the stick with 
their preferred right hand. Even in the transporting phase, goal location did not play a 
role in the hand choice. Between the phases, switching of the stick between the hands 
was mainly directed to the right hand, which must be the result of an increasing 
influence of hand preference. 
Arguably, this asymmetric switching, that is, the bias towards the more dexterous 
right hand, was the result of the higher task demands during transportation of the object 
(cf. LeConte & Fagard, 2004). Although it would have been more efficient to use the 
hand contralateral with respect to goal location, as the older children did, the younger 
children preferred to use their right hand irrespective of the target-object’s destination. 
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Apparently, it was not the control of the tool-to-object relation and the object’s 
movement path towards the goal location that determined the choice of which hand to 
use in the younger children. They were much more driven by internal constraints on the 
motor system, leading to more preferred-hand use, in fact reducing control of the tool-
to-object relation. 
 
Experiment 2 
 
In Experiment 1 a difference was found between 2-year-olds and 3-year-olds, in 
the way the target-object’s destination influenced the choice of what hand to use for 
grasping and controlling the tool. The following experiment combined such goal-related 
information with additional task constraints coming from the tool itself, in order to 
investigate their relative and combined influence on the hand-use planning. The goal 
location was again fixed, either to the left side or to the right side of the child, but now a 
cane was positioned with its center on the child’s midline, its handle pointing either to 
the left or to the right. The same two age groups were studied. 
Arguably, goal-related information is directly relevant for the second phase of the 
task, during transporting, while tool-related information, which is asymmetric now 
because the cane is asymmetrically shaped, is primarily important for how to grasp the 
tool. Note that which part of the tool will actually be used as the handle is constrained 
by the tool-to-object relation (the topology) the child decides to realize, for example, 
enclosing the object with the hook or using the cane as a stick. 
For the older children, because of the findings of the previous experiment, we 
expect potentially conflicting situations for the hand-use planning when the goal 
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location and the handle are both at the same side of the child. This will influence hand 
use by ‘complicating’ a clear choice, measured by an (almost) equal proportion of using 
each of the hands. On the other hand, when they are at opposite sides of the child, we 
expect the choice for using either the right hand or the left hand to be much more 
sharply separated. This is the effect of the combined and unambiguous influence of the 
two factors. 
 
Method 
Participants. Children in two age groups, 2-year-olds that were within three 
weeks of their second birthday (23-24 months) and 3-year-olds that were within three 
weeks of their third birthday (35-36 months), participated in this experiment. The data 
of 15 2-year-old children and 17 3-year-old children were used for further analysis. The 
group of the 2-year-olds contained 7 boys and 8 girls, and the group of the 3-year-olds 
contained 8 boys and 9 girls. The children were recruited and rewarded in the same way 
as in Experiment 1. 
Material. The same table with the movable blue pit as in Experiment 1 was used 
for this experiment (see Figure 1b). By bending one end of a 12-mm thick, hollow 
aluminum tube, a cane was constructed of 38 cm long with a width at the hook of 8.2 
cm. It weighted 44 g and was painted blue. The target-objects were the same as in the 
previous experiment. 
Procedure. The general procedure was the same as in Experiment 1, but with the 
following modifications. Instead of a stick, a cane was used that was always positioned 
between the child and the target-object, perpendicularly crossing the child’s line of sight 
(see Figure 1b). The orientation of the cane varied in two ways: handle-orientation 
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(pointing to the left or to the right of the child) and hook-orientation (away from or 
towards the object). Combining them with the two possible goal locations (on the left 
and on the right of the child) produced eight conditions. These were presented to the 
child in a random order, which resulted in a 10-min duration of one experimental 
session. 
Response scoring. From the videotaped sessions, two dependent variables were 
scored: topology and hand use. The variable hand use was acquired in the same way and 
with the same scoring criteria as in Experiment 1. 
The tool-to-object configuration that the child realizes in transporting the target-
object towards its goal location is called topology. It provides us with valuable 
information about the tool function the children perceive and use. The position where 
the object contacts the cane can in principle be anywhere on the cane’s surface, making 
it a continuous variable. However, for the purpose of this experiment, there were two 
values constructed for this variable: enclosure and non-enclosure (see Figure 3). 
Enclosure topology was defined as the configuration in which the object was inside the 
hook or touching the cane very near to the hook’s inside. The tip of the hook was also 
scored as enclosure. Non-enclosure topology was scored for all other tool-to-object 
configurations. For example, when the object was at the outside of the hook or when the 
cane was clearly used as a stick, that is, when the object touched the handle part of the 
hook. 
Two observers independently scored a random sample of about one third of the 
data (11 participants). For both of the dependent variables and each of the participants, 
the percentage of agreement was higher than 88% (κ > .86). The remaining data was 
divided between the two observers. 
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Figure 3. Examples of the two topologies: a) enclosure, b) non-enclosure. 
 
Results and Discussion 
The use of both hands was 0.8% (1 trial) for the 2-year-olds and 0.0% (0 trials) for 
the 3-year-olds, in the grasping phase. In the transporting phase this was 3.3% (4 trials) 
for the 2-year-olds and 3.7% (5 trials) for the 3-year-olds. These trials where excluded 
from further analysis. 
Hand use. The 2-year-olds showed 62% overall right-hand use in the grasping 
phase and 80% overall right-hand use in the transporting phase. For the 3-year-olds this 
was 63% in the grasping phase and 61% in the transporting phase. For both age groups, 
in both phases of the task, this significantly differed from left-hand use as confirmed by 
t-tests performed on the proportions of right-hand use: t(14) = 2.728, p < .05, in the 
grasping phase, t(14) = 6.318, p < .001, in the transporting phase, for the 2-year-olds, 
and t(16) = 2.873, p < .05, t(16) = 2.297, p < .05, for the 3-year-olds, respectively. 
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Again, similar to Experiment 1, it can be concluded that in both age groups and in both 
phases of the task there was an overall preference for using the right hand. 
The rationale for the analyses of the hand-use data differed slightly from 
Experiment 1. We started with analyses of the goal-related and tool-related factors in 
the two phases of the task, for each age group separately. After that, the most interesting 
results were highlighted in an analysis with age added as between-subjects factor, and in 
analyses for each age group in each phase separately. Finally, we looked at the deviation 
from basic hand preference as a function of the independent variables. Again, because 
of the exploratory nature of the analyses, this way of looking at the data gave us the 
clearest insight into what factors where driving hand choice, developmental differences 
therein, and adjustments during the task as a result of changing task demands. 
The percentages of right-hand use as a function of the independent variables in the 
two phases of the task are presented in Table 1. First, we performed a 2 (phase) × 2 
(goal location) × 2 (handle-orientation) × 2 (hook-orientation) repeated measures 
ANOVA on the hand-use data, for each age group separately. The results of these 
analyses are presented in Table 2. We will discuss the main findings below. 
As shown in Table 2, handle-orientation had a significant effect on hand choice. 
As was expected, the children of both age groups used the hand ipsilateral with respect 
to the cane’s handle. More remarkable, there was also a significant contralateral effect 
of goal location present for both age groups. 
For the 2-year-olds, there was a main effect for phase and an interaction between 
phase and goal location (see Table 2). The direction of these effects revealed that there 
was significantly more right-hand use in the transporting phase compared to the 
grasping phase, and that the effect of goal location on hand use diminished between the 
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Table 1. Percentages of right-hand use in the two phases of the task in Experiment 2, as a 
function of the three independent variables goal location (GL), handle-orientation (HAO) and 
hook-orientation (HOO). 
 
 2-year-olds 3-year-olds 
GL HAO HOO Grasping Transporting Grasping Transporting 
Away 87% 87% 76% 43% 
Right 
Towards 60% 93% 82% 60% 
Away 27% 80% 24% 18% 
Right 
Left 
Towards 20% 45% 29% 18% 
Away 87% 100% 94% 82% 
Right 
Towards 100% 100% 94% 94% 
Away 57% 62% 82% 100% 
Left 
Left 
Towards 58% 73% 24% 76% 
 
phases. The latter is remarkable because a-priori one would deem goal location to be 
more important for activities during and related to transportation. The former shows that 
the asymmetrical switching that was observed in Experiment 1 was also present in 
Experiment 2. Again, this illustrated an increasing influence of hand preference during 
the task in this age group. 
In the older children the influence of hand preference remained ‘constant’ over the 
phases, but the number of switches of the cane between the hands was still considerable: 
about 30% of the trials. This switching was, contrary to the younger children, equally 
distributed between left-to-right and right-to-left. This points at a more flexible use of 
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Table 2. Results of the ANOVA on the hand-use data of Experiment 2. Each age group was 
analyzed separately with phase, goal location (GL), handle-orientation (HAO) and hook-
orientation (HOO) as within-subject factors. 
 
 
2-year-olds 
F(1, 14) 
3-year-olds 
F(1, 16) 
phase 19.689*** n.s. 
GL 8.129* 32.422*** 
HAO              24.421*** 28.639*** 
phase × GL 9.263** 15.662*** 
phase × HAO n.s. 11.075** 
GL × HAO n.s. 13.922** 
GL × HOO 7.971* 13.222** 
HAO × HOO n.s. 9.459** 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
 
the capacities available in their action system, arguably due to a higher level of dexterity 
in both hands. This behavior must have been driven by task-related sensorimotor 
information. Indeed, for the 3-year-olds, there were interaction effects of phase with 
both goal location and handle-orientation (see Table 2). These revealed an increasing 
effect of goal location on hand use during the task, and a decreasing effect of handle-
orientation. 
The interaction effect of goal location and hook-orientation was present for both 
age groups, but was the result of a different hand-use pattern. In the older children, the 
direction of this effect was such that the contralateral effect of goal location on hand use 
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was only present when the hook was oriented away from the target-object. For hook-
orientations towards the target-object, hand use reflected the overall right-hand 
preference, for both goal locations. In the younger children, however, the interaction 
was such that a contralateral effect of goal location on hand use was present for both 
hook-orientations, but more strongly when the hook was orientated towards the target-
object. 
A 2 (age) × 2 (phase) × 2 (goal location) × 2 (handle-orientation) × 2 (hook-
orientation) repeated measures ANOVA with age as between-subjects factor yielded a 
three-way interaction between age, phase and goal location, F(1, 30) = 23.963, p < .001. 
This interaction effect proved that the difference in the pattern of hand use between the 
two age groups, with respect to goal location, was indeed significant. The 2 (goal 
location) × 2 (handle-orientation) × 2 (hook-orientation) repeated measures ANOVAs 
for each age group and each phase separately revealed that goal location had a 
significant contralateral effect on hand use in both age groups already in the grasping 
phase. This is in clear contrast with the results of Experiment 1. 
One final noteworthy result from the latter analyses. In the older children, in the 
transporting phase, the effect of handle-orientation was strongly dependent on goal 
location, F(1, 16) = 5.658, p < .05. The ipsilateral effect of handle-orientation on hand 
use was only present for the goal location on the right side of the child. This means that 
a large number of children who initially chose to pick up the cane with the left hand 
when the goal location was on the left, switched to the right hand for transporting the 
object. In other words, they selectively avoided ‘pulling’ movements with the left hand 
to the left side. 
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Deviation from hand preference. To get an indication of additivity and relative 
strength of the influence of the independent variables, we have to look at the size and 
direction of the deviations from the basic (right-)hand preference they bring about. 
Because children’s handedness was not assessed independently, we chose to define an 
ad-hoc and task-related measure for the hand preference. For each age group and each 
phase of the task, a separate baseline for basic hand preference was calculated, by 
averaging the proportion of right-hand use (which was always larger than the proportion 
of left-hand use) over all conditions in that phase and over all children in that age group. 
Due to the complete symmetry and the randomization of the experimental conditions, 
these baselines provide a good measure for the natural tendency in each age group to 
use one hand over the other. 
In Figure 4 the deviation from basic hand preference is shown for the two age 
groups and for both phases of the task, as a function of the two most important 
independent variables (viz. goal location and handle-orientation). The baselines were set 
as the zero levels in the two graphs of Figure 4, constituting a hypothetical hand-use 
system with no (task-related) hand preference. In the graphs, the effects of age and 
phase described above can clearly be recognized, and, in addition, the strength and 
direction of goal location and handle-orientation effects become apparent from this way 
of representing the data. 
For example, a straightforward observation is that, in the grasping phase, the 
relative deviations from basic hand preference were about equal in size and direction for 
both age groups. In the transporting phase, however, effects were larger in the 3-year-
olds, which means that their behavior is much more driven by external information. 
Note that in the conditions where both goal location and handle-orientation were on the
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Figure 4. Relative deviation from basic hand preference in the 2-year-olds in the grasping phase 
and transporting phase (above). Relative deviation from basic hand preference in the 3-year-olds 
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in the grasping phase and transporting phase (below). Basic hand preference is defined for each 
age group and each phase of the task, by averaging the proportion of right-hand use over all 
conditions in that phase and all children in that age group. The zero level in these graphs 
corresponds to hand use that is equal to the basic hand preference (1 × BHP) in that age group in 
that phase of the task. A value of 0.51 corresponds to hand use that is equal 1.51 × BHP in that 
age group in that phase of the task (i.e., more right-hand use). A value of -0.16 corresponds to a 
use of the right hand that is 0.84 × BHP in that age group in that phase of the task (i.e., less 
right-hand use). 
 
same side, the effects were also oppositely directed for the two age groups. As a second 
example, the goal location by handle-orientation interaction in the transporting phase in 
the older children, described above, is also clearly visible (compare the left two black 
bars with the right two black bars in Figure 4b). 
Based on the results above we know that four conditions were conflicting with 
respect to their sensorimotor input to limb selection in the grasping phase. These were 
the conditions where both handle-orientation and goal location were at the same side. 
Because of the oppositely directed effects that these variables had on hand use in these 
cases, their input to the planning system must have been conflicting. Figure 4 shows 
that the relative deviation from basic hand preference was smaller in these conflicting 
conditions (the outer two white bars in each graph), as compared to the non-conflicting 
conditions (the inner two white bars in each graph). In the latter cases, where the input 
was not conflicting, their combined influence resulted in relatively larger deviations 
from basic hand preference. This effect was visible in both age groups. It was still 
present even in the transporting phase (compare the outer two and inner two black bars 
of each graph), although less strongly so. 
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Topology. The 3-year-olds in 83% of the trials realized an enclosure of the target-
object in the hook and in 17% they realized non-enclosure topology. The 2-years-old 
used an enclosure topology in 67% of the trials and a non-enclosure topology in 33% of 
the trials. Overall these results tells us that the children in both age groups discover and 
use the typical hook function that the cane affords (i.e. enclosure topology), although 
there is an age difference. These findings are in accordance with earlier results of a 
comparable experiment reported by Cox and Smitsman (in press), in which children 
with an average age of 32.3 months used an enclosure topology in 76% of the trails. 
A 2 (goal location) × 2 (handle-orientation) × 2 (hook-orientation) ANOVA was 
performed on the topology data for each age group separately. None of the independent 
variables had an effect on topology in the 3-year-olds, so the starting configuration of 
tool to object and child did not determine the way the tool was used for displacement. In 
the 2-year-old children there was a main effect of goal location, F(1, 14) = 10.647, p < 
.01, revealing relatively more use of an enclosure topology when the goal location was 
at the right side. This effect is clearly connected to the high proportion of right-hand 
uses (80%) in the 2-year-olds in the transporting phase. Specifically, when the location 
of the goal is at the right side and the cane is in the right hand, it is much more efficient 
to perform the transportation by enclosing the object in the hook. 
A 2 (age) × 2 (goal location) × 2 (handle-orientation) × 2 (hook-orientation) 
repeated measures ANOVA with age as between-subjects factor yielded an age by goal 
location interaction, F(1,30) = 5.536, p < .05, showing that the effect of goal location 
indeed significantly differed between the two age groups. 
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General Discussion 
 
The two experiments revealed a number of interesting differences in the pattern of 
hand use between the two age groups. We will start by summarizing the most important 
findings: First, an overall preference for using the right hand was detected in both age 
groups and in both experiments. This effect of hand preference was stronger for the 
younger children and even increased during the task. Second, younger children’s hand 
use, contrary to older children’s hand use, was not influenced by goal-related 
information, when using a stick. However, when it was combined with the more salient 
tool-related information coming from the asymmetrical cane, both sources of 
information significantly influenced hand choice for grasping the tool, in both age 
groups. Finally, the effects of goal-related information, tool-related information and the 
way they were coupled with hand preference not only differed between the two tasks, 
but also between the two phases within each task. In the following we will discuss these 
findings and consider some possible explanations. Subsequently, we will interpret the 
results in light of the properties of the action-selection process for action we described 
in the introduction. 
A substantial part of the behavior in both age groups was determined by factors 
that seemed internal to the children’s action system, in particular hand preference. 
However, the hand preference manifested itself not rigidly during the task, but varied 
with the specific constellation of task constraints. A stable hand preference for young 
children is difficult to define clearly, as can be concluded from the literature; different 
studies report different ages between 7 months and 8 years (Hopkins & Rönnqvist, 
1998). As a result, and because no independent assessment of handedness was 
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performed, statements about individual children’s behavior is impossible. Nevertheless, 
looking at the overall pattern of hand use in this study, a preference for using the right 
hand cannot be denied. 
It is our conviction that young children (as well as adults) are bimanual in 
principle. In virtually all manual activity both hands are participating all of the time 
with a certain division of labor between hands (Corbetta & Gadacz, 1999; Corbetta & 
Thelen, 1996). Although in nearly all trials only one hand was used for controlling the 
tool, the other hand was always stand-by to take over the main task when task-demands 
necessitated this, or when performance was easier that way. The easy switching between 
the hands, which we saw in both age groups, clearly supports this statement. In the older 
children this was most explicitly guided by sensory input, while in the younger children 
the hand preference seemed largely responsible for the switching behavior, leading to a 
large and increasing asymmetry in hand use. 
Contrary to Experiment 1, in Experiment 2, goal location had an effect on hand 
use in the 2-year-olds already in the grasping phase, now that it was combined with the 
salient tool-related information from the asymmetrically shaped cane. The interesting 
question that arises from this finding is how goal location could play a part in the choice 
in one task, while it had no part in the other, very similar task. The answer to this 
question must be found in what sets these two tasks apart, which was of course the 
shape of the tool. The asymmetry of the cane, more specifically the fact that it had a 
hook at one end, formed a very salient and constraining source of information with 
respect to the tool-to-object relation (topology) that could be realized with it. We know 
from perception studies that young children are very sensitive to the action possibilities 
or constraints an object affords for another object in relation to a particular outcome 
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(e.g., Dejonckheere, Smitsman & Verhofstadt-Denève, 2005, in press; Gibson & Pick, 
2000). This claim is further backed up by the fact that we actually did observe frequent 
enclosure of the object in the hook in both age groups, which clearly shows that the 
children perceived the typical hook function the cane afforded. 
The perception that an enclosure topology is possible, which provides high 
controllability of the object’s movement path, had immediate consequences for how to 
grasp the tool, that is, on which side. As a result of this, the choice of which hand to use 
became important from early on in the task. This might have tuned the children to the 
discovery of potentially relevant information for hand use, coming from various sources 
like handle-orientation, but also goal location. What they discovered, therefore, was that 
picking up the tool in a certain way or with a certain hand made the use of it more or 
less efficiently later on. In other words, by their selections in an early phase of the task 
children prepared and facilitated task performance in a later phase. 
In both tasks children’s successful performance was affected by several different 
constraints. These constraints were functional or spatial (i.e., goal-related and tool-
related information) and directly related to the sub-goals in the task, or of a 
biomechanical nature (e.g., hand preference and dexterity) and directly related to the 
motor system (Gabbard & Rabb, 2000). Arguably, the influence of these constraints 
might switch during task performance, because of the different sub-goals the two phases 
of the task entail, and because of the different relative importance and meaning of tool-
related information and goal-related information. 
During transporting, the task became more difficult, and the demands on the 
action system were higher. The younger children increasingly chose to use the more 
dexterous and preferred right hand, which not always resulted in the most efficient and 
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easy way to execute the task. The older children, on the contrary, were able to suppress 
this motor demand in favor of a more efficient way of executing the task. Because of a 
high level of dexterity and skill in coordinating and controlling their action system, 
these children could easily switch the hook between the hands, enabling them to easily 
alter their initial choice if necessary. An important and interesting attribute of this 
finding is that the way this flexibility was used, was driven by the sensory input that 
was available with respect to the sub-goals that have to be reached and the task 
constraints these sub-goals provided (Leconte & Fagard, 2004). 
In this study different constraining influences on behavior were combined, 
revealing a number of interesting insights regarding the planning process that lies 
underneath. First, the particular hand choice children made at the start of the task was 
not rigid, but was easily adapted during task performance, if necessary. To be able to do 
this, planning has to be a dynamical process that can change its state when the available 
information changes. Second, the interplay of hand preference and dexterity with the 
sensorimotor input from the task was crucial in understanding the children’s behavior. It 
is not one single factor that caused the hand choice at any particular instant in time, but 
the specific constellation of factors that were involved. Their influences can be 
reinforcing or competing each other, as was demonstrated in Figure 4. Therefore, 
various internal and external constraints combine in the planning process. Third, partly 
because of the growing level of dexterity and skill, behavior was organized differently 
for the two age groups. In the older children the planning seems to be able to merge the 
available sensorimotor input with the internal factors differently, and, arguably, more 
efficiently. So, although present already in 2-year-olds, the planning process develops 
with age in the way it combines the different factors involved. 
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More generally, what this study revealed is that planning is not something that has 
its place outside and above action; we have to look at it as planning in action not just 
planning of action. The process is deeply interconnected with action and the way it 
evolves over time, both on the short timescale within a task as well as on the longer 
(developmental) timescale of becoming more skillful. Related to this, in both age 
groups, the planning proved to be embodied in the way it is organized around the child’s 
bodily means and growing dexterity in using those means. 
On a more speculative note, the view of planning we proposed is not unlike the 
model developed by Thelen et al. (2001) for the A-not-B task, which we described 
briefly in the introduction. Our results add to this line of thinking by exemplifying the 
concept that selections for action are not static end-states of an all-or-none process, 
which then hold as a fundament for subsequent actions. They are much more like an 
above-threshold temporary-stable state in the stream of output from a dynamical action-
selection process that does not stop after a single choice for action is made. Above 
threshold and temporary stable mean that the output of the process has to be strong 
enough and hold long enough, respectively, to actually determine the behavior. Inputs 
from various sources merge together, as long as they are available and picked up, and 
feed the process continuously, altering a selection in some cases, while refreshing and 
strengthening it in others. 
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Chapter 4 
 
A Dynamic Model for Limb Selection 
 
Choices about which (bodily) means to use to reach a certain goal constitute an integral 
part of action planning in any type of daily activity, from selecting the right tool for a 
job to choosing the appropriate hand for grasping a coffee mug. In general, planning in 
goal-directed behavior entails choices about goals, means and the specifics of how to 
couple and sequence those goals and means. The present study addresses the action 
planning in limb selection, more specifically, the action-selection process underlying 
the choice of which hand to use as a means in performing a unimanual grasping task. 
The options available in such a task are of course discrete; either the right hand or the 
left hand, making it a bi-stable system. One important factor involved is a person’s 
handedness, but cultural, habitual, and perceptual factors as well as task complexity 
contribute too (e.g. Bryden, 1999; De Agostini, Khamis, Ahui & Dellatolas, 1997; 
Fagard & Dahmen, 2003; Leconte & Fagard, 2005; Peters, 1990; Steenhuisen & 
Bryden, 1999), which makes it particular interesting as a case study for planning. 
Moreover, depending on the task and context, these factors can be reinforcing or 
competing in their contribution to the choice, temporarily favoring one hand above the 
other. This is evidently true for everyone who has ever experienced the difficulty of 
retrieving one’s keys out of one’s trouser pocket while holding a large bag of groceries 
in each hand. 
As mentioned, an important controlling factor for limb selection in a unimanual 
task is handedness. Handedness is often considered an invariant trait that determines a 
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person’s hand use in a large number of tasks (for an overview on handedness see 
Hopkins & Rönnqvist, 1998). A more contemporary view, which we will adopt here, 
takes other factors (i.e., from the environment and the task) into account, conceiving 
handedness, both in its direction and strength, as merely an internal predisposition or 
tendency to favor one hand above the other, not as the sole determinant in limb 
selection. This tendency can be counteracted when external stimulation becomes 
laterally specified or more demanding on the action system, as for example in grasping 
a tool in hemispace. This view is motivated by the observation that it is virtually 
meaningless to talk about a person’s dominant limb without doing a thorough analysis 
of the task with which it is measured. Handedness is neither a fixed nor a static 
biological trait, but is highly dependent on many contextual aspects of the task. Note 
that from this definition, it is reasonable to view handedness as a likelihood function for 
using one of the hands. 
As a general framework, one can roughly classify the relevant factors in limb 
selection into three categories of constraints, according to their relation to the action 
system: organismic, environmental, and task constraints (Newell, 1986, 1989; see also 
Clark, 1997). Each of these constraints does not serve as a single cause of behavior, but 
rather as a limiting factor on the action possibilities that are available for an organism 
(actor). The organismic constraints are best viewed as internal to the actor’s action 
system. It means that the actor is subjected to constraints resulting from the specific 
biomechanics and neuro-anatomy of his or her body, but also from the history of prior 
actions, as far as they altered the state of the action system in any way. Environmental 
constraints and task constraints are external to the actor’s action system and entail 
perceptual information with respect to the environment and the task. These constraints 
A Dynamic Model for Limb Selection 
 117 
are placed upon the actor by the environment in which the activities are embedded, and 
the nature and specifics of the task at hand (i.e., its goals, the available means, but also 
rules, conventions, and culture). Note that the distinction between environmental 
constraints and task constraint is not very strict. It depends on the actor’s freedom of 
manipulating these constraints. Note also that, in addition to their relation to the action 
system, another relevant and differentiating aspect of these action constraints is the 
timescale on which they are exerting their influence. This aspect will prove to be 
fundamental for our account of limb selection, and we will elaborate on it shortly. 
How do the different constraints coalesce in the planning? And how does limb 
selection come about as a result? In order to shed more light on these questions, 
Gabbard, Iteya, and Rabb (1997) performed the following simple but elegant 
experiment. Adult participants were asked to grasp a small object that was randomly 
placed at nine different locations in hemispace. The locations varied in laterality from 
left to right, keeping an equal distance to the body center on a half-circle in front of the 
participant (see Figure 1). Table 1 presents the results of their experiment. The overall 
response profile can be characterized as a tendency for ipsilateral reaching (i.e., the 
hand at the same side as the object) in the two hemispace sides, and use of the dominant 
limb at midline. This means that participants used their non-preferred hand when the 
object was presented on their non-preferred side. Although this general pattern was 
similar for both laterality groups, right-handers demonstrated a stronger preference for 
their dominant limb compared to left-handers. This can be gathered from the larger 
deviations from ipsilateral reaching at the non-preferred side in this group (see Table 1). 
Others reported comparable findings, in adults (Bryden, Pryde & Roy, 1999, 2000; 
Chapter 4 
 118 
Calvert & Bishop, 1998; Harris & Carlson, 1993), and also in children (Gabbard, Rabb 
Helbig & Gentry, 2001; Harris & Carlson, 1993). 
Figure 1. Setup of Gabbard et al.’s (1997) experiment. 
 
Table 1. Results of Gabbard et al. (1997): Proportion of preferred-hand use for the nine 
(randomly presented) object positions. 
 
Left hemispace  Right hemispace Group 
10° 30° 50° 70° 90° -70° -50° -30° -10° 
.98 .98 .98 .93 .75 .30 .13 .07 .08 Left-handers (N = 60) 
Right-handers (N = 84) .20 .19 .25 .42 .95 .99 .99 1.00 1.00 
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Inspired by these results Gabbard and Rabb (2000; 2004) hypothesized two 
mechanisms underlying limb selection: limb dominance and attentional information. As 
stated by the authors, limb dominance, or handedness as it is often referred to, is largely 
responsible for the hand choice in the ipsilateral hemispace and on midline. In terms of 
Newell’s (1986) categories of constraints, this mechanism belongs to the organismic 
constraints, as it is related to an asymmetry of the organism, be it functional or possibly 
even structural. Attentional information is supposed to be responsible for altering the 
hand choice in the contralateral hemispace. Gabbard and Rabb conceive the nature of 
the attentional information as perceptual, and its composition is determined by the 
spatial layout of the relevant objects in the task. Depending on the specifics of the task, 
it either fits into Newell’s category of environmental constraints or task constraints, as it 
is external to the organism’s action system. 
Despite the obvious relevance of these mechanisms and the ample empirical 
evidence that stresses the multi-causality of limb selection, we still lack a general 
framework for integrating these ideas in a concise explanation of how the choice to use 
a particular hand comes about. Put differently, as to date there is no working model for 
limb selection that can reproduce the empirical findings. As a minor point, the 
mechanisms do not offer a (testable) explanation for the differences in laterality strength 
between left-handers and right-handers. 
Recently, Cox and Smitsman (in press), following Thelen, Schöner, Scheier and 
Smith (2001) among others (Erlhagen & Schöner, 2002; Leconte & Fagard, 2004; 
Thelen & Smith, 1994; see also Busemeyer & Diederich, 2002; Busemeyer & 
Townsend, 1993; Grossberg, 1980), proposed a view on action planning that conceives 
of planning as a dynamical action-selection process for actions to take. This view differs 
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from the static symbol-manipulation and all-or-none type of views on planning in a 
number of fundamental points, which we will briefly describe below. First, choices for 
action are multi-causal, which means that many factors on several timescales can 
(potentially) influence the choice that will be made. These factors can be of very 
different origin and nature. Second, the process is embodied and embedded (situated) in 
its nature. This means that action selection, at its most fundamental level, is organized 
by and deals with structural and functional characteristics of the actor’s body and 
environment. These include preferences of a functional, biomechanical, or neuro-
anatomical nature. Third, the process has an intrinsic dynamics that incorporates these 
properties and determines the fate of the relevant factors in the process, in accordance 
with the neuro-anatomical structure of the action system. This makes it a continuous 
dynamical system in which choices for action emerge gradually over time. A final 
distinctive property, although not the topic of this paper, is that the process is also 
continuous in the sense that it does not halt after a single choice is made. Rather the 
dynamics of the process continues to generate subsequent choices for action, fed by the 
available input that may have changed. Choices are not ready made, waiting to be 
executed, but emerge from and remain part of the dynamics of the process. In this paper 
we will build on the view of planning described above to model limb selection. 
One of the most elaborate models embracing a highly similar view is by Thelen et 
al. (2001), concerning perseverative reaching behavior in infants, better known as the 
A-not-B error (Piaget, 1954). Their model is based on dynamic field theory of 
movement preparation (for an overview see Erlhagen & Schöner, 2002). A key aspect 
of Thelen et al.’s model is that the planning of a reaching movement is a process that 
takes place on different timescales. In the A-not-B task, there is the within-trial 
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timescale of the evolution of a motor plan for a single reaching movement towards a 
certain location. This plan is influenced by various types of information (task and 
specific inputs) that are available in real time, that is, before reaching onset during the 
actual planning of the reaching movement. In addition to this, an over-trials timescale of 
a series of reaching movements is suggested. At this timescale a motor memory evolves, 
which builds up a short-term bias towards a particular location, each time a reach is 
executed in the direction of that location. In other words, shaped by these earlier 
reaching movements, the motor memory gradually builds over time. In the authors’ 
perspective this motor memory influences subsequent plans for reaching movements. 
A most striking example from which it becomes apparent that these timescales 
interact is the phenomenon of perseveration, which is at the heart of the A-not-B error. 
Basically, perseveration demonstrates that a choice for action at a certain point in time 
is affected by previous choices for actions, such that these temporarily overrule the 
perceptual information that is available. In the A-not-B error it manifests itself by 
infant’s perseverance in reaching towards location A, after a number of successful 
reaches to that location, even after a perceptual cue is given in favor of another location 
(i.e., location B). Perseveration as a more general cognitive or behavioral phenomena, 
revealing the multiple-timescale dynamics of planning, has not had a lot of attention 
from researchers in the behavioural sciences. There are some studies on children’s 
search behavior (Sophian & Wellman, 1983), sorting (Zelazo & Reznick, 1991), and 
word-naming and categorization (Deák & Narasimham, 2003; Deák, Ray, & 
Brenneman, 2003). To our knowledge there is no study reporting perseverative limb 
selection in adults. 
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The multiple-timescale dynamics reveals itself in yet another subtle way. 
Consider a (bi-stable) system for which two distinct modes of behavior are possible. 
Moreover, consider this system to be performing under a gradually or sequentially 
changing parameterized condition. When this condition changes between two extremes, 
for which one of the behavioral modes is most suitable (and probable), a switch between 
the two modes of the system is observed at some point. Fundamentally, this switch can 
take place at a different value of the parameter, depending on the direction of change. 
This effect refers to the well-known hysteresis (and enhanced contrast) phenomenon, 
which is amongst the basic ‘flags’ of non-linear behavior in dynamical systems. 
Examples of hysteresis are numerous in human behavior (e.g., Farrell,1999; Haken, 
Kelso & Bunz, 1985; Hock, Schöner & Kelso, 1993; Kelso, 1995; Schöner & Kelso, 
1988; Tuller, Case, Ding & Kelso, 1994). To our knowledge, hysteresis in limb 
selection has never been studied, although a task designed by Bryden, Singh, 
Steenhuisen, and Clarkson (1994) is noteworthy in this respect. Starting from the body 
midline and extending to the left or right, participants performed a sequence of the same 
unimanual action. At some point, a transition occurred from using one hand to using the 
other. Because the task was performed in only one direction, a possible divergence of 
the transition point was not considered. 
A novel aspect that we introduce in this paper is the aspect of an asymmetry or a 
preference in the action-selection process. From the perspective of multiple-timescale 
dynamics, it is interesting to analyze the way in which a long-term bias potentially 
influences the planning. Within the focus of this study, hand preference is such a long-
term bias, known to affect limb selection. This asymmetry arises over a developmental 
timescale determined by factors that are not yet fully understood (e.g., Hopkins & 
A Dynamic Model for Limb Selection 
 123 
Rönnqvist, 1998). Nevertheless its influence cannot be denied, and must be taken into 
account in any serious model. A fundamental reason why this could be of more general 
interest for cognitive science is that it gives us a glimpse at how preferences as 
functional or structural asymmetries are part of the perception-action cycle, at the level 
of planning in goal-directed behavior. 
Summarizing, the goal of this paper is twofold. First, adding to the empirical 
realm and theoretical discussion on limb selection the aspect of multiple-timescale 
dynamics. To investigate this, we performed experiments in which the sequence of 
earlier limb selections was manipulated, thereby varying its possible effects on 
subsequent selections. Second, introducing a working dynamical model for the action-
selection process underlying limb selection, which integrates and extends the 
mechanisms proposed by Gabbard et al. (2000; 2004). In this way these mechanisms are 
treated in accordance with Newell’s (1986) view as constraints on action selection 
rather than as single-cause all-or-none explanations of this kind of behavior. We will 
show that the model reproduces the results of the reported experiments, and of Gabbard 
et al.’s (1997) original task. 
We report two experiments. In both experiments, adult participants who were 
sitting at a table had to pick up a small cube on each trial, and displace it to a box in 
front of them. In Experiment 1, participants received a series of trials in which the cubes 
were first placed at lateral positions, either four times on the extreme left side or four 
times on the extreme right side. This constituted a series of memory trials, building a 
memory trace (i.e., a short-term bias) for using one particular hand. To measure the 
possible effect of this memory trace on subsequent hand choices, this set of memory 
trials was followed by two more trials in which the object was presented on the 
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participant’s midline. For each participant, a set of memory trials was offered to the 
preferred hand and non-preferred hand, in two separate conditions. In Experiment 2, 
right-handed participants received a clockwise and counter-clockwise sequence of cube 
presentations on the nine different positions in Gabbard et al.’s (1997) task. Each 
participant received both sequences in two separate conditions. The main objective in 
this experiment was to detect differences in the pattern of hand use across hemispace as 
a function of the type of sequence that has been performed. 
In light of the results found by Gabbard et al. (1997) and our view on 
perseveration, we formulated two major hypotheses with respect to Experiment 1. First, 
we expected an increase in the number of non-preferred-hand uses at midline after a set 
of memory trials at the non-preferred hand. This short-term memory effect is what we 
call perseverative limb selection. A small increase in the number of preferred-hand uses 
was expected after a set of memory trials at the preferred hand, due to a ceiling effect. 
Second, because of the difference in handedness strength between the two laterality 
groups, we expected to find a difference in the size of the perseveration effect. Left-
handers were hypothesized to demonstrate a stronger effect of perseveration, because 
they already switch more easily to their non-preferred hand. Therefore, the effect of the 
short-term bias on future choices was reasoned to stand a better ‘chance’ in the process 
next to the weaker (compared to right-handers) long-term bias of the hand preference. In 
Experiment 2, when presenting the cubes in a clockwise sequence compared to the 
random task, we expected to see a (spatial) delay in the location of the switch from 
grasping the cube with the left hand to grasping it with the right hand. The same delay 
was expected for right-hand grasping switching into left-hand grasping in the counter-
clockwise condition. 
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Experiment 1 
 
Method 
Participants. Twenty strongly left-handed adults (5 male and 15 female) and 24 
strongly right-handed adults (4 male and 20 female). The direction and strength of the 
hand-preference was assessed using the four items of the manual part of the Lateral 
Preference Inventory for measurement of handedness, footedness, eyedness, and 
earedness (Coren, 1993). As was expected, it was more difficult to find strongly left-
handers (i.e., with four consistent left-hand answers on the inventory) than strongly 
right-handers. The mean age of the participants was 21.8 years (range: 19 - 28 years). 
None of the participants had a visual or physical impairment that could interfere with 
task performance. In particular, they all had normal or corrected to normal eyesight. 
Procedure. Participants were seated on a chair in front of a table (75 cm x 150 cm 
x 75 cm high), with an experimenter facing them on the opposite side. On this table nine 
locations were marked on a half circle, with the participant at its center, at slightly less 
than arms length away. These locations were set at 20 degrees intervals, starting at 10 
degrees relative to the edge of the table. This composed the following series: 10°, 30°, 
50°, and 70° on the left side of the participant, 90° (equaling the participant’s midline), 
and -70°, -50°, -30°, and -10° on the right side of the participant (see Figure 1). In the 
following, the minus sign will be used to denote locations in the right hemispace. 
A 1-inch3 cube was placed at one of these locations on each trial. Participants 
were asked to grasp the cube with one hand and transport it to a small box in front of 
them. Before the start of each trial, participants were instructed to close their eyes while 
the experimenter positioned the cube. After a verbal signal (“OK”) from the 
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experimenter, the participant opened the eyes and reached for the object. It was made 
clear that there was no need for a speedy reaction, but that enough time could be taken 
to make a decision to use one of the hands. Participants were unaware of the goal of the 
experiment. 
The experiment consisted of three conditions. Two conditions started by 
establishing a short-terms bias for one of the hands, by offering a set of four memory 
trials: M1, M2, M3 and M4. In one of the conditions the participant’s left hand was 
trained, in the other condition the participant’s right hand. Note that this means that 
each participant was trained on the preferred hand (PHM) as well as on the non-
preferred hand (NPHM). In the memory trials, the cube was presented successively at 
the 10°, 30°, 10°, and 30° locations on the left side (left-hand memory), or at the -10°, -
30°, -10°, and -30° locations on the right side (right-hand memory). Participants were 
free to choose the hand to grasp the cube with. In two subsequent ‘neutral’ trials, N1 and 
N2, the cube was presented at midline (90°), allowing us to determine the participant’s 
choice of limb on midline after the set of memory trials. The order of the two memory 
conditions was counterbalanced. 
In between these two memory conditions, Gabbard et al.’s (1997) experiment was 
performed as a third condition. The rationale for this was that this enabled us to 
establish a baseline proportion of preferred-hand use on midline, in the absence of a 
specific memory trace. In addition, it enabled us to replicate their findings. This random 
condition (RC) consisted of a series of nine trials in which the cube was placed on the 
table in each of the nine locations of Figure 1 in a completely randomized order. The set 
up of the experiment closely followed the original procedure by Gabbard et al. 
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Results and discussion 
Random condition. In the random condition we found a similar pattern of hand 
use as Gabbard et al. (1997). Despite this overall pattern, we found no significant 
differences between left-handers and right-handers on any of the specific locations. This 
may be due to a relatively small number of participants, which was about one-third of 
Gabbard et al. 
Memory conditions. The following results include 19 left-handed participants and 
17 right-handed participants. The reason for these numbers to be smaller than the total 
number of participants in each handedness group, is that not all participants turned out 
to be ‘trainable’ on their non-preferred hand. In our experimental procedure we 
deliberately did not instruct the participants to use the ipsilateral hand in the memory 
trials, because of the obvious possibility of transfer of this instruction to the neutral 
trials. As a result, a number of participants used their preferred hand rather than their 
non-preferred hand when the cubes were presented on their non-preferred side (i.e., 
contralateral with respect to cube position), despite the awkward across-midline 
reaching that this entails. As might be expected from the well-known difference in 
laterality strength between the handedness groups (although not found here), this 
number was considerably larger in the group of right-handers (seven participants) than 
in the group of left-handers (one participant). The participants who were not ‘trainable’ 
all used their preferred hand at all six trials in both conditions. 
In the following analyses, only the data of the participants who completed all 
memory trials (M1 to M4) with the appropriate hand were used, that is, ipsilateral with 
respect to the object. This constituted a group with a well-established short-term bias for 
that hand, and for whom perseverative limb selection might be expected. The results of 
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the two memory conditions are presented in Table 2. From the replication of Gabbard et 
al.’s (1997) experiment in the random condition, we obtained a baseline proportion of 
preferred-hand use on midline (90°). This was .84 for the left-handers and .88 for the 
right-handers. In the following we will discuss the main findings of the experiment. 
 
Table 2. Results of the memory conditions of Experiment 1: Proportion of preferred-hand use in 
the last two memory trials (M3 and M4) and the two neutral trials (N1 and N2). The proportion of 
preferred-hand use for the 90° location in the random task (Experiment 1) was .84 for the left-
handers, and .88 for the right-handers. 
 
Group M3 M4 N1 N2 
 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Left-handers (N = 19) 
Preferred-hand memory 
Non-preferred-hand memory 0.00 0.00 .53 .58 
 
1.00 1.00 .94 .88 
Right-handers (N = 17) 
Preferred-hand memory 
Non-preferred-hand memory 0.00 0.00 .53 .65 
 
First, the data of the two handedness groups were collapsed and analyzed as a 
single group of 36 participants. We tested if the proportions of preferred-hand use on 
midline differed between the two memory conditions (PHM and NPHM) and the 
random condition (RC). This was done for the first neutral trial (N1) and the second 
neutral trial (N2) separately, using Cochran tests for comparing three related samples. 
For the N1 trial there was a significant difference between PHM, NPHM and RC, Q(df = 
2, N = 36) = 26.000, p < .001. This was also the case for the N2 trial, Q(df  = 2, N = 36) 
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= 18.000, p < .001. These analyses show that, overall, the participants demonstrated a 
different pattern of limb selection on midline, depending on the sequence of earlier 
choices that have been made. This clearly shows that perseveration is present in adult 
limb selection, at least in unimanual grasping on midline. 
To analyze these findings more closely, we used McNemar tests for comparing 
two related samples to test whether the differences in the proportions of preferred-hand 
use in the combinations PHM - RC, NPHM - RC, and PHM - NPHM were significant. 
For both trials (N1 and N2) there were significant differences in the proportions of 
preferred-hand use between NPHM and RC (p < .001, and, p < .001, respectively), and 
between PHM and NPHM (p < .01, and, p < .001, respectively). After performing a set 
of memory trials with the non-preferred hand, participants subsequently used this hand 
more often, compared to performing a set of memory trials with the preferred hand or 
after having no specific memory trace at all. This is still true for the second subsequent 
N2 trial. Taken together, these results confirm the conclusion of perseverative limb 
selection in adult unimanual grasping. 
Next, to study this effect as a function of handedness, we analyzed the results for 
left-handers and right-handers separately. For both handedness groups, Cochran tests 
revealed that the proportions of preferred-hand use on midline significantly differed 
between PHM, NPHM and RC in both neutral trials (all p’s < .01, except for the N2 trial 
for the right-handers, p < .05). 
Finally, McNemar tests revealed that for both handedness groups, the differences 
in the proportions of preferred-hand use were significant between NPHM and RC (p < 
.05, for left-handers and right-handers), and between PHM and NPHM (p < .01 and p < 
.05, for left-handers and right-handers respectively), for the first neutral trial. For the 
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second neutral trial, only the difference between PHM and NPHM was significant in the 
left-handed group (p < .01). Although perseverance was present for both handedness 
groups in the first neutral trial, these analyses demonstrate a difference in the strength of 
the effect for the second neutral trial. Right-handers no longer use the non-preferred 
hand in the second subsequent trial more often after a specific memory trace of that 
hand. In other words, the effect of the earlier limb selections is no longer strong enough 
to overrule the hand preference. 
 
Experiment 2 
 
Method 
Participants. Fifteen strongly right-handed adult volunteers (3 male and 12 
female) with a mean age of 21.4 years (range: 19 - 25 years) participated in the 
experiment. 
Procedure. The general procedure was the same as in the previous experiment and 
closely followed the original procedure by Gabbard et al. (1997). Experiment 2 
consisted of three conditions, each with a series of nine successive cube presentations. 
Two of them where sequential conditions: a clockwise condition and a counter-
clockwise condition. In the clockwise condition, starting with the 10° location on the 
participant’s left side, the experimenter sequentially placed the cube on each following 
location of Figure 1, up until the -10° location on the participant’s right side. In the 
counter-clockwise condition the experimenter placed the cube in a similar but opposite 
fashion, starting on the participant’s right side at the -10° location. The order of the two 
sequential conditions was counterbalanced. As in Experiment 1, Gabbard et al.’s 
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experiment was replicated as a third condition in between the two sequential conditions. 
In this condition the cube was randomly placed in each of the nine locations of Figure 1. 
 
Results and discussion 
The results of the two sequential conditions are presented in Table 3. To highlight 
the effects, the proportions of preferred-hand use for the 50°, 70°, and 90° locations are 
also shown in Figure 2. Figure 2 also shows the scores of the participants for these trials 
in the random condition. 
 
Table 3. Results of the sequential conditions of Experiment 2: Proportion of preferred-hand use 
for the nine (sequentially presented) object positions. 
 
Left hemispace  Right hemispace Sequence 
(N = 15) 10° 30° 50° 70° 90° -70° -50° -30° -10° 
.13 .07 .13 .20 .73 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 Clockwise 
Counter-Clockwise .07 .07 .47 .67 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
As shown in Figure 2, a spatial delay in the location of the switch from preferred-
hand use to non-preferred-hand use is present between the two sequential conditions, 
and between the sequential conditions and the random condition. The occurrence of this 
effect at the level of individual participants was as follows: 67% (10 participants) 
displayed a hysteresis effect, whereas 33% (5 participants) had a critical boundary in 
their selection of limb. This result reveals the presence of hysteresis in adults’ selection 
of limb for unimanual grasping, identifying it as a nonlinear dynamical system. 
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Figure 2. Results of Experiment 2: Presented are the proportions of preferred-hand use for the 
50°, 70°, and 90° locations for the clockwise sequence, the counter-clockwise sequence and the 
random sequence. 
 
For the participants who showed hysteresis, the average size of the spatial delay 
was 1.3 locations, with a standard deviation of 0.48 locations. In the critical-boundary 
group, one participant used her preferred hand consistently at all nine cube location in 
all three conditions. Another participant of this group used her preferred hand up to the 
50° location in all three conditions. The other three participants demonstrated an equal 
pattern of limb selection; all three switched to the non-preferred hand at the 70° location 
in all three conditions. 
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Dynamic Model 
 
To reproduce the effects of perseveration and hysteresis in limb selection, we 
propose a model based on a dynamical action-selection process. The model will have to 
explain how the choice to use a particular hand for grasping the cube emerges as the 
resulting behavior at the overt level, from the various external and internal factors that 
are seem to interact at the covert level of the action-selection process. To accomplish 
this, the model will be based on a thorough analysis of the tasks, as well as on the 
relevant features of action planning as discussed in the introduction. We will describe 
the model’s basic features below. This will be followed by a simulation of Experiment 1 
and Experiment 2. Finally, we will present an extension of the model, by suggesting a 
concise implementation of the difference in handedness strength between left-handers 
and right-handers. This enabled us to reproduce Gabbard et al.’s (1997) findings, in 
particular replicating the differences in the patterns of hand use between the two 
handedness groups. 
The model we introduce is closely related to the general category of dynamic field 
models. This type of models has been used to describe various kinds of cognitive, goal-
directed and automatic human behavior, such as saccadic eye movements and arm 
movements (Erlhagen & Schöner, 2002; Kopecz & Schöner, 1995; Schöner, Kopecz & 
Erlhagen, 1997), perseverative reaching movements (Thelen et al., 2001), spatial 
memory (Schutte & Spencer, 2002; Schutte, Spencer & Schöner, 2003; Spencer & 
Schöner, 1998), and recently the habituation paradigm (i.e., “violation of expectancy” 
and “preferential looking”) has been added to this list (Schöner & Thelen, 2003; Thelen 
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& Whitmyer II, 2004). The success of this type of models lies in its generality; it can be 
used for any number of perceptual-motor tasks without altering its basic assumptions. 
Although not constructing a field-theoretical model, we will use two of its main 
concepts for building a model that will simulate the mapping between the continuous 
spatial (and temporal) aspects of the cube presentation and the discrete choice to use one 
of the hands for grasping that cube. These concepts are (see Erlhagen & Schöner, 2002): 
First, the choice to use one of the hands evolves gradually over time and is governed by 
a continuous dynamics. Second, this governing dynamics receives multiple inputs 
which integrate in the action-selection process. 
 
Model description 
The central feature of the model is the activation levels of the action-selection 
process for each of the two hands. In principle, the planning process for reaching to a 
certain location has to be viewed as a continuously distributed field of activation 
(Erlhagen & Schöner, 2002; Thelen et al., 2001). In this paper, however, we are not 
interested in the direction of the reach, but in the hand chosen to execute the reach with. 
Accordingly, we will only follow two sites, each representing the action-selection 
process to use one of the hands (cf. Schöner & Thelen, 2003). The sites will be assigned 
activation functions uL(t) and uR(t), for the left hand and right hand respectively. The 
choice to use a particular hand is determined by the activation level of the 
corresponding site. The likelihood of this choice is closely related to the numerical 
value of the site’s activation functions at a particular instant in time, or rather to the 
relative proportion of both activation levels. When the activation level passes a certain 
threshold, a motor plan for using the corresponding hand will be executed, which results 
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in the actual onset of a reaching movement of the corresponding limb. The threshold 
levels for the left-hand site and right-hand site are the same. When the activation levels 
of both sites pass the threshold simultaneously, or within a certain time window, this 
will be interpreted as bimanual behavior. 
The sites are mutually coupled by cross-lateral inhibitory connection. This means 
that when the activation level of one site increases (i.e., the likelihood of using the 
corresponding hand grows), this has a decreasing effect on the activation level of the 
other site (i.e., the likelihood of that hand being used shrinks). The key feature we 
introduce in this model is that the process is inherently laterally biased, which is 
determined by unequal connection strengths (cf. Thelen & Whitmyer II, 2004). The 
strength of the inhibition will, in general, be different for both sites, symbolized by the 
numerical values of the parameters cL and cR. Essential to the model’s ontology and its 
behavior is that a difference in inhibition strength (i.e., the difference in the numerical 
values of the c parameters) expresses a difference in hand preference or laterality. The 
more consistent the hand preference, that is, the more one hand is favored above the 
other, the larger the difference in the inhibition strength. Note that, in the dynamics of 
the model, this difference will only lead to an increased likelihood for using one hand 
over the other, not to a static preference to use one hand irrespective of external or 
internal stimulation. The functional form of the inhibitory connections is that of a 
sigmoid shape: 
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where the slope parameter β expresses the steepness of the function and u0 is a 
threshold. The function u(t) is the activation function of one of the two sites, which 
drives the inhibition. 
In general, limb selection will depend on the spatial layout of external stimulation, 
that is, the locations of relevant objects with respect to the actor’s body. The relation 
between external stimulation and corresponding manual behavior obeys some very 
robust laws. For example, the effect of spatial compatibility in stimulus-response 
activity for hand use, which is related to the more general Simon effect (Simon, 1969) 
and Poffenberger effect (Poffenberger, 1912). To enable the model to exhibit such law-
like behavior, the sites will receive (perceptual) input according to the lateral 
arrangement of the external stimulation. The input for both sites will not have equal 
strength, but will be closely related to the cube’s location in each trial. As a result of 
this, changes in the likelihood to use a particular hand will arise. The strengths of the 
perceptual inputs to the two sites, as a function of the cube’s location with respect to the 
participant, are presented in Figure 3 for both the left-hand site and right-hand site. In 
the model, the perceptual (per) input will be symbolized by IperL(t) and IperR(t), for the 
left hand and right hand, respectively. 
Critical to the phenomena of perseveration and hysteresis is that making choices 
for actions to take is a process that works on multiple timescales. To understand the 
results of both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, we have to realize that the choices to 
use one of the hands in a particular trial, among other things, depends on the hand 
choices in earlier trials. Therefore, in addition to the perceptual input, a second input 
source flows into the action-selection process. This input is internal to the action system 
(i.e., organismic; Newell, 1986), and originates from the (motor)memory of limb 
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Figure 3. Strength of the perceptual input for the left hand (LH) and right hand (RH) for the 
different object locations. 
 
selection in earlier trials. In the model, this memory (mem) input will be symbolized by 
ImemL(t) and ImemR(t), for the left hand and right hand, respectively. 
Starting from zero at the beginning of each condition in the experiment, this input 
source builds up or breaks down for each hand, depending on the particular pattern of 
limb selections over successive trials. Every time a particular hand is used, that is, the 
activation function of a particular site has passed the threshold, the strength of the 
memory input for that site is increased with 1.2 before the next trial. When a hand is not 
used in a trial the strength of the memory input will decrease to the zero level. 
Combining the perceptual source and memory source of input, the total input in the 
model now has the following form: 
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for the left-hand site and the right-hand site, respectively. 
In the absence of input, the activation functions will decay, eventually returning to 
a resting level h. This resting level establishes a basic activation level, which 
corresponds to an a-priori willingness or likelihood to use the corresponding hand in a 
stimulus-free or stimulus-neutral environment. The resting level h will have an equal 
value for both sites. 
The final part of the dynamics is a noise factor ξ(t), which is supposed to be 
Gaussian white noise. Noise is common in (realistic models of) behavioral, neural and 
biological systems (e.g., Mainen & Sejnowski, 1995; Schöner, Haken, & Kelso, 1986; 
Shinbrot & Muzzio, 2001; Thelen, Schöner, Scheier & Smith, 2001). It represents the 
random fluctuations in the system, which can have a functional significance for the 
behavior. In particular these can lead to spontaneous reaches with any of the two hands 
or both. 
In sum, the sites obey a continuous dynamics described by a set of two coupled, 
first-order nonlinear differential equations. These equations characterize the internal 
dynamics of the action-selection process and integrate the properties described above. In 
terms of the two equations, the model has the following form: 
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The ‘dot’ on the activation functions uL and uR on the left-hand side of the equations 
represents the derivative with respect to time (i.e., duL/dt and duR/dt respectively). As 
mentioned earlier, a fundamental part of the model’s behavior is the decaying property 
it possesses with time constant τ. This property is expressed by the first term on the 
right side of each equation. 
 
Simulation details 
All simulations were performed in Matlab (version 6.1, The MathWorks Inc.) on a 
standard PC. The model equations were integrated using the Euler procedure with 200 
time steps of 5 ms size. This means that single-trial simulations of the model ran for a 
time period that was comparable to the average duration of making a single hand choice 
in the experiments (i.e., from perceiving the cube to instantiating the reaching 
movement). Moreover, this was long enough to assure that the model converged to a 
highest activation level for a single site, which reflects the experimental procedure 
where participants were given ample time to decide which hand to use. Although the 
integration procedure equals exactly one second of the selection process, at this point 
the model makes no specific statements yet about the exact timing of this process. 
All simulations are based on 500 runs of the model. These repetitions are 
necessary to assure convergence of the model and because this way the noise term 
enabled us to obtain a clear distribution in the results (statistics). A complete 
experimental procedure was simulated for each fictive participant (run) in all 
simulations presented below. The strengths of the perceptual input and memory input 
were set before the start of every trial. After every trial, the strength of the memory 
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input was updated. Both inputs were present during the entire within-trial simulation, 
that is, all 200 time steps for each trial. 
 
Parameters settings 
First, the model was used to simulate Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. In order to 
get the closest fit as possible with the results of both experiments, the following 
numerical values for the model parameters were used: The strengths of the cross-lateral 
inhibition terms were set to the values cP = 1.8 for the preferred hand and cNP = 5.1 for 
the non-preferred hand. The steepness β of the sigmoid curve in the cross-lateral 
inhibition was set to 0.05, and the threshold v0 to 0. The resting level h received a value 
of –0.8. The strength n of the noise was set to 0.8. The time constant τ was set to a value 
of 3. This parameter setting was fixed for the simulations of both experiments. 
Consequently, the only difference between the simulations is the order, locations and 
number of cube presentations, and the corresponding perceptual input and memory 
input build up this entails. Fundamentally, the model’s behavior, therefore, has to 
account for the empirical effects of perseveration and hysteresis on the basis of this 
variation in input dynamics and its internal dynamics. After this Gabbard et al.’s (1997) 
experiment is also simulated to reproduce their results. For this we need a small but 
reasonable change in the parameter setting. 
 
Simulation of Experiment 1 
The strengths of the perceptual input were set to the values corresponding to the (-
)10°, (-)30°, and 90° cube locations, as displayed in Figure 3. So, over the subsequent 
trials M1  M2  M3  M4  N1  N2 in each of the two memory conditions of 
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Experiment 1, the perceptual input for each of the two sites was set to the following 
numerical values: 4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0 for the site corresponding to the 
hand ipsilateral to the object, and 1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  4.0  4.0 for the site 
corresponding to the hand contralateral to the object. 
Table 4 presents the results of the simulations for 500 runs of each of the two 
memory conditions of Experiment 1. Shown are the last two memory trials and the two 
neutral trials. 
 
Table 4. Results of 500 runs of the model simulating the memory conditions of Experiment 1: 
Proportion of preferred-hand use in the last two memory trials (M3 and M4) and the two neutral 
trials (N1 and N2). 
 
Condition M3 M4 N1 N2 
 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
Preferred-hand memory 
Non-preferred-hand memory .03 .01 .50 .64 
  
Figure 4 presents some typical results of single-participant simulation of the 
memory conditions. Figure 4a shows a participant who received a set of four memory 
trials at the non-preferred hand. As shown in the plots of the N1 trial and the N2 trial, 
this fictive participant kept on using the non-preferred hand after having been trained at 
this hand in trials M1 to M4. Figure 4b presents a participant, also trained at the non-
preferred hand, but demonstrating no perseveration. In the N1 trial and the N2 trial, this 
fictive participant switches to using the preferred hand, despite having used the non-
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preferred hand four times in trials M1 to M4. In terms of the model’s dynamics, this 
behavior results from the dynamical interplay between the perceptual input (on-line 
bias), memory input (short-term bias) and the preference (long-terms bias). In the two 
neutral trials, when perceptual input has equal strength for both sites again, the 
difference in memory strength that has built up during the memory trials was not strong 
enough to overrule the hand preference. 
 
Simulation of Experiment 2 
Over the subsequent trials T1  T2  …  T8  T9 in each of the two 
sequential conditions of Experiment 2, the perceptual input for each of the two sites was 
set to the following strength: 1.0  1.0  1.8  2.6  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0 
for the site corresponding to the hand ipsilateral to the location of the cube, and 4.0  
4.0   4.0  4.0  4.0  2.6  1.8  1.0  1.0  for the site corresponding to the 
hand contralateral to the location of the cube. These numerical values correspond to the 
input strengths for each cube location, as displayed in Figure 3. 
Table 5 presents the results of the simulations for 500 runs of each of the two 
sequential conditions of Experiment 2. Figure 5 presents some typical results of a 
single-participant simulation of the sequential conditions. 
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Figure 4. Examples of a single-subject simulation of the memory conditions of Experiment 1. 
The dotted line at the zero-level activation denotes the point at which the inhibition starts to 
affect the dynamics of the action-selection process. Subject in the non-preferred-hand memory 
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task showing perseveration (above). Subject in the non-preferred-hand memory task showing no 
perseveration (below). 
 
Table 5. Results of 500 runs of the model simulating the sequential conditions of Experiment 2: 
Proportion of preferred-hand use for the nine (sequentially presented) object positions. 
 
Left hemispace  Right hemispace Sequence 
10° 30° 50° 70° 90° -70° -50° -30° -10° 
.10 .05 .10 .24 .62 .93 1.00 1.00 1.00 Clockwise 
Counter-Clockwise .08 .08 .32 .62 .96 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
Simulation of Gabbard et al. (1997) 
One of the main findings of Gabbard et al.’s  (1997) experiment was the larger 
number of (across-midline) grasps into contralateral hemispace (i.e., with respect to the 
dominant limb) by right-handers compared to left-handers. As mentioned earlier, this 
was also observed by others. The researchers interpreted this finding as a difference in 
laterality strength between the two handedness groups. A natural embedding and 
implementation of this difference in laterality strength in the context of the model 
presented here, is in terms of unequal cross-lateral inhibition strengths. A larger 
numerical difference between the two c parameters represents a stronger lateralization, 
therefore corresponding to right-handers. Similarly, a smaller numerical difference, 
representing a weaker lateralization, corresponds to left-handers. 
In the simulations, the numerical values of the parameters were set as follows: cL 
= 1.8 and cR = 3.8 for left-handed participants, and cL = 5.1 and cR = 1.8 for right-
handed participants. Except for the cross-lateral inhibition strengths, which we will now 
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Figure 5. Examples of a single-subject simulation of the sequential conditions of Experiment 2. 
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The dotted line at the zero-level activation denotes the point at which the inhibition starts to 
affect the dynamics of the action-selection process. Subject in the clockwise task showing 
hysteresis (above). Subject in the counter-clockwise task showing hysteresis (below). 
 
treat as characteristic for each handedness group, all other parameters had the same 
numerical values as in the previous simulations. Simulations were performed for both 
handedness groups separately. Following the original experimental procedure, the nine 
locations were simulated in random order on each run. 
Table 6 shows the average results over 500 runs of the model simulating the 
experiment by Gabbard et al. (1997). As can be seen by comparing the simulation 
results to the experimental results displayed in Table 1, the overall pattern of hand use is 
similar between the two. 
 
Table 6. Results of 500 runs of the model simulating Gabbard et al.’s (1997) experiment: 
Proportion of preferred-hand use for the nine (randomly presented) object positions. 
 
Left hemispace  Right hemispace Group 
10° 30° 50° 70° 90° -70° -50° -30° -10° 
1.00 1.00 1.00 .98 .78 .30 .10 .04 .03 Left-handers 
Right-handers .13 .09 .24 .51 .93 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
 
 
 
A Dynamic Model for Limb Selection 
 147 
General Discussion 
 
This paper served two main goals: First, we wanted to add to the empirical realm 
and theoretical discussion on limb selection the aspect of multiple-timescale dynamics, 
exemplified by the effects of perseveration and hysteresis. In two experiments we 
manipulated the series of prior hand choices that preceded the selection at some point of 
a limb for grasping a small object positioned in hemispace. The results of the 
experiments showed that both perseveration and hysteresis are fundamental in adults’ 
unimanual grasping behavior. Both phenomena are considered as basic for nonlinear 
multi-timescale dynamical systems. As a result, these experiments revealed that limb 
selection is governed by an action-selection process that is both dynamical and working 
on multiple timescales. 
Second, we set out to introduce a working dynamical model for limb selection. By 
integrating and extending earlier proposed mechanisms (Gabbard & Rabb, 2000), we 
constructed a dynamical model that brings together various aspects relevant for action 
selection in goal-directed behavior. The model is capable of letting a single choice, 
leading to an overt behavioral selection, emerge from various underlying influences. 
External (i.e., task and environment) constraints as well as internal (i.e., organsimic) 
constraints are combined in one concise framework, working on at least three different 
timescales: on-line (perceptual input and the main process itself), short-term (prior 
choices / system’s recent history), and long-term (preferences / functional or structural 
system characteristics). With the model simulations that replicated ours and other 
experimental results, we demonstrated that a dynamical view of limb selection is not 
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only plausible, but offers a concise and rich framework for further studies in this and 
adjacent fields. 
Below we will discuss some of the model’s key aspects and the role they play in 
the dynamics. Before this however, an important observation regarding the model, 
which indeed serves as an important criterion for all models, is that there is no one-to-
one mapping between parameter settings and effects. Parameter settings alone cannot 
completely explain the richness of results we were able to reproduce with our 
simulations. For example, an important set of free parameters is the input strengths to 
the sites. These of course very much drive the sites’ activation levels, and, therefore, to 
a large extent determine the frequency distributions found in the simulations of Gabbard 
et al.’s (1997) experiment. Differences in these input strengths between the sites, 
however, cannot explain the success of the model in replicating the effects of 
perseveration and hysteresis. Importantly, perseveration and hysteresis were not added 
to the mathematical implementation of the model as separate elements, as is done in 
some other models (e.g., Robertson, Guckenheimer, Masnick & Bacher, 2004). 
Fundamental to both the experimental effects and the modeling results is the sequential 
order of the trials in combination with the multi-timescale dynamics of the action-
selection process. 
The difference in the cross-lateral inhibition strengths of the two sites is primarily 
responsible for the qualitative difference between the two laterality groups at the 
behavioral level. Handedness, therefore, is treated as a structural property of the 
dynamics governing limb selection. Motor memory, in contrast, is treated as an input 
source that itself builds over an intermediate timescale with respect to the dynamics of 
the planning process. The dynamic preshaping of the action-selection field by the motor 
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history of the system (memory trace), was already introduced in the dynamic field 
theory (Erlhagen & Schöner, 2002; Thelen et al., 2001). Incorporating a structural or 
functional asymmetry (long-term bias) as an integral part of its dynamics, is a novel 
aspect for this type of models. In this sense the present model is ‘more embodied’ than 
the earlier dynamical field model developed for the perseverative reaching behavior. 
Related to this is that the concept of cross-lateral inhibition in the action-selection 
process gives rise to an interesting new perspective on the development of handedness. 
As is well-known (e.g., Hopkins & Rönnqvist, 1998; McManus et al., 1988), the 
consistency of handedness in children grows until at least three years of age. Moreover, 
from the work of Corbetta and Thelen (1996; 2002) we know that the direction of 
handedness undergoes a series of transitions in the first few months after birth. We 
hypothesized that the changes in hand preference over age can be modeled by 
increasing difference between the strengths of the inhibitory connections (Cox & 
Smitsman, 2005). 
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Chapter 5 
 
Action-Selection Perseveration in Young Children: 
Advances of a Dynamic Model 
 
Studies on goal-directed behavior in children have shed light on the development of 
action planning, and, more in particular, on the development of action selection (see 
Chapter 1). The term action selection highlights the choices for action children have to 
make when trying to attain a goal. In general, such choices depend on the information 
that is available with respect to the goal, the means, and task constraints that may affect 
goal attainment. Action selection as part of goal-directed behavior has been studied, for 
example, in the context of tool use (e.g., Cox & Smitsman, 2006a; McCarty, Clifton, & 
Collard, 1999, 2001), imitation (e.g., Bekkering, Wohlschläger & Gattis, 2000) and 
problem solving (see Chapter 6). Although we have learned a great deal from these 
studies with respect to the factors involved in the choices children make, the issue is 
still unresolved as to how these different factors combine in the underlying action-
selection process. Moreover, we know very little about the development of this process 
during the first years of life. 
Reaching toward a location in hemispace (e.g., in grasping a tool) certainly is a 
basic example of a goal-directed action. Reaching and grasping are extensively studied 
in motor-development research and a great deal is know about their movement 
organization and development (e.g., Corbetta & Thelen, 1996, 2002; Spencer & Thelen, 
2000; Thelen, Corbetta, Kamm, Spencer, Schneider & Zernicke, 1993; Van Hof, Van 
der Kamp & Savelsbergh, 2002; Von Hofsten, 1984, 1991). With respect to unimanual 
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reaching and grasping, an essential part of planning such a movement is the choice of 
which hand to use, generally referred to as limb selection. This study addresses young 
children’s limb selection in unimanual grasping of a simple hand-held tool. By focusing 
on limb selection, the action system under study can basically be considered as a bi-
stable system. We propose that the overt behavior of this action system (i.e., the hand 
that is used) is governed by an underlying action-selection process. In the following we 
will elaborate on the implications of this proposition and on the factors that influence 
this selection process. 
A large number of factors that influence children’s limb selection are known, such 
as for instance, handedness (see e.g., Hopkins & Rönnqvist, 1998), object position (e.g., 
Harris & Carlson, 1993; Van Hof et al., 2002), and task complexity (e.g., Bryden, Pryde 
& Roy, 1999; Leconte & Fagard, 2004). Recent research suggests that not one of these 
factors solely determines the limb that is selected in a particular task, but rather that they 
to combine in the selection process (e.g., Cox & Smitsman, 2006a, 2006b; Leconte & 
Fagard, 2004). Moreover, the influence of at least some of these factors changes with 
age. For instance, it is well known that handedness increases in strength during the first 
three years of life (McManus, Sik, Cole, Mellon, Wong & Kloss, 1988). This particular 
combination (i.e., combined influence of factors and age-related changes) makes limb 
selection quite interesting for studying action planning from a developmental 
perspective. Despite the obvious relevance of the subject for understanding (uni)manual 
behavior, inter-limb coordination, and, more generally, for gaining insight into the 
development of action planning, we know very little about the way reaching and 
grasping is organized at the level of limb selection (Gabbard & Rabb, 2000). 
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Recently, Cox and Smitsman (2006a) reported a study on the confluence of factors 
in young children’s choice of what hand to use in a goal-directed task. In the 
experiment, 24- and 36-month-olds had to grasp and subsequently use a hand-held tool 
(a cane) with one hand, in order to transport an object towards a goal. Interestingly, the 
experiments showed that the hand that was selected initially, was altered during task 
performance in some situations but not in others. Children switched the cane from one 
hand to the other between the two phases of the task (i.e., between grasping and 
transporting), as a result of specific combinations of the relevant factors (viz. 
handedness, initial handle orientation and goal location). This behavior could not be 
explained in terms of the dominance of a single one of these variables. Stated 
differently, a number of different factors mutually contributed at the same time in the 
selection of the limb to perform the task with. Moreover, this demonstrated that limb 
selection only temporarily favored one hand above the other, and that changing 
information about the relevant variables during the course of the action could either 
reinforce or weaken earlier choices. In the latter case this led to switching of the cane 
between the hands. In the researchers’ opinion these results revealed that a dynamic 
process must be governing limb selection. 
More generally, action-selection processes typically involve a mapping between, 
on the one hand, sensorimotor and intentional information, and, on the other hand, some 
type of motor output (e.g., a particular limb). Interesting insights on the mechanisms 
behind this mapping are to be gained in situations where the obvious, natural or initial 
choice becomes challenged because of the competition between the different factors 
involved. An interesting example where this is the case, comes from tasks that extend 
over a longer period than a mere singleton action. In such tasks the recent history of the 
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system might come into play, and perseveration might be observed as an overt 
behavioral phenomenon. Fundamentally, perseveration reveals that the action-selection 
process is affected by the history of earlier selections, which (temporarily) overrule the 
influence of the sensorimotor and intentional information that is available. In this 
context, perseveration gives us a window on the development of planning, by revealing 
the multi-causal and multiple-timescale dynamics of action selection. 
A famous example of perseverative action selection is the A-not-B error (Piaget, 
1954), which constitutes a cornerstone in our thinking about the development of 
executive functions and planning: Infants in Piaget’s stage IV (approximately 7 to 12 
months of age) sometimes reach erroneously to a location (A), in search of an object. 
They do so after having retrieved the object on that location a number of times, and 
despite having witnessed the object being hidden at another location (B). This error has 
recently been successfully explained and modeled by Thelen, Schöner, Scheier, and 
Smith (2001) using a model that was inspired by a dynamic and embodied view of 
planning. The model is based on the more general dynamic field theory of movement 
programming (Erlhagen & Schöner, 2002). 
Recently, we used a discrete (i.e., two-neuron) version of the dynamic field model 
mentioned above to simulate limb selection in adults (Cox & Smitsman, 2006b). The 
model implemented the limb-selection process, thereby stressing the multi-timescale 
aspects of the underlying dynamics. This enabled us to better understand and 
quantitatively simulate the effects of perseverance and hysteresis in limb selection, 
which we found in our experiments. In the model, the choice for a hand to grasp an 
object with emerges gradually, driven by intertwining real time, embodied processes 
like (motor) memory, inhibition, perception and noise. The importance of such an 
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intrinsic dynamics inherent to hand use had been pointed out by others (e.g., Corbetta & 
Thelen, 1996, 2002; Leconte & Fagard, 2004; Van Hof et al., 2002; see also Carson, 
1993). 
For a more detailed account of the limb-selection model we refer to Chapter 4 of 
this thesis. Here it will suffice to recall that a significant feature of the model was the 
combination of two basic mechanisms that underlie limb selection, viz. limb dominance 
and attentional information (Gabbard & Rabb, 2000). Attentional information refers to 
the environmental and task-related parts of the constraints that influence limb selection 
(Newell, 1986), and which are generally perceptual in nature. Limb dominance (i.e., 
handedness) is an organismic constraint (Newell), because it is functionally or possibly 
even structurally connected to the action system. In this study we will present an 
extension of our limb-selection model, based on empirical findings on the development 
of handedness. This model will be used to simulate the experiment we performed on 
young children’s perseverative limb selection. Below we will introduce the set up of the 
experiment, followed by a discussion on handedness and attentional information, and 
the way they are involved in the experiment. 
In the main part of the experiment, children of 14, 24, and 36 months old, grasped 
for a spoon with one hand and subsequently (pretend to) feed a puppet. In two separate 
conditions children received a series of ‘training’ trials, designed to build up a short-
term bias for using one of the hands. In each condition, following this training, there 
were two ‘neutral’ trials in order to measure the effect of the bias on subsequent limb 
selections. Specifically, in the training trials the spoon’s position and handle orientation 
were either both left or both right, provoking the children to use the left or right hand, 
respectively. In the follow-up neutral trials, the spoon was presented on midline with the 
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handle pointing towards the child, that is, neutral with respect to laterality. Because of 
the identical set of neutral trials after each training series, we reasoned that a difference 
in limb selection between the two can only be the result of this training. Therefore, if a 
difference is found, it must be interpreted as a perseveration effect, revealing the 
influence of the system’s recent history. This then suggests that limb selection must be 
operating on multiple timescales. 
Limb selection in children (as well as in adults) is, to a large extent, directly guided 
by on-line sensory (attentional) information about the spatial (extrinsic) properties of 
objects. For instance, McCarty et al. (1999, 2001) demonstrated that in 19-month-olds, 
hand choice in spoon grasping ipsilateraly reflects the orientation of the spoon’s handle. 
Such an effect of orientation has also been demonstrated by Cox & Smitsman (2006a) 
for slightly older children in grasping a cane. In addition, other studies have reported a 
close ipsilateral link between object position and hand choice in grasping (Gabbard, 
Rabb Helbig & Gentry, 2001; Harris & Carlson, 1993; Van Hof et al., 2002). More 
generally, numerous spatial-compatibility effects are known, revealing a tight ipsilateral 
link between perception and action in reacting on an external stimulus (e.g., Hommel & 
Prinz, 1997; Poffenberger, 1912; Simon, 1969; Simon & Rudell, 1967). In sum, there is 
strong evidence, at least for the 24- and 36-month-olds, that the spoon presentation 
during training will indeed provoke children to ipsilateral grasping, which is necessary 
for building up a bias. 
Handedness is a well-known and much-studied factor involved in limb selection. 
As a working definition of handedness, we will regard it as an asymmetry property of a 
bi-stable system. Any proper definition of handedness must consist of at least two 
components: direction and strength of handedness. First, and most obvious, is the 
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direction of the asymmetry: One has either a right-hand or a left-hand preference. From 
a dynamical systems point of view we can say that this part of the definition stresses the 
asymmetry of the action system, that is, the fact that it has only two stationary states 
that differ in stability. (The special case of ambidexterity is captured by the strength 
component.) Second, and more subtle, the persistency with which the preferred hand is 
used over a wide range of tasks gives us an indication of the strength of the handedness. 
Handedness strength, therefore, reflects how much this asymmetry property of the 
action system ‘resists’ external forces (i.e., perturbations) that drive the choice towards 
the non-preferred hand. In terms of dynamical systems, handedness strength refers to 
the stability difference underlying the asymmetry property. More in specifically, it 
expresses how one of the system’s states is more stable than the other. 
The possible functional (i.e., psychological) or structural (i.e., biological) origins of 
the tendency to prefer one particular hand over the other, and the way this develops with 
age, are not within the scope of the present paper. In fact, limb dominance is known to 
develop by mechanisms not yet understood in full length (for an overview on 
handedness development see Hopkins & Rönnqvist, 1998). Relevant for the present 
study however, is that young children’s handedness is not at all (or at least not yet) a 
fixed and full-grown property of their action system. For instance, it has been reported 
that in the first year of life handedness fluctuates between left-handedness, right-
handedness, and bi-laterality (Carlson & Harris, 1985; Corbetta & Thelen, 1996; Fagard 
& Pezé, 1997; Gesell & Ames, 1947). In addition, as mentioned earlier, handedness 
strength is known to increase during the first three years of life (McManus et al., 1988). 
Consequently, we expect a difference in handedness strength between the three age 
groups, which might influence the results of our experiment. To determine children’s 
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handedness direction and strength, we performed a number of unimanual grasping trials 
without training, preceding the actual experiment. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Children of three age groups participated in this experiment: Twenty-six 14-month-
olds, 26 24-month-olds, and 26 36-month-olds, who were all within a four-week range 
around this age. The data of 21, 19, respectively 26 children were used for further 
analysis. The others were not used because of procedural or equipment errors, or 
because the child did not perform the task completely or refused to participate at all. 
The group of the 14-month-olds contained 14 boys and seven girls, the group of the 24-
month-olds contained eight boys and 11 girls and the group of the 36-month-olds 
contained 11 boys and 15 girls. Children were recruited from birth records of the city of 
Nijmegen. They were rewarded for their participation by means of a certificate with 
photograph, and also received a financial compensation for travel and parking expenses. 
 
Material 
In the perseveration part of the experiment, we used a metal spoon, a spoon-holder 
(wood and plastic), a plastic toy paprika, and a terry-cloth hand puppet. These objects 
are shown in Figure 1. In the handedness part of the experiment an additional plastic toy 
gnome of 7.1 cm high and about 3.8 cm in diameter was used. The spoon’s handle was 
about 13 cm long and had an oval-shaped bowl of about 5.5 cm by 4.5 cm, 1.5 cm deep. 
The relatively deep bowl of the spoon minimized control demands during transport of 
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paprika towards the hand puppet. This might otherwise be a potential source of error, 
especially in the youngest-age group. The spoon was presented on the spoon-holder 
about 10 cm high above the table, making it easy to grasp. The mass of spoon plus toy 
paprika was 56 g, while the mass of the spoon alone was 37 g. There were three 
different hand puppets used: a fish, a duck and an elephant. All three could open and 
close their mouth by movements of the experimenter’s hand, making them especially 
suitable for playing a pretend-to-feed game. 
Figure 1. Setup of the experiment. Displayed is an example of a training trial with 
spoon position and handle orientation right. The (red) arrow demonstrates the direction 
in which the spoon is transported at the start of the trial. 
 
Child’s midline 
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Procedure and Design 
The experiment was performed in a quiet research room on the university campus 
especially equipped to accommodate children. Upon arrival, the necessary time was 
taken for the child to become acquainted with the room and the experimenters. After 
this, the child was positioned at the long end of a table, with an experimenter sitting in 
front of her on the other side. During the experiment the 24- and 36-months-old children 
were standing on a footboard to prevent them from walking around. The 14-months-old 
children were seated on their parent’s lap to assure the necessary postural stability. 
Before the start of each task, the children were allowed to explore the objects that were 
going to be used for a while. Each child was subjected to three series of trials, one 
handedness condition and two training conditions, which we will describe below. The 
handedness condition always preceded the two training conditions, which were 
presented in a random order. In between the conditions there was a period of pause and 
free play. 
Handedness conditions. In this part of the experiment, children performed a 
number of trials in order to determine their handedness strength and handedness 
direction. These conditions consisted of a total of nine unimanual grasping movements 
on objects in hemispace. In each trial an object (spoon or gnome) was positioned and/or 
orientated differently relative to the child, as follows: In two subsequent trials, the toy 
gnome was positioned at an easy reaching distance, randomly, once in front of the 
child’s left shoulder and once in front of the child’s right shoulder. In two trials, the 
spoon was positioned, in a random order, in front of the child’s left shoulder with its 
handle pointing to the left and in front of the right shoulder with its handle pointing to 
the right. In two trials, the spoon was positioned on the child’s line of sight, once with 
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its handle pointing to the left and once with its handle pointing to the right (in a random 
order). In three trials, the spoon was presented on the child’s line of sight with the 
handle pointing towards the child. This setup enabled us to determine handedness 
direction and handedness strength (at least at the group level). Moreover, it provided us 
with a measure for hand-use variability as a function of object position and orientation, 
both combined and separately. 
Training conditions. During the introductory phase of this part of the experiment, 
an experimenter explained to the child that the animal (i.e., the hand puppet) was 
hungry and needed to be fed. Because it was to little to eat on its own, the child was 
asked to help it by using the spoon. The experimenter proceeded by putting the hand 
puppet around her hand and presenting it just out of reach on the child’s line of sight. 
Each trial started by placing the spoon on the holder, also out of reach, in one of the two 
following position-orientation combinations: Either in front of the child’s left shoulder 
with the handle pointing to the left, or in front of the child’s right shoulder with the 
handle pointing to the right, or on the child’s line of sight with the handle pointing 
towards the child (see Figure 1 for an example). After a short delay spoon plus holder 
were pushed towards the child in a straight line. The child was allowed to grasp the 
spoon when it was within reach at her end of the table. After feeding the hand puppet, 
the spoon was retrieved and a new trial was started in the same way. 
In this part of the experiment, each child was subjected to two series of training 
trials. Each training condition consisted of six subsequent spoon presentations. These 
conditions first established a training of the child’s left or right hand, by presenting the 
spoon either four times on their left side with the handle pointing to the left or four 
times on their right side with the handle pointing to the right, respectively (see Figure 
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2). In the first two of these training trials (trials T1 and T2) the experimenter tried to 
‘persuade’ the child to use the appropriate hand by presenting the spoon somewhat more 
peripherally, if necessary. This was not done anymore in the third and fourth training 
trials (trials T3 and T4). The subsequent two trials (trials N1 and N2) were neutral trials, 
where the spoon was presented at midline with the handle pointing towards the child. 
The last two trials were performed in order to measure children’s limb selection after 
the training set. 
Figure 2. Design of the training conditions. The dotted line represents the child’s 
midline. Each condition has four training trials (T1 to T4) with the spoon either left or 
right, and two neutral (N1 and N2) trials where the spoon was on the child’s line of sight. 
 
T1      T2   T3      T4       N1     N2
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An observer scored the hand a child used to grasp the object with from the 
videotaped sessions. This was compared to a report that was scored live by one of the 
experimenters, during the experiment. Agreement between the two was very high, and 
in case of mismatch the video-scored value was used at all times. The possible values 
for hand use were left, right, or both. The latter value was assigned when both hands 
grasped the spoon at the same time. In case of a unimanual grasping movement, the 
hand that grasped the spoon first was scored, even when this was altered during the 
feeding movement. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Handedness condition 
Using the laterally-neutral trials (i.e., spoon presented on the line of sight with the 
handle pointing towards the child) we determined the direction of handedness for each 
individual child. For this we applied the following procedure: If one particular hand was 
chosen more often than the other in these three trials, that hand was considered to be the 
child’s preferred hand. This is similar to what others have used to determine young 
children’s and infants’ handedness (e.g., McCarty et al., 1999). According to this 
procedure there were 11 left-handed children and 10 right-handed children in the group 
of 14-month-olds, in the group of 24-month-olds there were eight and 11, and in the 
group of 36-month-olds there were five and 21, respectively. For the subsequent 
analyses the direction of the handedness of each individual child was used to transform 
the data from a representation in terms of left-hand grasps and right-hand grasps to a 
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more general and functional form in terms of preferred-hand use and non-preferred hand 
use. After this, the data of both laterality groups were pooled. 
In Table 1 the results of the other six trials of the handedness conditions are shown. 
Children’s responses to these trials were used to get an idea of handedness strength at 
the age-group level. From the spoon-central trials it becomes clear that when grasping a 
spoon on midline, handle orientation had a large influence on children’s hand choice, 
especially in the two oldest-age groups. In none of the age groups children had an 
overall preference for using one of the hands (Chi-squared tests, all p’s > .3). While in 
the two oldest-age groups this was due to children’s (nearly) perfect mirroring of the 
spoon’s handle, in the youngest-age group there was more variability in hand choice. 
The difference in the amount of mirroring was significant, χ2(2, N = 132) = 21.112, p < 
.001. This is in accordance with McCarty et al. (1999), who found similar results for 14- 
and 19-month-olds. When the spoon was presented in front of the children’s shoulders, 
as in the spoon-lateral trials, the same age difference with respect to mirroring was 
found, χ2(2, N = 132) = 9.415, p < .01. For these trials, where the spoon’s lateral 
position comes into play, children in the youngest-age group displayed a clear overall 
preference for their preferred hand, χ2(1, N = 42) = 6.400, p < .05. Finally, both the 
youngest-age groups showed hand-choice variability when grasping the (orientation-
free) gnome in a lateral position. In these two age groups there was no overall preferred 
hand. Contrary, the 36-month-olds had a (slight) overall bias towards grasping the 
object with their preferred hand in these trials, χ2(1, N = 52) = 4.000, p < .05. As a 
result, in none of the age groups the object’s lateral position was perfectly mirrored. 
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Table 1. Experimental results of the training conditions: Proportion of mirroring object position 
and/or orientation and proportion of preferred-hand use in the three conditions and the three age 
groups. 
 
Condition Mirroring object 
position and/or orientation 
Preferred-hand use 
 
.79 .52 
.83 .50 
Gnome lateral condition 
14-month-olds (N = 21) 
24-month-olds (N = 19) 
36-month-olds (N = 26) .78 .67 
 
.79 .71 
.96 .54 
Spoon lateral condition 
14-month-olds 
24-month-olds 
36-month-olds .98 .52 
 
.71 .57 
.97 .53 
Spoon central condition 
14-month-olds 
24-month-olds 
36-month-olds 1.00 .50 
 
These results give rise to some general statements on handedness strength and 
hand-choice variability, as a function of object position and orientation. Note again that 
these statements hold at the (age-)group level. First, the overall level of variability 
seems to decrease with age, and seems to be highest in the youngest-age groups. This 
can be gathered from the spoon trials, where the 14-month-olds mirror the handle 
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orientation significantly less compared to the older two age groups. While in the spoon-
lateral trials this was due to more preferred-hand use, in the spoon-central trials it was 
not caused by an overall hand preference. Second, handedness strength seems to be 
largest in the group of 36-month-olds, and about equal in two other age groups. Except 
for the spoon-lateral trials, where the 14-month-olds show an overall hand preference. 
Arguably this is due to the increased control demands and postural instability 
accompanying the more difficult lateral grasping movement. This might make these 
children chose their more dexterous preferred hand more often. Finally, it can be 
expected that building a temporary bias for one of the hands in the training conditions 
will be more difficult in the group of 14-month-olds. 
 
Training conditions 
Because of the transformation of the data from right-hand use and left-hand use to 
preferred-hand use and non-preferred hand use, the two training conditions are now 
relabeled as control condition and test condition. In the control condition training was 
performed on the preferred hand, while in the test condition training was performed on 
the non-preferred hand. In Table 2 the proportions of preferred-hand use are presented 
for each age group in the last four trials (trials T3, T4, N1 and N2) of the two training 
conditions. 
As was expected, the differences in handedness strength and variability we found 
in the handedness conditions, gave rise to different patterns of limb selection between 
the youngest-age group and the two oldest-age groups in the training conditions. In the 
last two training trials (trials T3 and T4; see Table 2), especially in the test condition, 
there are differences in the proportion of preferred-hand scores between the age groups.  
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Table 2. Experimental results of the training conditions: Proportion of preferred-hand use in the 
last two training trials (T3 and T4) and the two neutral trials (N1 and N2) for the control condition 
and test condition. 
 
Group T3 T4 N1 N2 
 
.91 .95 .95 .81 
14-month-olds (N = 21) 
Control condition 
Test condition .24 .24 .67 .67 
 
1.00 1.00 .95 .89 
24-month-olds (N = 19) 
Control condition 
Test condition .00 .00 .50 .79 
 
1.00 1.00 .96 .85 
36-month-olds (N = 26) 
Control condition 
Test condition .00 .00 .65 .72 
 
These differences were significant in the test condition, trial T3: χ2(2, N = 66) = 12.188, 
p < .005; trial T4: χ2(2, N = 66) = 11.593, p < .005, but not in the control condition, trial 
T3: χ2(2, N = 66) = 4.420, p = .110; trial T4: χ2(2, N = 66) = 2.176, p = .337. The 
children in the two oldest-age groups could be trained perfectly, that is, they showed no 
preferred-hand use in the training trails of the test condition, and there was only 
preferred-hand use in the training trails of the control condition. On the contrary, a 
considerable number of 14-months-old children used the ‘non-trained’ hand in the last 
two training trials of test condition. As mentioned earlier, the reason for using the 
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preferred hand more often might be related to the increased control demands and 
postural instability for the lateral spoon grasps. 
After switching from the training trials to the neutral trials, there was a 
considerable effect of the training on the amount of preferred-hand use in the neutral 
trials. McNemar tests revealed that the differences in the proportion of preferred-hand 
use in trial N1 between the two experimental conditions were significant only for the 
two oldest-age groups (p < .01, for both the 24- and 36-month-olds; p = .70 for the 14-
month-olds). Because this undoubtedly shows that a number of these children persisted 
in using the hand they had been using in the preceding trials, this effect can only be 
interpreted as perseverance. The effect was not (significantly) present anymore in trial 
N2 (McNemar tests, all p’s > .5). 
For the children in the youngest-age group there seemed to be no significant effect 
of training on the performance in the neutral trials. However, this might be due to the 
higher variability in their overall limb selection, especially in the training trials. Because 
they used the ‘to be trained’ hand significantly less, this might have decreased the 
effectiveness of the training. To test this hypothesis we looked at the subgroup of 14-
month-olds that showed perfect training scores in the test condition, that is, no 
preferred-hand use in the training trials of this condition. The data of this subgroup of 
14 children is shown in Table 3. As was expected, this subgroup showed a significant 
difference in the proportion of preferred-hand use between the training conditions in 
trial N1 (p < .05, McNemar test). The effect was no longer present in trial N2. Note that 
this group is indeed also less variable in their limb selection in the control condition. 
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Table 3. Experimental results of the subgroup of 14-month-olds that is based on no preferred-
hand use in the training trials of the test condition: Proportion of preferred-hand use in the last 
two training trials (T3 and T4) and the two neutral trials (N1 and N2) for the control condition and 
test condition. 
 
Subgroup T3 T4 N1 N2 
 
1.00 1.00 1.00 .86 
14-month-olds (N = 14) 
Control condition 
Test condition .00 .00 .57 .64 
 
Simulations 
 
In the following we will present model simulations of young children’s 
perseverative limb selection as found in the experiment. The model that implements the 
internal dynamics of the limb-selection process entails the following two differential 
equations: 
 
 
In the model, the time-dependent u functions represent the activation functions for the 
limbs (sites), each of which is related to the likelihood of selecting the corresponding 
limb. The indices P and NP denote the preferred-hand site and non preferred-hand site, 
respectively. The ‘dot’ on the activation functions on the left-hand side of the equations 
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symbolizes the first-order derivative with respect to time. The parameter h is the resting 
level of the sites, to which activation will decay (with rate τ) in the absence of 
stimulation. The two sites are connected by mutual inhibition, σ, which is of sigmoid 
shape. For the strength of this inhibition the following inequality holds: cP < cNP. It is a 
basic claim of the model that this difference in cross-lateral inhibition strength 
represents handedness. The total input to the sites is represented by the I terms in the 
equations, which consist of both sensory input and memory input. Finally, ξ is a noise 
factor with strength n. For a more thorough introduction and discussion of the model see 
Chapter 4. 
Both the experiment and the literature on young children’s limb selection suggest 
an age-related increase in handedness strength as well as an age-related decrease of 
variability in unimanual grasping. To simulate our experiment in accordance with these 
empirical findings, we varied the corresponding parameters in our model as a function 
of age. Specifically, the parameters determining the strength of cross-lateral inhibition 
and noise received the following numerical values: cP = 0.5, cNP = 3.5, n = 3.3 for the 
14-month-olds, cP = 2.0, cNP = 5.0, n = 2.0 for the 24-month-olds, and cP = 3.0, cNP = 
7.0, n = 1.7 for the 36-month-olds. This parameter setting reflexes the differences in 
handedness strength and variability between the age groups as we found in our 
experiment. These age-related parameters and the other model parameters (τ = 3; h = -2; 
β = 2) were fixed throughout all simulations. 
The equations were integrated using an Euler procedure in Matlab (version 6.1, 
The MathWorks, Inc.) on a standard PC. By taking 400 time steps of 5 ms each, we 
simulated two seconds of selection-process time, which we gathered to be a realistic 
estimate. All simulations are based on 500 repetitions (i.e., fictive participants), to 
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assure convergence of the model and to obtain distributions in the results. A complete 
experimental procedure was simulated for each repetition: Four training trials followed 
by two neutral trials for each of the two conditions (i.e., control and test). The strengths 
of the inputs were set before the start of every trial and were active for the entire trial 
duration. During the training trials, sensory input to the site that corresponded to the 
side of the spoon presentation had strength 6.0; sensory input to the other site had 
strength 1.0. This difference in input strength represents the strong ipsilateral influence 
of object position and handle orientation on limb selection. During the neutral trials, 
sensory input was of equal strength (6.0) for both sites. After every trial, the strength of 
the memory input was updated according to the limb selection in that trial. Between the 
control and test conditions memory input was reset to zero. 
Two typical results of a complete series of six trials are shown in Figure 3. In 
Figure 3a the simulation results of a fictive 14-months-old in the non-preferred hand 
training condition (i.e., spoon presentation in trials T1 to T4 are on the side of the non-
preferred hand). In accordance with the experimental results of that age group limb 
selection is quite variable, in the training trials as well as in the neutral trials. The 
selection of the non-preferred and preferred hand does not seem to follow a clear pattern 
over trials. Even more remarkable is that although the spoon is presented on the side of 
the non-preferred hand, in trial T3 the subject grasps it (quite awkwardly) with the 
preferred hand. Figure 3b shows the results of a fictive 24-months-old child, also in the 
non-preferred hand training condition. After using the spoon with the non-preferred 
hand for four times during training, the subject ‘sticks’ to using this hand in the neutral 
trials where the spoon presentation is laterally neutral. 
 
Chapter 5 
 178
Figure 3. Examples of typical single-subject simulations. Simulation of a 14-months-old child 
in the test condition. Notice the variability in limb selection (above). Simulation of a 24-
months-old child in the test condition (below). Notice the perseverance in the use of the non-
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preferred hand after the training trials, when the spoon is presented at midline in trial N1 and 
trial N2. 
  
Summarizing the main finding of the experiment, which the model has to 
reproduce: First, the higher variability in limb selection found in the training trials of the 
youngest children. Second, the effect of perseveration that was found in the two oldest-
age groups. Third, the effect of perseveration that was found in a subgroup of the 
youngest children, filtered for 100% training effectiveness. Table 4 presents the 
statistics of the simulations for 500 runs of the model for each trial, performed 
separately for each age groups. Comparing Table 4 with Table 2 reveals a similar 
overall pattern of limb selection between the results of the simulation and the 
experimental results in all three age groups. 
In Table 5 the statistics of the subgroup of the simulations of the 14-months-old 
children are shown. Comparing Table 5 with Table 3 demonstrates that the results of the 
simulation produce the same overall pattern of limb selection as were found in the 
experiments. 
 
General Discussion 
 
The present study addressed perseverative limb selection in young children in the age of 
14, 24 and 36 months. An experiment was performed in which children were provoked 
to grasp a spoon repeatedly with the same hand, in a series of training trials. After this, 
spoon presentation switched to a lateraly ‘neutral’ position and orientation. We looked 
at how the choice of hand for grasping the spoon with in these neutral trials was 
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Table 4. Model simulation results for the training conditions based on 500 runs: Proportion of 
preferred-hand use in the last two training trials (T3 and T4) and the two neutral trials (N1 and 
N2) for the control condition and test condition. 
 
Group T3 T4 N1 N2 
 
.95 .95 .90 .87 
14-month-olds 
Control condition 
Test condition .21 .21 .64 .63 
 
1.00 1.00 .98 .93 
24-month-olds 
Control condition 
Test condition .04 .04 .59 .70 
 
1.00 1.00 .99 .97 
36-month-olds 
Control condition 
Test condition .01 .01 .63 .67 
 
influenced by the prior series of choices in the training trials. The experiment revealed 
that the children in the two oldest-age groups perseverated in their choice of hand. In the 
youngest-age group this seemed not to be the case. This negative result, however, 
proved to be caused by the overall ‘quality’ of their training (i.e., the strength of the 
memory trace that was built up). This could be concluded after analyzing the results of a 
subgroup of the 14-month-olds, defined by having ‘perfect’ training results. This 
subgroup did show a significant level of perseveration in their choice of hand. 
Summarizing the main results of the experiment: First, all three age groups showed 
some degree of perseverative limb selection. Second, the action system’s recent history 
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Table 5. Model simulation results for the training conditions in a subgroup of 14-month-olds 
that is based on no preferred-hand use in the training trials of the test condition: Proportion of 
preferred-hand use in the last two training trials (T3 and T4) and the two neutral trials (N1 and 
N2) for the control condition and test condition. 
 
Subgroup T3 T4 N1 N2 
 
.96 .97 .90 .85 
14-month-olds 
Control condition 
Test condition .00 * .00 * .54 .65 
 
(i.e., the motor memory established by the training) is central to this effect. Third, the 
size of the effect was influenced by handedness strength, which, as an overall level of 
variability, influenced the effectiveness of the training. 
The results of this experiment clearly add to the conclusion that perseveration, as a 
general behavioral phenomenon, might not be the result of a lack of ‘knowing’ or 
‘insight’ (Thelen et al., 2001). A more feasible explanation can be found by considering 
the dynamical and multi-causal aspects that are fundamental to repetitive or ongoing 
goal-directed behavior. As mentioned in the introduction, this perspective on 
perseveration can give us valuable insight in the development of goal-directed behavior. 
In particular it provides us with a way of understanding how different components on 
different timescales interact over time to codetermine behavior. The study presented 
here did not only show perseverance and the effect of prior choices on limb selection, 
clearly establishing it as a dynamical process, it also offered a model that brings 
together the external (e.g., object) properties and internal (i.e., subject) properties into 
one concise quantitative framework. Below we will discuss the general conclusions 
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following from these results, in terms of the dynamic model, and what they suggest 
about action planning and action control in goal-directed behavior in general and in 
young children in particular. 
 
Dynamic Model 
One of the main goals of this study was to extend an existing model on limb 
selection (Cox & Smitsman, 2006b) from adults to children in the age of one to three 
years. More in particular, we intended to incorporate into the limb-selection process, the 
developmental changes in handedness that are known from the literature and that were 
(partially) reproduced in the handedness conditions. To demonstrate how these changes 
influence the selection process, the model was used to simulate a limb-selection 
perseveration experiment. 
Two main parameters implemented these developmental changes in handedness: 
The noise level and the (difference in) inhibition strength. The noise level reflected the 
overall variability in hand use. It determined the level of spontaneous activation of one 
of the sites, increasing the likelihood of the corresponding hand being selected for 
performing the reach. This random force has its influence on the dynamics of the 
selection process next to the sensory and memory input. In the model, handedness 
(strength) was incorporated by the difference in the strength of the inhibition between 
the two sites. This was already introduced in the earlier version of the model (Cox & 
Smitsman, 2006b). In the present context however, differences in inhibition strength 
have a developmental meaning. The difference in handedness strength between the age 
groups in our experiment (especially the oldest-age group seemed to have a stronger 
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hand preference than the other two), was reflected by the difference in inhibition 
strength, which was suggested to increase with age. 
Motor memory was treated as an input source that itself builds over an intermediate 
timescale with respect to the dynamics of the limb-selection process. Dynamic 
preshaping of the action-selection field by the motor history of the system (memory 
trace), was already introduced in the dynamic field theory (Erlhagen & Schöner, 2002; 
Thelen et al., 2001). In contrast, handedness (as an overt behavioral preference) was 
treated as a long-term asymmetry property of the dynamical system that governs limb 
selection. A larger asymmetry of the governing dynamics (i.e., a larger difference in 
inhibition strength), reflects a stronger handedness. Incorporating a structural or 
functional asymmetry (long-term bias) as an integral part of its dynamics, is a novel 
aspect for this type of models. In this sense the present model is ‘more embodied’ than 
the earlier dynamical field model developed for perseverative reaching in the A-not-B 
task. 
 
Action planning and action control 
Children acquire more and more very robust action-effect relationships throughout 
the first years of life (e.g., Hommel, 2003, 2006; Elsner & Hommel, 2001). Frequently 
occurring action-effect contingencies in particular situations form behavioral heuristics 
and strategies that start to play an increasing role in the (off-line) guidance of actions. It 
is not unnatural to regard these heuristics and strategies as functional (or possibly even 
structural) preferences of the action system, that is, as long-term behavioral biases in 
particular situations. It is assumed that this information is used in the off-line planning 
phase of action, generally preceding the actual performance of the action. In this phase a 
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rough sketch of the required actions and the expected outcomes is constructed, on the 
basis of these heuristics and strategies and possibly other preferences. Sensory 
information, on the contrary, is supposed to be monitored and dealt with by lower-level 
on-line processes during the control phase of action. The general off-line action plan is 
specified (and in a sense completed) in this control phase to guide the actual execution 
of the action plan. The specific and detailed sensory information is usually not assumed 
to be present yet in the higher-level off-line planning phase. 
However, action planning is all about prospective control of behavior (e.g., 
Bertenthal & Clifton, 1998; Gibson & Pick, 2001; Smitsman, 2001; Von Hofsten, 
2003). This means that for an action system to stay goal directed and be adaptive in a 
dynamic world, the ‘output’ of action planning has to be as ‘on-line’ and adaptable as 
action control. In order to adequately and flexibly deal with the change aspects of 
behavior, imposed for example, by changing or ambiguous information or by 
cooperation between partners during joint action, action planning has to be a ongoing 
and dynamical process. The view of action planning presented in this paper, in 
particular the merging of long-term (off-line) action-effect relationships with short-term 
(on-line) sensory information, provides a framework for thinking about this. We believe 
that sensory information, intention, as well as functional and structural properties of the 
action system, such as for example preferences, continuously interact in real time. 
Moreover, this process must already be going on in an early stage of the process, not 
just as a ‘finishing touch’. 
As a final consideration, we note that it is well known that a certain level of 
prospective control of action is already visible in neonates (see e.g., Lee, 2004; Von 
Hofsten, 2003). This has, for example, very elegantly been demonstrated by studies on 
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infant sucking behavior (Craig & Lee, 1999; Craig, Grealy & Lee, 2000). This, and 
other studies alike, suggest that the new-born action system is functionally and/or 
structurally equipped to combine different sensory, motor and even early cognitive 
components in order to engage in goal-directed behavior. Considering this, we are 
forced to a view of cognitive development that is about the way all these different 
components and timescales merge. Development in behavior, then, is the result of 
changes in the relative weight that all these components have in the action-selection 
process. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Epilogue 
 
The epilogue of this thesis will cover three main points. First, planning and its 
development will be discussed in more general terms, as compared to the Introduction 
(Chapter 1), emphasizing and criticizing the influential problem-solving approach. 
Second, the status of the ideomotor principle as a general principle of sensorimotor and 
cognitive development will be reviewed. This will be followed in the third and final 
section by an outline of a dynamic view on action planning and action control as part of 
a process of action selection. This section will try to combine into a general framework 
the topics raised in the Introduction (Chapter 1) and that were investigated in the 
empirical part of this thesis (Chapters 2 to 5). 
 
Planning as Problem Solving 
 
An influential definition of planning, especially in the developmental literature, is 
the one by Haith (1994) labeling it as future-oriented problem solving (see Chapter 1). 
The problem-solving approach to planning has been (and still is) a major research topic 
in cognitive science (see e.g., DeLoache & Brown, 1987; Friedman & Scholnick, 1997; 
Friedman, Scholnick & Cocking, 1987; Garnham & Oakhill, 1994; Kahney, 1986; 
Miller et al., 1960; Newell & Simon, 1972; Schank & Abelson, 1977). Research in this 
area mainly focuses on puzzle-like tasks with well-defined initial and final states, such 
as route planning (e.g., Fabricius, 1988; Gardner & Rogoff, 1990; Klein, 1983), chess 
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(e.g., Charness, 1981; Holding & Reynolds, 1982; Holding, 1985), Tower of Hanoi 
(e.g., Klahr, 1978; Klahr & Robinson, 1981; Moris et al., 1997; Squire, 1987; Welsh, 
1991), balance-scale task (e.g., Karmiloff-Smith & Inhelder, 1974/5; Siegler, 1978, 
1981), various logical and mathematical problems and puzzles (e.g., DeLoache, 
Sugerman & Brown, 1985; Karmiloff-Smith, 1979; see also Anderson, 1980), and last 
but not least the classical Piagetian conservation tasks (e.g., Piaget, 1954; Siegler, 1981, 
1983). 
The remarkable association between planning and problem solving in cognitive 
science is probably due to the successes in artificial intelligence (AI) and computer 
science (CS) in this and adjacent areas.i An obvious clue to the influence of AI and CS 
on the study of planning is the TOTE model (Test - Operate - Test - Execute cycle) of 
planning proposed by Miller et al. (1960). This model bares more than coincidental 
resemblance to the Von Neumann architecture from the late 1940s (Instruction Fetch - 
Instruction Decode - Operant Fetch - Execute cycle) on which virtually all modern 
multipurpose computers are still based. AI and CS, and their appealing metaphors have 
a strong influence on our way of thinking about cognition (see e.g., Stillings et al., 
1995). Some of the metaphors that are readily used in cognitive psychology in general, 
and in the problem-solving approach to planning in particular, are: representation, 
knowledge base, problem space, search, and (search) strategy. These entities and 
processes seem to be easily linkable to various aspects of problem-solving tasks, to the 
behavior and (mental) operations of adults in such tasks, as well as to processes and 
areas (modules) in the brain. 
As a result of this influence (or at least partially responsible for it) much of the 
research on the development of planning, and for that matter of cognitive development 
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in general, has been focused on issues related to detecting the presence or absence of 
various types of domain-specific knowledge, logical structures, and various 
representational capacities, mapping capacities and memory capacities. Or, when 
present, to their growth and increasing complexity. Some of the research topics, relevant 
for planning, are young children’s abilities to inhibit prepotent responses (e.g., 
Dempster, 1993; Diamond, 1990, 1991a, 1991b) such as longstanding but inferior 
strategies (e.g., DeLoache, Sugerman & Brown, 1985; Diamond, 1990; Kuhn, 2000; 
Karmiloff-Smith, 1979; Siegler, 1996), to keep in mind larger and more complex 
sequences of subgoals (e.g., Willatts, 1989), and to stay focused on the (distal) main 
goal and resist attaining only a (proximal) smaller subgoal (e.g., Diamond & Gilbert, 
1989; Mischel & Mischel, 1983; Willatts, 1999). 
 
Criticisms to the Problem-Solving Approach 
 
Friedman et al. (1987; see also Friedman & Scholnick, 1997; Smitsman, Cox & 
Bongers, 2005) formulated a number of objections to the planning-as-problem-solving 
view. I will reproduce the three that are most relevant for the present thesis. First, there 
seems to be no consensus on which part of problem solving must be attributed to 
planning. Stated differently, in which of the basic qualities mentioned above does 
planning reside? Second, planning is far more common; not just reserved for solving 
intellectual problems (i.e., puzzle-like tasks). An obvious candidate is of course the 
planning of action in goal-directed behavior, which is the central theme of this thesis.ii 
Third, the dominance of adult problem solving (see also DeLoache & Brown, 1987). 
Although this objection is not quite as relevant anymore today considering the large 
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number of studies on children’s problem solving, it gives rise to an interesting point 
nonetheless; worth discussing in some detail in the following paragraphs. 
By taking adult or expert performance as normative and ideal, researchers have 
considered the change of becoming an expert from the state of being a novice, as 
resulting from practice, experience and increasing domain-specific knowledge. In 
children, we have seen the search for presence or absence of the basic qualities (i.e., 
structures and capacities) of planning, as presented in the list above. What makes this 
third objection still interesting, is that both (i.e., the adult research as well as the child 
research) take a structural stance with respect to planning. It is assumed that adult 
planners already possess all the basic qualities, but that these qualities are elaborated 
and used more efficiently and effectively after practice and experience. In children the 
basic qualities are supposed to be absent, a priori, and improved planning abilities are 
caused by the assembly of these qualities. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, this structural stance sidesteps the unique changes 
associated with children’s growing cognitive skills, as well as the way in which this 
affects the guidance of goal-directed behavior. The presence or absence of basic 
qualities does not learn us much about planning; planning involves more than a list of 
components. For sure, all of them are undeniably related to planning and its 
development. And, of course, everyone will agree that no single one of them can 
explain the (non)occurrence or success of planning in children. However, the issue here 
is that planning is about how these qualities combine in a goal-directed activity. It must 
be concluded that it is precisely these mechanisms that we still know very little about 
(e.g., Thelen, Schöner, Scheier & Smith, 2001; Smitsman et al., 2005). Therefore, 
research is needed from a process perspective (i.e., how does it work and what 
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influences it), as well as from a developmental perspective (i.e., the changes in this 
process from childhood to adulthood or from novice to expert). 
 
The Ideomotor Principle as Developmental Principle 
 
From a theoretical point of view, the ideomotor principle suggests a type of 
‘cognitive growth’ consisting of an increasing arsenal of stable links between 
anticipatable events and the associated actions that caused them. In this sense the 
concept is not in disagreement with Piaget’s theorizing about infants’ cognitive 
development as originating from (early) sensorimotor interactions with the world 
(Piaget, 1952; 1954). Piaget regarded children’s behavior in the sensorimotor period 
(i.e., the first two years) as going from purely reflexive and accidental in newborns and 
young infants (Stage I and Stage II), to reproductive (as in repeating actions with 
interesting outcomes; Stage III), to clearly goal-directed and intentional in older infants 
(Stage IV and onwards). Cognitive development as described by these sensorimotor 
stages, however, reflects a general change with age. That is, in time, infants tend to 
develop along the lines of these overall stages of ‘competence’. In contrast the two 
ideomotor stages reflect an ongoing learning process that is applicable to adult novices 
as well as infants (‘universal novices’; Brown & DeLoache, 1978), and in every new 
task that is encountered. So, although similar developmental mechanisms can be 
recognized in both views, it is not obvious how to parallel the two types of stages. In the 
following, I will discuss four general (empirically inspired) comments on the 
developmental mechanisms underlying the acquisition process in the first stage of the 
ideomotor principle. These comments can roughly be divided by topic as concerning (1) 
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the initial state and (2) the progression of the progress, and (3) the aspect of causality 
and (4) contextual information during acquisition. 
 
Initial State 
In the first comment I want to emphasize the rich and substantial body of research 
on motor development, performed in the past two or three decades, especially by Esther 
Thelen and coworkers (e.g., Adolph, Corbetta, Smith, Spencer, Thelen). Following this 
research we have to conclude that, while initially behavior is indeed highly variable and 
seemingly disorganized, this does not imply that it lacks an ‘intentional’ link to the 
outside world (see also Gibson & Pick, 2002; Reed, 1982, 1996). Consider for example 
the development of infant reaching (e.g., Corbetta & Thelen, 1996, 2002). Research has 
irrefutably shown us that within the ‘flapping’ movements infants make at first, a 
definite form of intentional control of these actions is nonetheless present. That is, their 
movements are clearly (supposed to be) directed at a target. In fact, much of the 
research summarized in the section on prospective control of behavior in Chapter 1 
suggests that neonates are already able to regulate a relationship with their environment 
in a way that is considerably more sophisticated than merely random. This argument 
suggests that action-effect relations or other long-terms associations are formed. 
However, the initial state on which the ideomotor process builds is not necessarily a 
‘tabula rasa’. On the contrary, functional structures are already present in the infant’s 
action system, and newly acquired knowledge should be embedded into these structures. 
Note that the same argument applies to adult novices to a particular task; in general, 
they too do not start from scratch. 
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Progression 
The second comment concerns the numerous examples in developmental 
psychology where (overt) behavior does not improve regularly or gradually over time. 
On the contrary, more often than not, as it becomes organized, behavior goes through a 
phase that is highly controlled and inappropriately perseverative (Smith, 2006; Spencer 
& Schöner, 2003). Although the ideomotor principle does not explicitly deal with 
developmental trajectories, as a ‘rule’ of development, it should be able to account for 
these very general deviations from regular and gradual progression. It remains unclear 
how an increasing number (and increasing strength) of action-effect associations can 
explain, for instance, such U-shaped learning curves that are quite common in both 
cognitive and motor development. 
 
Causality 
In the third comment the well-known fact is noted, that young children respond 
differently to event relations that have a causal structure than to those without such 
relationship. Consider the following two examples. First, in a series of studies 
DeJonckheere, Smitsman, and Verhofstadt-Denève (e.g., 2005, in press) used a 
habituation paradigm to investigate infants’ perception of containment and, in 
particular, what they attended to in order to detect if containment is possible or not. The 
researchers mechanically lowered a block into a slightly larger box that had an opening 
at the top. In some conditions the lowering block fitted nicely into the opening of the 
larger box; in other conditions the block ‘magically’ passed through the box’ rims. 
Depending on the number of rims that were contacted, infants as young as nine months 
showed increased looking times when the lowering box passed through the rims --not so 
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when only one rim was touched, but definitely in the more discernible case where three 
rims were touched. This hints at surprise and therefore detection of an unrealistic or 
non-causal event. Interestingly, looking times did not increase when the rims were 
flexible and clearly deformed when the lowering box passed (pushed) through them. 
These and subsequent studies demonstrated that infants were focused on dynamic object 
relations. That is, they detected the possibility of containment by monitoring the event 
structure at the edges and rims of the objects, and by considering properties such as size, 
orientation and movement of the objects as relative to each other (see also Smitsman et 
al., 2005). In light of the argumentation presented here, this research clearly 
demonstrates that causal events (i.e., passing through by fit or deformation) are 
processed differently from non-causal events (i.e., ‘magically’ passing through). 
Second, infants as young as six months showed significantly more dishabituation 
when they saw a causal sequence of events played in reverse, than when they saw the 
reversal of a similar but non-causal sequence (Leslie, 1984; Leslie & Keeble, 1987). For 
these children, the reversed causal sequence was something new that was happening, 
and therefore interesting. The reversed non-causal sequence, however, was just another 
sequence of unrelated events. It was concluded that children do not only encode the 
events in the sequence, but also the causal structure that holds between them.iii These 
findings might question the bi-directionality of the movement-effect associations. They 
strongly suggest that in the first ideomotor stage, a movement and its resulting effect are 
not just linked together as two ‘unvalued’ events. Contrary, the causal structure that 
holds between them, that is, the fact that one brings about the other, is encoded along 
with them. The co-activation patterns of the sensory codes representing the effect and 
the motor codes representing the movement (i.e., the cause) might in some way carry 
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directional information, which could influence the anticipation mechanism in the second 
ideomotor stage.iv 
 
Context 
Finally, in the fourth comment, consider again one of the main pieces of evidence 
for the early acquisition of action-effect relations: The studies on infant memory and 
retention (Rovee & Rovee, 1969; Fagen & Rovee, 1976; Fagen, Rovee & Kaplan, 1976) 
that indeed demonstrate that children relate movements and their sensory effects already 
at a very early age (even at five weeks of age!). More recent studies, however, add some 
nuance to this evidence (Hartshorn & Rovee-Colier, 1997; Hartshorn et al., 1998; for an 
overview see Rovee-Colier & Barr, 2001). Using the mobile-kicking paradigm, they 
found that infants of three to six months old (and even as young is eight weeks) did not 
kick above baseline level when they were tested with a slightly different mobile (i.e., 
slightly smaller drawings on the sides of the blocks the mobile was composed of!). It 
seemed like they did not recognize it as being a similar object that afforded the same 
action. This shows that the action-effect contingency was not retrieved from long-term 
memory when the object was slightly dissimilar to the original one. This contingency, in 
other words, was not generalized. Infants of nine to 12 months of age generalized (i.e., 
started kicking increasingly) only after short delays, but not anymore after longer 
delays. This means that they too stored the specific sensory details of the mobile, but 
went for the functional equivalence at first. Later the action-effect relation was only 
retrieved when sufficient cues matched. Finally, after relatively long delays (a few 
weeks), children of virtually all the age groups that were tested (three to 12 months) did 
not increase their rate of kicking when they were tested in a different context with the 
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same mobile. After such long delays, conditions had to be quite similar in order to 
facilitate retrieval of the relation. 
One might say that the infants in the experiment just did not recognize the mobile, 
and thus simply could not come up with the (leg-kicking activating) goal of making it 
move. However, it was not just any new object hanging above them, but a highly 
similar mobile with exactly the same relevant characteristics. Fundamentally, the cues 
that prevented infants from kicking were unrelated to the sensory effect of the moving 
mobile, although they did not raise any type of obstruction or resent for leg kicking. 
Still, such cues seem to play a crucial role in determining whether a goal is set or 
pursued. With respect to the present context, this raises the question of what is actually 
acquired. Is it an action-effect relation (i.e., “Leg kicking makes something move.”)? Or 
is it an action + effect + object features + circumstances relation (i.e., “Leg kicking 
makes that particular mobile in that particular crib move.”)? This latter relation is much 
too sensitive to be useful and practical, because (as research showed) when some of the 
components do not match those during acquisition, no effect-related motor codes will be 
activated. 
 
Interestingly, despite the undisputable evidence that action-effect contingencies are 
picked up already very early in life, there is equally strong evidence that infants’ 
association and recall of events and actions are highly susceptible to the causal structure 
and contextual information that coincide with their acquisition. In light of this, we might 
have to be modest with the conclusions we take from the fact that all kinds of action-
effect association can be learned and used. At the very least this demonstrates the 
flexibility and plasticity of sensorimotor systems and cognitive systems, and clearly 
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shows that they are connected. Yet, as part of a theory on (the development of) planning 
and control of goal-directed action, we need to make sure that it actually works this 
way. In addition: Sure, new associations between actions and effects are learned. And 
sure, they play an important role in the planning of future behavior. The issue that is 
addressed in this thesis, however, concerns how they come to influence the choices that 
are made for actions to take, amidst multiple other sources of information. 
 
Revisiting Action Planning and Control: 
The Action-Selection Approach 
 
In order to shed more light on the general topic stated above, this thesis would like 
to advocate the stance that action planning and action control are part of a more general 
action-selection process underlying all goal-directed behavior.v This statement clearly 
demands clarification, which will be presented below by means of discussing the four 
main conceptual points it entails: That (1) goal-directed behavior is governed by a 
selection process; (2) its selections for action arise multi-causally by dynamically 
merging information and processes that operate on different timescales; (3) the selection 
process is ongoing, that is, not just selecting a singleton action but capable of producing 
multi-step behavior, allowing behavioral switches to occur; and (4) the way the process 
operates develops with age. The incentive of this section is twofold: First, to present a 
general outline of a view on action selection that is motivated by our own research and 
that of others. However, since the following presentation of ideas is nowhere near a full-
grown theory, each of the four points needs considerably more investigation. A second 
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purpose of this section therefore, is to serve as a basis for further research and 
discussion to develop these ideas. 
 
Selection process 
The term action selection highlights the fact that in regulating its relation with the 
environment, an agent constantly makes (and revises) choices on what to do and what to 
do next. More specifically, goal-directed behavior is guided (i.e., governed) by an 
umbrella process --the process of action selection--, which combines different 
subsystems in the effort of continually selecting successive actions to take towards 
achieving a goal. Selections for actions (or behavioral choices) are temporary stable 
states of this action-selection process, in the sense of a dynamical system as discussed in 
Chapter 1. This means that the selections for actions emerge in a self-organizing way 
from the coupled dynamics of all the contributing subsystems. In particular this does not 
mean that the process selects between options from a discrete and predetermined set 
(although in many experiments the set of possible responses certainly is restricted). On 
the contrary, action selection involves mechanisms that merges several contributing 
subsystems in such a way that some temporary stable behavioral pattern arises from a 
continuum of possibilities. 
The action-selection view does not merit the distinction between action planning 
and action control as incorrect. There is ample empirical evidence, both of a behavioral 
and of a neuroanatomical nature, suggesting that they are indeed (quasi-)separate 
processes that to some degree employ different channels in the brain (for an overview 
see e.g., Glover, 2004). Essentially however, planning and control are themselves mere 
labels for a set of functions or structures that contribute to the guidance of goal-directed 
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behavior. In fact, each of the two clearly consists of a number of subsystems, involving 
for instance intention, memory, attention, and perception (see Chapter 1). Moreover, in 
selecting actions to take, processes that are usually attributed to action planning can play 
a similar role as processes that are usually attributed to action control. For instance, a 
behavioral switch can be caused equally likely by an intervention at the control level, as 
by a sudden change of plan. In turn, both of them can be caused by changing 
sensorimotor information in the course of the activity, an intentional switch, or the 
recall from memory of a more appropriate action. 
More generally, on the one hand, goal-directed behavior always takes place in the 
context of a certain task and in a particular environment, therefore action selection is 
subjected to sensorimotor processes. That is, it coevolves with the activities that are part 
of the task as well as with task- and goal-related events that take place in the 
environment. On the other hand, by definition, goal-directed behavior is always aimed 
at achieving a particular goal or satisfying a certain internal need. Therefore, processes 
internal to the agent like goal-related cognitions, intentions, and preferences also guide 
action selection. This means that action selection is just as much subjected to ideomotor 
processes. The main point here is that both ideomotor processes and sensorimotor 
processes contribute to action planning as well as action control, and that these 
processes are not necessarily hierarchically (temporally) ordered in the process of action 
selection. To come to a deeper understanding of voluntary action it might not be wise to 
either have a sensorimotor view or an ideomotor view. Nor is it necessary to pose a 
sequential order of sensorimotor after ideomotor. Rather, a merger based on equality 
and interaction of the two into one sensorideomotor framework might be worth 
investigating, as is done below. 
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Finally, what the empirical studies in this thesis emphasized is that the action-
selection process is not something that has its place outside and above action (e.g., like 
planning as an off-line channel; see Hommel, 2003, 2006). More specifically, action 
selection is not just the formation of a ‘plan’ in the ideomotor sense, waiting to be 
executed (e.g., as a fixed sequence of operations, see Miller, Galanter & Pribram, 1960), 
during which control mechanisms in the sensorimotor sense act as mere error-
correction. Guiding goal-directed behavior needs the action-selection process, and 
therefore both action planning and action control, to be in action not just of action. 
 
Multi-causality and Dynamics 
As already hinted on above, action selection is multi-causal, which means that 
many different subsystems on different timescales contribute to the process. There are 
numerous examples that this is indeed the case in the planning of movements (e.g., Cox 
& Smitsman, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d; Erlhagen & Schöner, 2002; Leconte & 
Fagard, 2004; Thelen et al., 2001; Thelen & Smith, 1994), as well as in higher-order 
faculties as decision making (e.g., Busemeyer & Diedrich, 2002; Busemeyer & 
Townsend, 1993).vi For instance, proprioceptive and visual information coming from 
the senses serve as input to the selection process and can influence the choices that are 
made. But internal processes and information (i.e., in some way related to the agent’s 
body or brain), such as inhibition, short-term memory, long-term memory, intention, 
and goals contribute as well. Moreover, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, bodily processes 
and the way they are involved in the task, for instance motor preferences, dexterity, and 
skills, also form an essential part of action selection. Although all these factors converge 
in the action-selection process and constrain the possible outcomes of this process they 
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do not do so in a prescriptive way. In fact their influence should be conceived of more 
along the lines of Newell’s (1986, 1989) conception of constraints on movements (see 
Chapter 4). 
An interesting example of a long-term influence that plays a role in the action-
selection process has been discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, viz. handedness. It is far from 
resolved whether handedness has to be considered as a functional (i.e., goal-, task- or 
context-related and softly-assembled) or a structural (i.e., hard-wired and biological) 
property of the action system (see e.g., Hopkins & Rönnqvist, 1998), but in any case it 
clearly is a long-term property which influences behavioral choices. This makes it a 
relevant and interesting exemplary case to come to a more general way of 
conceptualizing how ‘long-term information’, such as goals and preferences, is 
absorbed in the action-selection process and comes to influence behavior. Below I will 
try to generalize the ideas put forth in our research and model on limb selection. 
As demonstrated by the example of handedness, an overt behavioral preference of 
the action-selection process can be brought about by creating an asymmetry in the 
governing dynamics. This, in turn, can be induced by the appropriate relative strengths 
between the different contributing subsystems (i.e., a parameter settingvii). For instance, 
as demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 5, a difference in the relative strength of cross-lateral 
inhibitions can be seen as the materialization of the overt behavioral preference we label 
as handedness. In that particular case the difference in inhibition created an asymmetry 
in the dynamics of the limb-selection process by a-priori favoring one limb above the 
other (i.e., increasing the likelihood of activating that limb). 
Basically, the asymmetry in the limb-selection dynamics was induced by the goal 
of performing an unimanual grasp of an object in hemispace. Therefore, we might 
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stretch this idea further by considering goals to be temporary behavioral preferences of 
an intentional nature, which possess an external and prospective quality (i.e., directed at 
some future state of the world). Similar to handedness and using this definition of a 
goal, we might generally conceive of goal-directedness as intentionally creating 
asymmetries in the dynamics of the action-selection process that guides goal-directed 
behavior. This then increases the likelihood of producing an appropriate action 
(sequence) towards attaining the future goal. 
Being an open system, the action-selection process is influenced by the information 
that flows through the contributing subsystems. Following Jeka and Kelso (1989) we 
conceive of information as meaningful and specific to the system in that it contributes to 
the intrinsic dynamics, for instance, by perturbing it towards a new behavioral pattern. 
The difference being that information here is (also) directed at attaining an external 
goal. Information can be of an intentional nature, such as from a goal, as discussed 
above, and give rise to a deliberate and required asymmetry of the dynamics. However, 
information influencing behavioral choices can of course also be of a sensorimotor 
nature or come from short-term memory. 
As said before, behavioral choices are temporary stable states of the action-
selection process. So although the goal-related asymmetries of the dynamics might 
create a rough outline of a possible action repertoire (by increasing its likelihood), what 
actually will happen in terms of action selection is determined by how the process 
evolves over time in the context of various sources of (possibly conflicting) 
information. Therefore, in general, the action-selection process is driven by the 
direction, strength and timing of the information as much as by the goal-related 
asymmetries of its dynamics. Consider for instance the example of limb selection. The 
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a-priori bias the limb-selection process has towards the preferred limb (i.e., handedness) 
can temporarily be overruled by sensory information on an object’s position. However, 
the choice might still flip to the preferred side when other sources of sensory 
information come into play or when there is a strong (motor) memory of earlier choices, 
which happen to be biased to the preferred side. 
As said, some goal-related asymmetries determine the relative strength (i.e., 
influence) different sub-processes have in the action-selection process. This might 
control the order in which different aspects of the goal are pursued or subsequent steps 
are taken leading to goal attainment. However, an asymmetry might also be created 
between different sources of sensory information that are available, regulating their 
relative strengths in the process. Focusing attention to a certain aspect of a goal or task, 
for instance, can be the ‘cause’ of such an asymmetry. This does not necessarily have to 
be in line with the intended end-goal, but might serve to attain a sub-goal or avoid 
obstacles and dead-ends. Generally, the asymmetries that are created are specific to the 
goal in question and concern different features of that goal. However, a goal-related 
asymmetry, just as information (cf. Jeka & Kelso, 1989; Schöner & Kelso, 1988b), is 
always defined in terms of the processes that contribute to action selection. 
The idea of a goal-related asymmetries in the governing dynamics as outlined 
above is quite analogous to the activation of motor codes in Hommel’s model for action 
planning and control (see e.g., Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Hommel, 2003, 2006; see also 
Chapter 1). Following from the ideomotor principle this model conceives of voluntary, 
goal-directed action as starting with the activation of goal-related motor codes. That is, 
action starts with the construction of a roughly-sketched off-line plan, which is based on 
action-effect relations that were acquired in an earlier phase and stored in long-term 
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memory. In fact, ‘knowledge’ on the relative influence different subsystems and 
information should have in order to produce the appropriate goal-directed actions is 
something that is acquired in a way that is very similar to this. The model presented 
here tries to incorporate these ideas into a more dynamic account of action selection, 
such as described in Chapter 1 (see e.g., Schöner, 1995; Spencer & Schöner, 2003). 
However there are a few noticeable differences with the model conceived by Hommel. 
Below I will briefly discuss two of the main differences. 
First, the model presented here much more clearly materializes how (off-line) 
planning and (on-line) control communicate in the guidance of goal-directed action. 
Instead of directly activating motor codes into an off-line plan which is subsequently 
‘enriched’ by a (separate) on-line control channel, goals constrain the dynamics by 
favoring actions that can lead to goal attainment. Action selection, however, is equally 
much a result of sensorimotor (and other) information as of the goal-related 
asymmetries of the dynamics. This makes planning no longer off-line, but part of the 
on-line governing dynamics that produces choices for actions in real time. 
Second, as long as the goal is maintained by the agent, the asymmetry is fixed, 
making a particular action (sequence) highly probable in terms of subsequent stable 
outcomes of the selection process. However, by focusing attention to something else or 
by simply changing the ‘plan’, thereby adjusting the relative influence of a subsystem or 
source of information, the agent has intentional control of this process (at least part of 
it). In terms of the governing dynamical system, an asymmetry can change as flexibly as 
goals can switch or ideas can be adjusted, for instance by considering new or additional 
information. In this sense an asymmetry in the dynamics of action selection might be 
conceived of as a temporary, functional asymmetry or preference of the action system. 
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Behavioral Switches 
Sensorimotor information, goal-related cognitions, and all contributing processes 
are at the basis of the choices that are made for actions. Many different subsystems 
come together in the action-selecting process and can reinforce or compete each other, 
that is, they can strengthen or weaken each other’s effect when they are present at the 
same time. This idea of interaction between different contributing factors is in 
accordance with recent models of brain functioning (e.g., Corballis, 1998; 
Georgopoulos, Schwartz & Kettner, 1986; Georgopoulos, 1990; Ghez, Hening & 
Favilla, 1990; Iacobini, Woods, Lenzi & Mazziotta, 1997; Iacobini & Zaidel, 2003; 
Roser & Corballis, 2002). So to better understand how action evolves from the way 
these factors are combined, we have to look at the specific composition of the different 
factors involved. This composition will be different for different goals and tasks, and 
can change in different phases within a task (i.e., for different sub-goals). Moreover, 
because these factors are generally time dependent, therefore so is their possible effect 
on the action-selection process. This means that when the specific constellation of all 
these factors changes, which happens over time due to sensorimotor feedback of the 
actions themselves, changes in the environment, or a change of goal, the resulting 
choices for action will also change. This can be a gradual as well as an abrupt process 
that leads to behavioral adjustments during the course of the activities. 
To elucidate how this model might account for behavioral switches, consider one 
last time the last part of the glass-of-water example introduced in Chapter 1. (To 
recapitulate: You wanted to grasp the glass, which was positioned to your left, in order 
to give it to someone else, who was sitting to your far right.) In discussing this example, 
I will focus only on the limb-selection part of the action but a highly similar reasoning 
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can be held, for instance, for direction and force of the movements involved. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, spatial information on the glass’ position will probably activate 
the left hand, while spatial information of the person sitting to your right will activate 
the right hand. The end-goal is to have the glass at the right, so the goal-related 
asymmetry of the limb-selection process will favor a right-hand grasp by biasing the 
system towards the right. However sensory information of the glass positioned at the 
left side might temporarily overrule this, resulting in an initial left-hand grasp. After 
grasping the glass this sensory input vanishes, because the glass is no longer at that 
position, and the original (goal-related) right-hand bias will determine the dynamics. 
This results in a switch to the right hand sometime in the midst of moving the glass to 
the right side of the table. Fundamentally, actual limb selection (i.e., whether you will 
switch or make a direct right-hand grasp) will also depend on handedness (direction and 
strength) and possibly other relevant information that is available. So in some cases, for 
instance when you are a strong right-hander, a direct right-hand grasp is more probable. 
 
Development 
Finally, the way the different factors are combined in the action-selection process 
to produce choices for action develops with age. As mentioned in Chapter 1, there is 
evidence that prospection, or a certain level of action planning, is present from very 
early on in life, although the way in which the different components come together in 
the process changes with age. That is to say, the action-selection process develops in the 
way it combines the internal and external constraints (i.e., information and processes) 
the action system is subjected to. Ample evidence for this claim can be found. Below I 
Epilogue 
 215 
will discuss just two examples that justify this claim, one empirical and one modeling 
example: 
One example comes from the research on handedness. It is well known that there is 
a large influence on limb selection coming from spatial factors (e.g., position and 
orientation of relevant objects) and task complexity, over a wide age range in infants 
and children (e.g., Cox & Smitsman, 2006a, 2006b, 2006d; Gabbard, Rabb & Gentry, 
2001; Gabbard & Rabb Helbig, 2004; Harris & Carlson, 1993; Leconte & Fagard, 2004; 
Van Hof, Van der Kamp & Savelsbergh, 2002), and adults (e.g., Bryden, Pryde & Roy, 
1999, 2000; Calvert & Bisshop, 1998; Gabbard, Iteya & Rabb, 1997; Harris & Carlson, 
1993). We also know that the strength or consistency of laterality increases between 
these age groups (see e.g., McManus, Sik, Cole, Mellon, Wong & Kloss, 1988; see also 
Hopkins & Rönnqvist, 1998). However, the difference in the patterns of limb selection 
over different age groups (e.g., between children and adults) in various tasks cannot all 
be explained by this increase. It must also be the result of how laterality, dexterity and 
perceptual information interact in the choice of what hand to use in a particular situation 
(e.g., Leconte & Fagard, 2004). 
The other example comes from Thelen et al.’s (2001) model for the A-not-B task in 
terms of dynamic field theory (for an overview on DFT see Erlhagen & Schöner, 2002). 
In their model of infant perseverative reaching, there is an important parameter, h, 
which (basically) represents the density of interconnected nerve fibers. This density is 
suggested to increase with age, corresponding with the underlying neural system 
settling in a cooperative regime. This results in the child no longer making the A-not-B 
error. The key thing in explaining this overt behavioral change, however, is that the 
effect the h parameter actually has on the process is by controlling the relative strengths 
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of the memory input and the sensory input, and enabling the system to come up with a 
stable self-sustaining solution. In other words, this parameter regulates the way internal 
and external constraints on the behavior come together in the planning of a reaching 
movement. 
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Notes 
                                                 
i Moreover, it fits with traditional Western philosophical views of Plato, Descartes and Kant. 
ii Note in this respect also the concept of a motor problem (Reed, 1985; see also Smitsman & Bongers, 
2001), which is what infants have to ‘solve’ each time they engage in a novel locomotor situation, or 
when they are at the verge of breaking through to their next motor milestone. 
iii Interestingly, Leslie (1988; 1995), in an attempt to explain these results, embraces a view on the 
development of causality that is very similar to the planning-from-prospection view as discussed in 
Chapter 1. 
iv To make matters even worse, other research (Cohen & Amsel, 1998; Cohen, Amsel, Redford & 
Casasola, 1998) has shown that when the objects involved in the event sequence are more complex, 
dishabituation for the reversed causal sequence starts significantly later --at ten months. This has been 
explained by the fact that young children (i.e., six months) are not yet able to regard these complex 
objects as being distinct, which makes focusing on causality difficult. This posses a more general problem 
for the ideomotor principle, because if the world is not seen in ‘isolated’ objects or events, it is difficult to 
know what has to be associated to what. 
v Sometimes choices for action (i.e., selections) are made rationally and consciously, but in other cases 
they arise spontaneously and unconsciously, sometimes labeled as automatic behavior. In essence the 
same type of selection process might be underlying both types of choice mechanisms. 
vi Moreover, since recently it is becoming increasingly clear that people’s responses in a simple reaction-
time experiment are probably as much determined by the conditions of the experiment, as by what 
participants themselves bring into the task (see e.g., Gilden, 2003; Van Orden, Holden & Turvey, 2003, 
2005). Many different biological, psychological and social processes contribute to the choices for actions 
that are made during such a task. 
vii The parameter setting of a (closed and deterministic) dynamical system determines its specific set of 
possible stable solutions (see e.g., Guckenheimer & Holmes, 1983; Sastry, 1999). This means that 
specific parameter values create specific asymmetries between what the system can and cannot do. 
However, the actual time-course of the system’s behavior, within this set of possible solutions, is driven 
by the internal dynamics of the system and the initial conditions. For example, consider the simple one-
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dimensional dynamical system that is given by the potential function V(x) = – ¼x4 + 1/8 ax2. The 
dynamics of this systems is given by the first-order ordinairy differential equation dx/dt = –dV/dt = x3 – 
¼ax. The qualitative behavior of this system is determined by the parameter a. For certain values of a this 
system has one solution for other values it has three. For instance, there is one solution at x = 0 for a = 0, 
and there are three solutions at x = 0, +½, and –½ for a = 1. In the latter case, which of the solution the 
system will occupy after transient, depends on the initial state of the system (i.e., in which attractor zone 
it starts). That is, x = 0 for x(0) = 0, x = +½ for x(0) > 0, and x = –½ for x(0) < 0. In a dissipative system 
(i.e., a system that is in interaction with its environment), input that flows through the system also drives 
the dynamics and by that it codetermines the behavior. The following global difference can be made 
between the nature of input and parameters in dynamical systems. Input is something that generally 
changes in real-time and influences the state of the system directly by being a driving force in the 
dynamics. Parameters generally change over longer timescales and determine the relative importance (or 
strength) of different components in the dynamics. Relevant to the present discussion is the idea of 
parameter settings as (internal and global) asymmetry-creating constraints on the set of stable solutions of 
a system. 
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Summary / Samenvatting 
 
Dit proefschrift gaat over de ontwikkeling van het plannen van de handelingen die 
nodig zijn voor het succesvol uitvoeren van een doelgerichte taak. Neem bijvoorbeeld 
het oppakken van een voorwerp (b.v. beker of pen), een handeling die we dagelijks vele 
malen uitvoeren. Niet iets waar je veel planning voor nodig hebt, zo lijkt het. Toch moet 
deze handeling worden aangestuurd om de juiste bewegingen te maken die tot het 
einddoel leiden. Dit betekent dat je steeds (onbewuste) keuzes moet maken over hoe iets 
gedaan moet worden, bijvoorbeeld welke hand je gebruikt om het voorwerp te pakken. 
In Hoofdstuk 1 wordt benadrukt dat plannen feitelijk bestaat uit een aaneenschakeling 
van het maken van zulke keuzes, gericht op het bereiken van een (toekomstig) doel. Bij 
doelgerichte handelingen is er altijd sprake van een samenspel tussen de intentie om een 
doel te bereiken, de momentane sensomotorische informatie tijdens de taakuitvoering, 
en andere relevante factoren, bijvoorbeeld eerdere ervaringen en (lichamelijke) 
voorkeuren. De centrale vragen in dit proefschrift zijn daarom hoe de keuzes voor 
handelingen tot stand komen onder invloed van al deze factoren en hoe zich dat 
ontwikkelt met leeftijd. 
Achtereenvolgens bespreekt het inleidende hoofdstuk een aantal van de relevante 
resultaten van het onderzoek naar de ontwikkeling van doelgericht handelen en de 
prospectieve controle van gedrag. Het blijkt dat er veel onderzoek is gedaan naar welke 
factoren (structuren) een rol spelen in planning bij jonge kinderen, maar dat een 
procesmatige aanpak van planning ietwat onderbelicht is gebleven. Vanuit het 
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onderzoek naar prospectie is daarvoor wel een goede basis gelegd, waarbij wordt 
verondersteld dat planning op een natuurlijke wijze voortkomt uit vroege processen van 
perceptie, actie en cognitie. 
Handelingen vinden altijd plaats in een omgeving die vanwege diens complexe 
eigenschappen (t.w. ontoegankelijkheid, onvoorspelbaarheid, niet-episodischheid, 
dynamica en continuïteit) een aantal specifieke eigenschappen van een doelgerichte 
‘agent’ verwachten om effectief en efficiënt te kunnen opereren. De consequenties zijn 
kortweg dat de agent zowel gebruik moet maken van opgedane kennis van de omgeving 
alsook van directe (d.w.z. real-time) informatie over die omgeving. En dat deze 
informatie op een of andere manier moet samenkomen in een continu en dynamisch 
proces dat doelgerichte handelingen aanstuurt. Een manier waarop doelspecifieke en 
handelingsrelevante kennis over de wereld wordt verkregen en kan worden ingezet 
wordt voorgesteld door het ideomotor principe. Dit principe veronderstelt de (vroege) 
acquisitie van zogenaamde actie-effect relaties (contingenties). Dit zijn relaties tussen 
een handeling en het daardoor veroorzaakte effect in de omgeving die, doordat ze 
samenvallen in de tijd, aan elkaar worden gekoppeld (handeling  effect). Omdat 
wordt verondersteld dat deze relaties bi-directioneel zijn, kunnen ze in een later stadium 
worden ingezet om doelgerichte handelingen te initiëren. Door namelijk op een bepaald 
effect te anticiperen (doelkeuze), zal ook de gekoppelde handeling worden geactiveerd 
(effect  handeling). 
Het ideomotor principe kan worden ingebed in een theorie over planning en 
controle van doelgericht handelingen die planning ziet als off-line (d.w.z. gedreven door 
geheugen) en controle als on-line (d.w.z. gedreven door sensomotorische informatie). 
Deze twee processen worden verondersteld sequentieel te zijn in de tijd. Een andere 
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theorie veronderstelt een meer dynamische wisselwerking tussen drie controleniveaus 
(t.w. planning, timing en controle), die bovendien alledrie rechtstreeks sensorisch 
gekoppeld zijn aan de omgeving. Deze theorie veronderstelt dus een volledige on-line 
sturing van doelgericht handelen. Het onderzoek gepresenteerd in het empirische deel 
van dit proefschrift is niet bedoeld als een expliciete toets van de gepresenteerde 
theorieën, noch om te beslissen welke van de twee de meest adequate is. Integendeel, bij 
het interpreteren en bediscussiëren van de resultaten van onze experimenten maken we 
volop gebruik van concepten en ideeën die zijn geïntroduceerd door beide theorieën. 
De vier empirische hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift (Hoofdstuk 2 tot en met 
Hoofdstuk 5) behandelen (globaal) twee hoofdpunten: De multi-causaliteit en multi-
tijdschaal dynamica die actie aandrijft, en in het bijzonder de rol van lange termijn 
factoren zoals doelen en voorkeuren op de keuzes die worden gemaakt voor uit te 
voeren acties. In dit proefschrift worden deze kwesties onderzocht vanuit een 
ontwikkelingsperspectief. Dat wil zeggen dat we kijken naar leeftijdsgerelateerde 
veranderingen om hieruit inzicht te verkrijgen in de onderliggende processen en de 
manier waarop deze processen met elkaar in interactie zijn. In het nu volgende zal ik 
kort de opzet, resultaten en interpretatie van het in de empirische hoofdstukken 
gepresenteerde onderzoek beschrijven. Dit wordt afgesloten met een samenvatting van 
het laatste concluderende hoofdstuk. 
Hoofdstuk 2 doet verslag van een enkel experiment waarin werd onderzocht hoe 
jonge kinderen een haak gebruiken om een object te verplaatsen dat op een tafel ligt. De 
kinderen die deelnamen aan het experiment waren gemiddeld 32.3 maanden oud. De 
kinderen werd gevraagd om de haak, die steeds opnieuw werd neergelegd op 
verschillende plekken en in verschillende oriëntaties, op te pakken en daarmee een 
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object te verplaatsen naar een eindlocatie op de tafel die ze zelf mochten kiezen. Door 
de eindlocatie voor het object vrij te laten probeerden we te achterhalen welke (andere) 
factoren van invloed zijn op de keuzes die kinderen maken tijdens het uitvoeren van de 
taak. De resultaten van het experiment lieten zien dat de manier waarop de kinderen de 
haak gebruikten om het object te verplaatsen niet werd bepaald door de manier waarop 
deze was neergelegd. Onafhankelijk van de beginconfiguratie prefereerden de kinderen 
de ‘insluitmethode’, dat wil zeggen het insluiten van het object in het gebogen gedeelte 
van de haak, wat een hoge mate van controle biedt. Wat dit aantoont is dat het werktuig 
functioneel werd waargenomen. Kinderen probeerden bijna altijd het object dichter naar 
zich toe te brengen. Om dit te doen gebruikten ze voornamelijk een bepaald type 
beweging dat heel effectief is en gemakkelijk te maken (zgn. ‘veegbewegingen’). De 
hand waarmee de kinderen de haak oppakten was bijna altijd de hand aan dezelfde kant 
als waar de haak lag. Toch werd de keuze van de hand op een subtiele manier ook 
beïnvloed door hun voorkeur voor de insluitmethode. Tijdens het verplaatsen van het 
object speelde ook de voorkeurshand een rol bij de handkeuze. Resumerend, de keuzes 
voor acties in deze taak werden beïnvloed door sensorische informatie over de initiële 
configuratie van de haak (i.h.b. voor handkeuze) en verschillende preferenties, 
waaronder handvoorkeur, insluitmethode en veegbeweging. 
Het hierboven beschreven experiment, waarin kinderen een werktuig moesten 
gebruiken dat eerst moest worden opgepakt en daarna worden gebruikt om een taak mee 
uit te voeren, is  een voorbeeld van een zogenaamde ‘meerstappen taak’ (hier: twee 
stappen). In het algemeen zijn dit taken waarbij meerdere handelingen moeten worden 
uitgevoerd (in verschillende fases) om tot het uiteindelijke doel te komen. Dit soort 
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taken zijn in het verleden ook al door andere onderzoekers gebruikt om planning bij 
jonge kinderen te bestuderen. 
In de in Hoofdstuk 3 gepresenteerde experimenten, onderzochten en gebruikten we 
het idee van de tweestappen taak om meer te weten te komen over planning van jonge 
kinderen. Aan dit onderzoek namen kinderen deel van twee leeftijdsgroepen: tweejaar 
oude kinderen en driejaar oude kinderen. In twee experimenten hebben we 
hoofdzakelijk gekeken naar de keuze van de hand bij het oppakken en daarna gebruiken 
van een eenvoudig handzaam werktuig in een doelgerichte taak. Zoals in het vorige 
experiment moesten de kinderen met het werktuig een object naar een eindlocatie op 
een tafel verplaatsen. Er zijn echter twee belangrijke verschillen met het vorige 
experiment. Ten eerste was er nu geen vrije eindlocatie voor het object, maar een 
voorbestemde eindlocatie: In sommige condities aan de linkerkant van het kind, in 
andere condities aan de rechterkant van het kind. Ten tweede waren er verschillen met 
betrekking tot het gebruikte werktuig: In Experiment 1 werd een (rechte) stok gebruikt, 
terwijl in Experiment 2 een haak werd gebruikt, die in verschillende initiële oriëntaties 
werd neergelegd. Deze aanpak stelde ons in staat om het effect te onderzoeken dat 
variaties in werktuig gerelateerde informatie in combinatie met doel gerelateerde 
informatie hebben op de keuzes die kinderen maken (i.h.b. de handkeuze). De resultaten 
lieten leeftijdsverschillen zien in de manier waarop de twee informatiebronnen (m.b.t. 
haak en doel) de keuze voor de hand beïnvloeden in de verschillende fases van de taak 
(oppakken en verplaatsen). Dit hoofdstuk wordt afgesloten met een eerste ruwe schets 
van een dynamisch actieselectie mechanisme dat de handkeuze aanstuurt. Dit proces 
integreert verschillende factoren die zowel intern (b.v. motorische voorkeuren en 
handigheid) als extern (d.w.z. sensorisch) zijn aan het actiesysteem van het kind. 
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Om tot een completer beeld te komen van actieplanning, voerden we nog twee 
experimenten uit die hebben geleid tot het opstellen van een dynamisch model van 
handkeuze bij volwassenen. Dit wordt gerapporteerd in Hoofdstuk 4. In Experiment 1 
werden linkshandige en rechtshandige (volwassen) proefpersonen gevraagd om een 
aantal keren met één hand een klein blokje op te pakken van de tafel. Nadat er een 
duidelijke verandering werd toegepast op de positionering van het blokje, zagen we dat 
beide groepen (RH en LH) ‘bleven hangen’ in de eerdere handkeuze. Dit wordt wel 
‘perseveratie’ genoemd (Engels: perseveration). In Experiment 2 waren er twee 
condities. In de ene conditie werd het blokje in een opeenvolgende reeks van negen 
trials in de richting van de wijzers van de klok neergezet van links naar rechts, ofwel in 
de tegenovergestelde richting van rechts naar links. In dit experiment vonden we een 
spatiële verplaatsing (of shift) van het punt waarop de proefpersonen besloten om van 
een linkshandige naar een rechtshandige greep over te gaan en vice versa. Het 
voorgestelde model implementeert de multi-tijdschalen dynamica van het actieselectie 
proces dat de handkeuze aanstuurt. Het model combineert twee mechanismen, ‘limb 
dominance’ (handvoorkeur) en ‘attentional information’ (informatie uit aandacht) die 
eerder al zijn voorgesteld als drijvende kracht achter handkeuze. Gebruikmakend van 
het model waren we in staat om onze experimenten te simuleren en de resultaten te 
reproduceren. Daarenboven hebben we een eerder experiment weten te simuleren, door 
middel van een koppeling van de sterkte en de richting van de handvoorkeur tot één 
concept binnen het dynamische model. Een aantal van de belangrijke aspecten van het 
model is geïnspireerd op de meer algemene dynamische veldentheorie, die eerder (o.a.) 
al succesvol werd toegepast bij het modelleren van de beroemde A-niet-B taak. 
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Hoofdstuk 5 rapporteert een empirische test naar perseveratie in de handkeuze bij 
14-, 24- en 36-maanden oude kinderen. Daarnaast presenteert dit hoofdstuk een 
uitbreiding van het dynamisch model. In het experiment werd aan de kinderen gevraagd 
om verschillende keren een lepel te pakken met één hand. In het eerste gedeelte van het 
experiment waren er twee (training) condities: Oftewel de lepel werd vier keer aan de 
rechterkant van het kind aangeboden met de steel naar rechts wijzend, oftewel vier keer 
aan hun linkerkant met de steel naar links wijzend. Na beide trainingscondities werd de 
lepel nog twee keer aangeboden op de middenlijn van het kind. Deze opzet stelde ons in 
staat om vast te stellen of de handkeuze van de kinderen werd beïnvloed door eerdere 
keuzes. Dat wil zeggen of de kinderen persevereerden in hun handkeuze. De richting en 
sterkte van de handvoorkeur van de kinderen werd vastgesteld in een derde conditie, 
waarin de lepel vijf keer werd aangeboden op de middenlijn met de steel naar het kind 
toe wijzend. Het model is een uitbreiding van het eerder in Hoofdstuk 4 gepresenteerde 
model, om de leeftijdsveranderingen in de sterkte van de handvoorkeur erin te kunnen 
opnemen. Het model stelde ons in staat het experiment te simuleren en de resultaten 
ervan te repliceren. Tenslotte worden de resultaten van het experiment en de implicaties 
bediscussieerd in de context van de zich ontwikkelende actieselectie in doelgericht 
handelen. 
Tenslotte, bespreekt de epiloog van dit proefschrift, beschreven in Hoofdstuk 6, 
drie onderwerpen die eerder al werden aangesneden of aangekondigd in het 
introductiehoofdstuk. Deze onderwerpen geven aanleiding tot een verdere discussie 
over de ontwikkeling van actieplanning. Om te beginnen wordt in dit hoofdstuk de 
invloedrijke benadering van planning vanuit het perspectief van probleem oplossen 
(‘problem solving’) behandeld. Daarna worden enkele kritische kanttekeningen gemaakt 
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bij het ideomotor principe als algemeen principe voor ontwikkeling. Ter afsluiting 
wordt de discussie over planning en controle van actie opnieuw opgepakt en bekeken 
vanuit een iets andere (nieuwe) invalshoek. Gebaseerd op eigen onderzoek en dat van 
anderen wordt er een proces van actieselectie voorgesteld dat ten grondslag ligt aan alle 
doelgericht handelen en dit handelen aanstuurt. Dit actieselectie proces is een 
overkoepelend proces dat zowel planning en controle van actie omvat. Typische 
eigenschappen van dit proces die worden besproken zijn multi-causaliteit, dynamica, 
continuïteit en dat het zich ontwikkelt met leeftijd. 
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De omslag van een proefschrift draagt maar één naam. Toch is het niet het product van 
een volstrekt solitaire bezigheid. In tegendeel, het is een schoolvoorbeeld van het feit 
dat ideeën (even in het midden gelaten of ze goed of slecht zijn) nooit in een 
enkelvoudig brein worden geboren. Enkele personen wil ik in het bijzonder bedanken. 
Ad, door jouw toedoen kwam ik op het einde van m’n studie naar de vakgroep 
Ontwikkelingspsychologie. Er was recentelijk vernieuwend werk verschenen waar we 
uitvoerig over aan de praat raakten. Dit is exemplarisch voor de manier waarop onze 
samenwerking de aflopen jaren steeds is geweest. Gebaseerd op een gedeelde interesse, 
maar vooral ook in een ontspannen en plezierige sfeer en met veel discussie! Over het 
onderzoek en allerlei andere zaken. Om je een voorstelling te kunnen laten maken hoe 
ik onze gesprekken waardeer, wil ik het vergelijken met het lezen in een favoriet 
boek… Je leest er steeds weer iets in wat je aan het denken zet. En zoals dat gaat met 
zo’n boek, je blijft erin lezen omdat je nooit weet waar en wanneer je er iets nieuws in 
tegenkomt. Je leest er graag in, juist omdat je weet dat het zo is. Soms zoek je er iets in 
op en soms kom je iets tegen zonder dat je wist wat je zocht, of zelfs dat je iets zocht. 
Kees van Lieshout, je was slechts op een achtergrond bij het project betrokken. 
Toch heb je het op die manier mogelijk gemaakt dat ik mijn werk met plezier kon doen 
en dat mijn onderzoek tot ontplooiing kon komen. Ik kwam de vakgroep binnen met een 
compleet andere achtergrond… Misschien wel als een vreemde eend in de bijt? Bedankt 
voor het vertrouwen! 
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denken in de sociale wetenschappen (en soms ook ver daarbuiten). Iedere 
vrijdagmorgen, vaste prik. Iets om naar uit te kijken. Altijd discussie (vanaf slide 1)! Ik 
hoop nog lange tijd te kunnen blijven meedraaien. 
Experimenteel onderzoek kan niet worden gedaan zonder proefpersonen. Aan alle 
kinderen die hebben deelgenomen aan de pilots en experimenten (en dat zijn er 
honderden!) en hun ouders ben ik daarom misschien wel de meeste dank verschuldigd. 
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noodzakelijke tegenwicht van de dagelijkse beslommeringen. Danielle, om deze 
beslommeringen samen te mogen ‘dragen’ met iemand zoals jij is een voorrecht! Om 
als ontwikkelingspsycholoog je eigen kinderen te zien opgroeien betekent dat je altijd je 
werk mee naar huis neemt. Proefpersonen en afleiding ineen, wat een luxe!? 
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